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ABSTRACT Title of Document: BRITISH MODERNIST ... - DRUM

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Whereas Genette’s discussion <strong>of</strong> homodiegetic external narration centers on firstperson<br />

narrative, which Barthes had argued was absurd or impossible, 23 Frobisher’s<br />

homodiegetic external narration is in the third person. That is, the possible absurdity<br />

<strong>of</strong> homodiegetic external narration is fully externalized: the self is not simply outside<br />

<strong>of</strong> the self’s own thoughts, but outside <strong>of</strong> its own body. Narrative theory traditionally<br />

gives narrators a certain power over the story, but unlike Maggie Verver, who is able<br />

to control her own story by narrating it, Frobisher, in narrating his own movements,<br />

cedes whatever power over them he might have had left. External narration <strong>of</strong> the self<br />

splits not only mind but body, eliminating any hierarchical connection between the<br />

two. Of course, this homodiegetic external third-person narration is itself contained<br />

within homodiegetic internal first-person narration, creating a multi-leveled<br />

polyautonarration. An older Frobisher remains the first-person narrator <strong>of</strong> the<br />

protagonist’s story, narrating the actions and thoughts <strong>of</strong> his younger self without<br />

resort to free indirect discourse or interior monologue, mimics his younger self’s<br />

attempts at objectivity. The diegetic doubling <strong>of</strong> the self is then, in turn, a further<br />

iteration <strong>of</strong> the split that occurs between diegetic narrator and protagonist. To narrate<br />

oneself is to create two selves. To multiply the self is to diffuse control <strong>of</strong> the self. It<br />

23 Barthes in his “Introduction to the Structural Analysis <strong>of</strong> Narratives” divides all narration into<br />

“personal” and “apersonal.” Third-person narratives are either personal or impersonal depending on<br />

whether a sentence may be translated into the first person with a simple substitution <strong>of</strong> pronouns.<br />

Barthes argues that the sentence, “the tinkling <strong>of</strong> the ice against the glass appeared to give Bond a<br />

sudden inspiration” cannot be so translated due to the impersonal nature <strong>of</strong> the verb “appeared”<br />

(Barthes 283). The verb “appeared” implies external narration: the narrator does not know whether<br />

the glass gave Bond an inspiration, whereas an internal narrator would know (or, rather, narrate)<br />

Bond’s true internal state, which cannot, from an internal point <strong>of</strong> view, be a matter <strong>of</strong> appearance.<br />

Of course, this line <strong>of</strong> argument implies a sort <strong>of</strong> unity and certainty about the internal self, a<br />

perfect knowledge <strong>of</strong> one’s own mental state by virtue <strong>of</strong> the internal point <strong>of</strong> view. The<br />

Unfortunates, as we see here, does not ascribe to this view <strong>of</strong> the self or the consciousness.<br />

193

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