Complete Cases Chart - Supreme Court of Canada - On the Identity ...

Case Name (Court)
(Judge)
Location/Method of Search Relevant Statutes Issues/Holdings
- (1) whether the search violates s. 8 of theCCharter? - Y/N
- (2) whether to exclude evidence by s. 24(2)? – Y/N
Reasoning
- (1) relevant to s.8 + CASES (Kokesch, Plant, Hunter, Tessling, Edwards)
- (2) relevant to 24(2) + CASES (Collins)
(con).
*Final Level
Property - Home
(Hydro by-pass)
search his house, police were
unable to show the accused
an actual copy of the warrant.
- (2) Should the evidence be excluded?
• YES
demonstrated the inattention of the police to the accused's rights.
- (2) Admission of the evidence obtained by this kind of unwarranted search could
bring the administration of justice into disrepute if the courts allowed this kind of
police conduct, and it was therefore excluded.
R. v. Mooring
[1999] B.C.J. No.
1557
Prowse J.A.;
McEachern and Goldie
JJ.A. (con).
* Final Level
Surveillance
Wiretap/
Procedural Fairness
R. v. Vu
1999 BCCA 182,
McEachern C.J.B.C.;
MacFarlane and
Goldie JJ.A. (con).
*Final Level
Identity/Search of
Person
(Photograph/
identity) – this is not
the case we have on
computer
- The accused was convicted
of murder based on evidence
from unreliable witness, who
gave evidence of a
conversation he had with
Mooring in which Mooring
allegedly confessed to
shooting someone.
- The convictions were also
partly based on Mooring's
intercepted communications,
but Mooring was not named
in the wiretap authorization.
- An undercover officer
purchased cocaine from the
accused at a residential
dwelling.
- Two officers then went to
the premises without a
warrant and questioned the
accused about an assault.
- The officers noted that the
accused’s face and clothing
matched the description
provided by the undercover
officer.
- The accused was arrested
and photographed.
- The undercover officer
testified that she had not used
the photographs to refresh her
memory of the accused.
- Criminal Code, ss. 185,
185(1)(e), 186(4)(a),
186(4)(b), 186(4)(c),
686(1)(b)(iii);
- Charter, ss. 8, 24(2).
• Charter, ss. 8, 24(2).
- (1) Did the wiretap recording of the accused
violate s. 8?
• YES
- (2) Should the evidence be excluded?
• YES
- (1) Was going up to the accused door,
knocking, then taking a physical description
of the accused a violation of his reasonable
expectation of privacy per s. 8 of the Charter?
• NO
- (2) Should the evidence be excluded?
• NO
- Ref. to Hunter (s. 8 protects people and not things or places; people are entitled to
a reasonable expectation of privacy).
- (1) The accused was acquitted of the murder charges.
• Although it authorized the interception of the accomplice’s communications, the
wiretap warrant did not authorize an interception in respect of Mooring and
therefore it violated his reasonable expectation of privacy.
- (2) The quality of the wiretap evidence was so poor, incomplete and
incomprehensible, that it should not have been admitted.
• The witness was unreliable, but the information given was not so devoid of
reliable content as to be inadmissible on the grounds that it would bring the
justice administration into disrepute.
- Ref. to Ferris
- (1) The conduct of the officers was reasonable, as they had reasonable grounds to
believe that an offence had been committed.
• Walking to the door and knocking on it constituted a minimal interference with
the privacy interest of the occupant.
• Looking at people and taking a physical description of those who answer the
door are non-intrusive techniques for determining the characteristics of the
accused.
- (2) Looking at the person who answers the door is a non-intrusive technique and
was not characterized as conscriptive.
• The evidence should be admitted in any event under section 24(2) of the Charter.
• Rejecting this evidence on the basis of either trespass or "using the body" of the
accused for identification by simply looking at him in a non-invasive way would
clearly bring the administration of justice into serious disrepute.
- Ref. to Hunter (warrantless searches are presumed to be unreasonable; s. 8
protects a person’s reasonable expectation of privacy)
- Ref. to Kokesch (can’t obtain evidence through a Charter breach; police must act
in good faith in conducting searches).
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