Stony Brook University - SUNY Digital Repository

Stony Brook University - SUNY Digital Repository Stony Brook University - SUNY Digital Repository

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ideology, and ideology must be challenged so as to reveal its economic and political consequences for individuals” (732). In the same year, C. H. Knoblauch would offer a similar conclusion about the “liberationist” potential upon the social and political and, through them, personal fronts of the Uncertainty that is born out of the dialectical, or, as he refers to it, “dialogical” nature of language and the “language user.” In this essay, “Rhetorical Constructions: Dialogue and Commitment,” Knoblauch writes: [T]he concept of language in dialectical relationship with the concept of language user, each conditioning the other within the contexts of material social reality and historical change. […] The life of language […] is a function of its users, yet its users are themselves constituted by the processes of language as well as by the other material and historical realities that language objectifies. […] The “world” that language presents to its users as an objectified condition both appears to be and is profoundly actual, immediate, material, and enveloping. Yet it is also wholly historical and dynamic, a human product upon which human beings make their impact. (134) For Knoblauch, the ultimate purpose of this perspective upon, and use of, language is the disciplining of a “critical consciousness,” a “self-aware and consciously ‘critical’ concern that understands the tendency in all social institutions to forget their origins in human activity, to forget their historicity and thereby monumentalize themselves at cost of human life” (135). Put simply, a “critical consciousness” would allow writers, through their writing, to “recogniz[e] our involvement in social reality while resisting wherever necessary 102

the tendency of that reality to make us or to make others less than fully human” (136). I believe Knoblauch defined, with Lil Brannon, such an end most profoundly in their book, Rhetorical Traditions and the Teaching of Writing, their repudiation of “classic” rhetoric and celebration of the “modern.” When discussing the influence of the “epistemological crisis of the seventeenth century” upon the rise of what they call “modern rhetoric” and its results, they write: The natural tendency of discourse is to explore, to progress from what is known to what is not yet known. The process of starting and interrelating assertions eventually takes the writer into new intellectual territory because it forces experiments in the making of connections that have not been made before. […] “Creative” writers are creative because they retain the imaginative flexibility needed to abandon earlier discourses in order to see things in new ways. The most powerful learning comes, not from the effort to validate some existing state of knowledge (though that is a useful activity), but from the discovery of a new conception which changes the very dimensions of knowledge. (72, emphasis mine) This is a promotion of Uncertainty as the beginning and the end of writing and thinking and learning - and very well better than I could have offered myself. Without it, it would seem, you are doing none of the three. Without it, writing exists simply as “a mechanical act of selecting prefabricated forms of preconceived content” (4), “a perfunctory, ceremonial exercise, not designed to discover new learning but only to recapitulate in decorous prose what people already know” (24). And without the likes of Berlin and Knoblauch and Brannon and those other critics and theorists – again, whether named or not - whose work 103

the tendency of that reality to make us or to make others less<br />

than fully human” (136). I believe Knoblauch defined, with Lil<br />

Brannon, such an end most profoundly in their book, Rhetorical<br />

Traditions and the Teaching of Writing, their repudiation of<br />

“classic” rhetoric and celebration of the “modern.” When<br />

discussing the influence of the “epistemological crisis of the<br />

seventeenth century” upon the rise of what they call “modern<br />

rhetoric” and its results, they write:<br />

The natural tendency of discourse is to explore, to<br />

progress from what is known to what is not yet known.<br />

The process of starting and interrelating assertions<br />

eventually takes the writer into new intellectual<br />

territory because it forces experiments in the making<br />

of connections that have not been made before. […]<br />

“Creative” writers are creative because they retain<br />

the imaginative flexibility needed to abandon earlier<br />

discourses in order to see things in new ways. The<br />

most powerful learning comes, not from the effort to<br />

validate some existing state of knowledge (though<br />

that is a useful activity), but from the discovery of<br />

a new conception which changes the very dimensions of<br />

knowledge. (72, emphasis mine)<br />

This is a promotion of Uncertainty as the beginning and the end<br />

of writing and thinking and learning - and very well better than<br />

I could have offered myself. Without it, it would seem, you are<br />

doing none of the three. Without it, writing exists simply as<br />

“a mechanical act of selecting prefabricated forms of<br />

preconceived content” (4), “a perfunctory, ceremonial exercise,<br />

not designed to discover new learning but only to recapitulate<br />

in decorous prose what people already know” (24). And without<br />

the likes of Berlin and Knoblauch and Brannon and those other<br />

critics and theorists – again, whether named or not - whose work<br />

103

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