Art Criticism - The State University of New York
Art Criticism - The State University of New York Art Criticism - The State University of New York
history must itself be rethought in order to introduce approaches that might better lead students towards critical engagement with their own visual culture. Reformatting the survey in such ways is therefore not only an act of pedagogical reform but a political move as well; it requires that we teachers, even as we introduce themes of study like sexual politics and pictorial mimesis, must give up our institutional role as the final jury and judge in matters of art-historical truth and openly celebrate the creativity and autonomy of student thought. This is not easy to do; for we have been deeply socialized into imposing our authority. But the well-being of our students demands that we try. Notes I Joseph Beuys, "Not Just a Few Are Called, But Everyone," in Art in Theory 1900- 1990: An Anthology of Changing Ideas, eds. Charles Harrison and Paul Wood (Oxford and Cambridge, Mass.: Blackwell, 1992), p.892. 2 For example, see The Art Journal 54 (Fall 1995), the entire issue of which is on "Rethinking the Introductory Art History Survey." 3 These themes reflect art history's ongoing self-reflexive "crisis." For a sampling of such concerns, see the theoretical and methodological essays thematically organized in each issue of The Art Bulletin between December 1994 and September 1997. 4 An earlier and shorter version of this essay was presented in a panel session titled "Wake Up!: Prompting Student Input in Art History Survey Courses" at the Southeastern College Art Conference held in Richmond, VA, October 1997. 5 See G. W. F. Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit, trans. A. V. Miller (Oxford: Oxford UP, 1977), pp.104ff. I borrow the felicitous term "integrity'~ from Charles Taylor, Hegel, (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1975), pp.l48ff. "Integrity" is an interpretive rendering in English of Hegel's phrase Gewij3enheit seiner selbst ' (certainty of self). In the necessarily schematic presentation that follows, I shall be eliding contemporary distinctions among and debates about self-confidence, self-esteem, and self-respect as they pertain to integrity of self and practices of mutual recognition. 6 Here I am invoking Marx's critical re-assessment of Hegel's notion oflabor. Whereas in his account of the master/slave relationship Hegel stresses that the slave recognizes himself in his labor even as his work is done on behalf of the master, Marx emphasizes that modern work under the conditions of capital and wage labor is "estranged" and "alienated"; see Karl Marx, The Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844, trans. Martin Milligan (New York: International, 1964), pp.106-119. 7 This is a Foucaultian manner of restating certain conditions of mutual recognition. On the power embodied in interactions, see Michel Foucault, "The Subject and Power" in Hubert L. Dreyfus and Paul Rabinow, Michel Foucault: Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics, 2nd ed., (Chicago: University of Chicago 116 Art Criticism
Press, 1983), pp.219-222; and on freedom as "maximized" in the minimization of unequal power distribution among the interacting agents, cf. idem, ''The Ethics of the Concern for Self as Practice of Freedom," in Ethics: Subjectivity and Truth, ed. Paul Rabinow (New York: The New Press, 1997), pp.281-301, especially pp.298-299. In my estimation, a crucial text for Foucault on these matters is Heidegger's discussion of the two poles of solicitude (Fiirsorge) in Being and Tune, trans. John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson (New York: Harper and Row, 1962), pp.l58-159. 8 On mutual recognition in the Hegelian corpus, see now Robert R. Williams, Hegel's Ethics of Recognition (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997). 9 Cf. Thomas McCarthy's interpretation of Habermas's theory of communicative as a refiguring of Kantian regulative ideals as operative ideals embodied in dialogic practices of argumentation, in his Ideals and Illusions: On Reconstruction and DeconstTUCtion in Contemporary Critical Theory (Cambridge, Mass. and London: MIT Press, 1991), pp.I-3 and passim. 10 What I am calling the "fundamental ethical promise of our times" is simply the achievement of self-integrity via regular practices of mutual recognition. Following implications in Habermas's reading of Hegel, 1. M. Bernstein has developed a similar account under the notion of modernity's "causality of fate"; see his Recovering Ethical Life: Jiirgen Habermas and the Future of Critical Theory (London and New York: Routledge, 1995), and idem, The Fate of Art: Aesthetic Alienation from Kant to Derrida and Adorno (University Park: The Pennsylvania State UP, 1992), p.284, n.46. See also the important discussion of honor, dignity, and the modern problemization of recognition in Charles Taylor, The Ethics of Authenticity (Cambridge, Mass. and London: Harvard UP, 1991), pp.46-52. 11 For analysis of the spectacle, see Guy DeBord, The Society of the Spectacle, trans. Donald Nicholson-Smith (New York: Zone, 1994). On spectacular consumption as oriented towards styling how one looks to the other, see Fredric Jameson, Signatures of the Visible (New York and London: Routledge, 1992), pp.11-12. And on the current mass media packaging of "rebel" identities, see Thomas Frank and Matt Weiland, eds., Commodify Your Dissent: Salvos from "The Ba.fJler"(New York and London: W. W. Norton, 1997). 12 Another way to put this is that the possession of commodities sustains identity more in line with "having" rather than ''being'' a self. \3 On the emergence in modernity of procedures of normalization, which includes the re-structuring of education, see Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison, trans. Alan Sheridan (New York: Vintage, 1979); and on pastoral power and its incorporation into modem governmentality, see idem, "Politics and Reason," in Politics, Philosophy, Culture: Interviews and Other Writings 1977-1984, ed. Lawrence D. Kritzman (New York and London: Routledge, 1988), pp.57-85. 14 See Immanuel Kant, "What is Enlightenment?," in On History, ed. Lewis White Beck, (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1963), pp.3-1 O. For a reworking of the themes of Kant's text, see Michel Foucault, "What is Enlightenment?," in Ethics: Subjectivity and Truth, pp.303-319. vol. 17, no. 1 117
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history must itself be rethought in order to introduce approaches that might<br />
better lead students towards critical engagement with their own visual culture.<br />
Reformatting the survey in such ways is therefore not only an act <strong>of</strong> pedagogical<br />
reform but a political move as well; it requires that we teachers, even as we<br />
introduce themes <strong>of</strong> study like sexual politics and pictorial mimesis, must give<br />
up our institutional role as the final jury and judge in matters <strong>of</strong> art-historical<br />
truth and openly celebrate the creativity and autonomy <strong>of</strong> student thought.<br />
This is not easy to do; for we have been deeply socialized into imposing our<br />
authority. But the well-being <strong>of</strong> our students demands that we try.<br />
Notes<br />
I Joseph Beuys, "Not Just a Few Are Called, But Everyone," in <strong>Art</strong> in <strong>The</strong>ory 1900-<br />
1990: An Anthology <strong>of</strong> Changing Ideas, eds. Charles Harrison and Paul Wood<br />
(Oxford and Cambridge, Mass.: Blackwell, 1992), p.892.<br />
2 For example, see <strong>The</strong> <strong>Art</strong> Journal 54 (Fall 1995), the entire issue <strong>of</strong> which is on<br />
"Rethinking the Introductory <strong>Art</strong> History Survey."<br />
3 <strong>The</strong>se themes reflect art history's ongoing self-reflexive "crisis." For a sampling <strong>of</strong><br />
such concerns, see the theoretical and methodological essays thematically<br />
organized in each issue <strong>of</strong> <strong>The</strong> <strong>Art</strong> Bulletin between December 1994 and<br />
September 1997.<br />
4 An earlier and shorter version <strong>of</strong> this essay was presented in a panel session titled<br />
"Wake Up!: Prompting Student Input in <strong>Art</strong> History Survey Courses" at the<br />
Southeastern College <strong>Art</strong> Conference held in Richmond, VA, October 1997.<br />
5 See G. W. F. Hegel, Phenomenology <strong>of</strong> Spirit, trans. A. V. Miller (Oxford: Oxford<br />
UP, 1977), pp.104ff. I borrow the felicitous term "integrity'~ from Charles<br />
Taylor, Hegel, (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1975), pp.l48ff. "Integrity" is an<br />
interpretive rendering in English <strong>of</strong> Hegel's phrase Gewij3enheit seiner selbst '<br />
(certainty <strong>of</strong> self). In the necessarily schematic presentation that follows, I shall<br />
be eliding contemporary distinctions among and debates about self-confidence,<br />
self-esteem, and self-respect as they pertain to integrity <strong>of</strong> self and practices <strong>of</strong><br />
mutual recognition.<br />
6 Here I am invoking Marx's critical re-assessment <strong>of</strong> Hegel's notion <strong>of</strong>labor.<br />
Whereas in his account <strong>of</strong> the master/slave relationship Hegel stresses that the<br />
slave recognizes himself in his labor even as his work is done on behalf <strong>of</strong> the<br />
master, Marx emphasizes that modern work under the conditions <strong>of</strong> capital and<br />
wage labor is "estranged" and "alienated"; see Karl Marx, <strong>The</strong> Economic and<br />
Philosophic Manuscripts <strong>of</strong> 1844, trans. Martin Milligan (<strong>New</strong> <strong>York</strong>: International,<br />
1964), pp.106-119.<br />
7 This is a Foucaultian manner <strong>of</strong> restating certain conditions <strong>of</strong> mutual recognition.<br />
On the power embodied in interactions, see Michel Foucault, "<strong>The</strong> Subject and<br />
Power" in Hubert L. Dreyfus and Paul Rabinow, Michel Foucault: Beyond<br />
Structuralism and Hermeneutics, 2nd ed., (Chicago: <strong>University</strong> <strong>of</strong> Chicago<br />
116<br />
<strong>Art</strong> <strong>Criticism</strong>
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