Complete Cases Chart - Supreme Court of Canada - On the Identity ...

Case Name (Court)
(Judge)
Location/Method of Search Relevant Statutes Issues/Holdings
- (1) whether the search violates s. 8 of theCCharter? - Y/N
- (2) whether to exclude evidence by s. 24(2)? – Y/N
Reasoning
- (1) relevant to s.8 + CASES (Kokesch, Plant, Hunter, Tessling, Edwards)
- (2) relevant to 24(2) + CASES (Collins)
(not owner)
R. v. Silveira
[1994] 69 O.A.C. 296
Griffiths J.A.; Carthy
J.A. (con); Abella J.A.
(dis).
*affirmed - SCC
Property Search –
Home (garage)
R. v. Wijesinha
[1994] 66 O.A.C. 356
Galligan J.A.;
Goodmann and Abella
JJ.A. (con).
* affirmed - SCC
seized and monitored a cell
phone/pager found in the
girlfriend’s car.
- Police conducted
surveillance of the appellant,
who was suspected of drug
trafficking, for several days.
- Because they feared
evidence would be destroyed,
police entered the appellant’s
family home without a
warrant, in violation of his
reasonable expectation of
privacy.
- The accused was then
charged with drug trafficking
and possession.
- The accused was a lawyer,
and was surveilled by a
police informant wearing a
bodypack recorder.
- Narcotics Control Act, s.
10;
- Charter, ss. 7, 8, 9, 10(b).
- Criminal Code, ss.
139(2), 183;
- Charter, ss. 8, 24(2).
• NO
- Did the search and seizure violate s.8?
• YES
- (2) Should the evidence be excluded?
• NO
- (1) Did the recording violate s.8?
• YES
- (2) Should the evidence be excluded?
• NO
privacy in the girlfriend’s house and he had his own key.
- Ref. to Hunter v. Southam (“reasonableness” in s.8 protection).
- (1) Police entered the residence uninvited and without a warrant), therefore the
initial entry was a trespass.
- (2) The warrantless search was of little detriment to the appellant.
- Ref. to Kokesch (factors re admissibility of evidence: manifest culpability of the
appellant and a low level of intrusion into reasonable expectation of privacy).
- Dissent (Abella): The evidence should have been excluded under s. 24(2) because
there was a high reasonable expectation of privacy. Police are to be allowed strategic
latitude but not where lawful alternatives are available (enough information existed
to obtain a search warrant much earlier).
– Ref to Hunter v. Southam (it is rare for individuals to have a low reasonable
expectation of privacy).
- (1) The Court referred to LaForest J. in Duarte: in microphoning conversations,
reasonable expectation of privacy turns on whether the speaker spoke in
circumstances where it was reasonable to expect their words would only be heard by
the persons being addressed.
- Given that the appellant is a former Crown Attorney, he would have a reasonable
expectation that police officers would not participate in unlawful activities,
suggesting s. 8 may not apply at all
Surveillance –
Recorder
SC of PEI – APPEAL DIVISION
Dyne Holdings Ltd.
v. Royal Insurance
Company of
Canada
[1996] 135 D.L.R.
(4th) 142
Carruthers
C.J.P.E.I.; Mitchell,
- An insured company sought
a declaration that it was
entitled to have its insurers
defend it in an action
commenced by a third party.
- According to the insured,
the statement of claim alleges
the plaintiff suffered personal
injury arising out of oral or
- Prince Edward Island
Rules of Court, 1990, Rule
61.05(1)(c), 61.05(3).
- No ruling on s.8 or 24(2). - Ref. to Hunter v. Southam (the existence of a right to privacy consisting of the
right to be let alone and to be secure against encroachment upon one’s reasonable
expectation of privacy).
- Ref. to O’Connor (there currently exists no tort for the infringement of privacy:
any legal remedy depends on the circumstances of the case and the conflicting rights
involved. Established torts may be given a wider meaning in order to recognize
privacy interests).
- There is no duty on Commercial, but there is a duty on Royal and Continental, to
defend the appellants.
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