Complete Cases Chart - Supreme Court of Canada - On the Identity ...

Case Name (Court)
(Judge)
Location/Method of Search Relevant Statutes Issues/Holdings
- (1) whether the search violates s. 8 of theCCharter? - Y/N
- (2) whether to exclude evidence by s. 24(2)? – Y/N
Reasoning
- (1) relevant to s.8 + CASES (Kokesch, Plant, Hunter, Tessling, Edwards)
- (2) relevant to 24(2) + CASES (Collins)
(without warrant)
R. v. Belnavis
1996 CanLII 4007
(ON C.A.)
Doherty J.A.;
Osbourne and Austin
JJ.A. (con).
*Affirmed SCC
Vehicle Search
- The accused was driving a
car with a U.S. license plate
and was speeding.
- Police pulled the car over
and found garbage bags full
of stolen goods.
- The accused was arrested
based on a warrant for
outdtanding traffic fines.
- Charter, ss. 8 and 24(2). - (1) Was the vehicle search an arbitrary
detainment and did it violate s.8?
• YES
- (2) Should the evidence be excluded?
• NO
- (1) Belnavis had a reasonable expectation of privacy with respect to the vehicle
and the search was therefore not authorized by law.
- Belnavis' arrest on a warrant for the outstanding traffic fines justified her continued
detention and could have justified the towing of the vehicle back to the police
station. It could not, however, justify a search of the vehicle, since a search could
only be said to be incidental to an arrest if it served some purpose connected to the
arrest.
- (2) There was no element of self-conscription in the procural of the material from
the car. The material pre-existed the Charter breach and did not emanate from
Belnavis.
- Belnavis was lawfully detained throughout.
- The admission of this evidence did not render the trial unfair, even if it was
obtained based on an unconstitutional search.
R. v. Maffei
1994 CanLII 300 (ON
C.A.)
Brooke, Finlayson
and Austin JJ.A.
* final level
Identity/search of the
person – Blood
Samples
R. v. Edwards
[1994] 88 O.A.C. 321
McKinlay J.A.;
Finlayson J.A. (con);
Abella J.A. (dis).
* affirmed SCC
Property – Home
- The accused caused a fatal
car crash.
- He was taken to hospital
and, while there, a doctor
took a blood sample.
- Police seized the samples
and used them as evidence
against the accused.
- The police searched the
home of a suspect’s
girlfriend.
- They seized drugs and
arrested the girlfriend.
-The suspect (the appellant)
was driving with a suspended
license and was later arrested.
- Without a warrant, police
- Charter, ss. 8, 24(2). - (1) Did the police’s taking of the blood
sample violate s. 8 of the Charter?
- Narcotics Control Act, s.
4(2).
- Charter, ss. 7, 8, 9, 10(b),
24(2).
• NO
(2) Should the evidence be excluded?
• NO
- (1) Did the seizure of the phone/pager
violate s.8?
• NO (with regard to the appellant, but the
girlfriend has standing to challenge).
- (2) Should the evidence (drugs in the
apartment) be excluded?
- Ref. to Kokesch (police must act in good faith when conducting a search).
- Ref. to Edwards (totality of circumstances test).
- Ref. to Hunter (s. 8 protects reasonable expectation of privacy; a warrantless
search is presumed to be unreasonable).
- (1) The blood sample came into existence for legitimate medical purposes and, as
such, was real evidence that existed prior to, and irrespective of, the subsequent
seizure and resulting Charter breach.
- (2) The police officer acted conscientiously and in good faith in pursuing his
investigation and any breach of the appellant's Charter rights was inadvertent.
- The administration of justice is not brought into disrepute by admitting into
evidence the test results of the blood samples.
- (1) The existence of a reasonable expectation of privacy depends on a contextual
analysis of the totality of the circumstances.
- The Court supports the trial judge’s finding of reasonable and probable grounds to
arrest the accused for drug possession. (The trial judge found a violation of the
girlfriend’s rights, but not of those of the appellant since he had no reasonable
expectation of privacy in his girlfriend’s apartment).
- Dissent (Abella): There is a s.8 violation and the evidence should be excluded. The
couple’s three year relationship affords the appellant a reasonable expectation of
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