Complete Cases Chart - Supreme Court of Canada - On the Identity ...

Case Name (Court)
(Judge)
Location/Method of Search Relevant Statutes Issues/Holdings
- (1) whether the search violates s. 8 of theCCharter? - Y/N
- (2) whether to exclude evidence by s. 24(2)? – Y/N
Reasoning
- (1) relevant to s.8 + CASES (Kokesch, Plant, Hunter, Tessling, Edwards)
- (2) relevant to 24(2) + CASES (Collins)
2636
Goldie J.A.; Rowles
and Huddart JJ.A.
(con).
* Final Level
Property - vehicle
R. v. Piche
[1996] B.C.J. No.
2600
Gibbs J.A.;
McEachern and Legg
JJ.A. (con).
*Final Level
Identity/Search of
Person (body search)
R. v. Hutchings
[1996] B.C.J. No.
3060
McEachern C.J.B.C.;
MacFarlane and
Prowse JJ.A. (con).
*Final Level (leave to
appeal dismissed at
SCC)
Property search-
Home
(Hydro/Electrical/
- His vehicle was ticketed and
towed pursuant to the
Impounding Bylaw, and he
had to pay $17 to retrieve it.
-Brazier claims that s. 3(a) of
the Impounding Bylaw
violated his rights under
section 8 of the Charter.
- The accused was charged
with a robbery committed by
a masked man.
-After the accused was
caught by police they found a
bag with lots of money in his
pants.
- The accused couldn’t say
where the money had come
from or where he lived.
- He was then taken to the
police station and detained.
- While detained, the police
investigated the money found
on the accused and
discovered the bills were
marked as coming from a
bank.
- Police set up surveillance of
a property, but saw nothing
indicating the barn was used
for a large cannabis
cultivation operation, as
alleged by an informant.
- The RCMP contacted BC
Tel, which verified that the
phone was registered to
Hutchings' sister.
- Hydro records showed the
barn's electrical consumption
was low, which suggested
that electrical power was
• NO
- Charter, ss. 7, 8, 9. - (1) Was the accused’s s. 8 Charter right
violated in that the officer had no reasonable
or probable grounds to search and seize the
money and to make further inquiries
regarding its origin?
- Charter, ss. 8, 10(b);
- Criminal Code, s.
686(1)(b)(iii);
- Narcotic Control Act.
• NO
- (2) Should the evidence be excluded?
• NO
- (1) Was there a violation of s. 8 of the
Charter with respect to the hydro bill,
telephone information or the FLIR?
• NO
authorized by law and the law is reasonable in light of its purpose and need.
- Ref. to Hunter (s. 8 protects reasonable expectation of privacy).
- (1) The appellant had little or no expectation of privacy in respect of the money
given that it had been in the custody of the police since his initial lawful arrest.
- (2) However, even if the search and seizure violated section 8 of the Charter, the
evidence should be admitted becausethe admission of the evidence would not bring
the administration of justice into disrepute.
- (1) The telephone number did not disclose Hutchings’ personal “core” information
(as discussed in Plant), and it did not qualify as information for which he had a
reasonable expectation of privacy.
• Hutchings' reasonable expectation of privacy with respect to the property was
lessened by the hydro bills which gave hydro a right of entry (Benham case).
• Hutchings had no reasonable expectation of privacy regarding the escape of heat
from the barn (FLIR didn’t reveal any new information and just aided the naked
eye to see what was being emitted from the house – see also Binnie’s argument in
Tessling)
• There was sufficient admissible evidence in the information to justify issuing the
warrant for the barn.
- Ref. to Plant (core biographical information).
- Ref. to Tessling (can’t have reasonable expectation of privacy in the heat
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