Economic Regulation - IATA
Economic Regulation - IATA
Economic Regulation - IATA
Create successful ePaper yourself
Turn your PDF publications into a flip-book with our unique Google optimized e-Paper software.
08 - <strong>Economic</strong> <strong>Regulation</strong> 57<br />
This chapter discusses how the regulatory framework<br />
can become more flexible in order to attract timely and<br />
cost-effective investment into the industry. It outlines<br />
options to improve investment incentives for airports<br />
and ANSPs, but also highlights the importance of open<br />
and constructive consultation between the infrastructure<br />
providers and airline users over the design, cost, timing<br />
and financing of new investment.<br />
No ownership or regulatory approach for airports has<br />
yet demonstrated that it can deliver, in all circumstances,<br />
timely and cost-effective new investment. However,<br />
the regulatory structure is just one component in the<br />
investment decision. As such, it is important not to<br />
apportion excessive credit or blame to the regulatory<br />
structure for the level of investment undertaken.<br />
Nevertheless, regulation can have an influence on the<br />
focus of investment, helping to direct capital to where<br />
it is most needed to address capacity constraints. The<br />
investment climate has been relatively benign over the<br />
last ten years, with relatively low and declining interest<br />
rates.<br />
While this climate is unlikely to change significantly, there<br />
is little scope for further major declines in financing costs,<br />
raising the importance of factors such as regulation in<br />
providing a suitable climate for new and sustainable<br />
investment.<br />
STRUCTURAL AND REGULATORY<br />
CONSTRAINTS ON INVESTMENT<br />
The complexities and long timescales involved in<br />
designing and constructing major new airport and ANSP<br />
investments, along with external planning and approval<br />
processes if necessary, means that major investment<br />
projects will be undertaken and need to be remunerated<br />
across several regulatory time periods. Even smaller,<br />
quicker investments – for example, those designed to<br />
improve service quality rather than provide additional<br />
capacity – will look to receive a return across a longer<br />
time horizon than one regulatory period.<br />
Therefore, regulation – and in particular price-cap<br />
regulation – is argued by some to act as a constraint on<br />
investment (or an incentive for under-investment), partly<br />
due to the ‘hold-up’ problem whereby firms cannot be<br />
certain of returns in future regulatory periods and partly<br />
due to ‘ex-post opportunism’ by the regulated firm itself<br />
who may renege on part of the agreed capital expenditure<br />
in order to increase its return. For regulated prices to<br />
give the correct incentive for investment they should be<br />
at a level equal to the incremental cost of that capacity.<br />
However, with large and lumpy capital investment that<br />
could require sharp increases in charges and profits for<br />
the regulated company in the short-term, which would<br />
not be possible under price-cap regulation.<br />
However, as discussed in previous chapters, there is<br />
little evidence that price-cap regulation has constrained<br />
investment – indeed with the allowed cost-of-capital<br />
return sometimes being higher than the actual financing<br />
costs many firms have had an incentive to over-invest 24 .<br />
For airports such as London Heathrow, the key factors<br />
that have delayed new investment are environmental and<br />
planning constraints, not the regulatory structure.<br />
Indeed, there are other strategic factors that can help<br />
overcome the constraints of long-timescales upon<br />
investment 25 .<br />
• First, under-investment risks imposing significant<br />
additional internal and reputational costs on the firm if<br />
the airport or ANSP is currently congested – especially<br />
for hub airports, where congestion delays can, in the<br />
long-term, affect the willingness of transfer passengers<br />
to use that airport.<br />
24<br />
See Oxera, (May 2006), “The Future of Infrastructure <strong>Regulation</strong>”, Conference, London.<br />
25<br />
See D Starkie, “Investment Incentives and Airport <strong>Regulation</strong>”, in the December 2006 edition of the Utilities Policy Journal.