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SIGNS IN SOCIETY - STIBA Malang

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i6o<br />

I Social Theory and Social Action<br />

Comparison, Pragmatics, and Interpretation I 161<br />

totic options, each with serious implications for empirical work in the comparative<br />

vein.<br />

Despite the apparent newness of much comparative discourse, it would be<br />

an error to assume that comparison itself has no historical lineage. In fact, some<br />

form of comparative thinking can be located in almost any intellectual milieu,<br />

especially if the assertion of noncomparability is taken as a negative modality of<br />

comparison. Today, forms of comparison are typically distinguished by the absence<br />

or presence of historical connectedness: similar phenomena that are remote<br />

in space and time can be compared by a logic of analogy or parallelism, whereas<br />

phenomena that are known to share a developmental source or to have been in<br />

contextual interrelationship can be analyzed genealogically or historically (Marc<br />

Bloch 1967:47; Gould 1989:213). This clear-cut distinction between analogy<br />

and genealogy does not, however, fully characterize previous models of comparative<br />

discourse.<br />

It is easy to forget that for millennia the dominant mode of cross-cultural<br />

understanding, whether dealing with religion or any other cultural phenomena,<br />

was ethnocentrism, that is, the view that other societies can be placed on a continuum<br />

of familiar to strange, calculating out from one's immediate neighbors to<br />

the most remote peoples. Herodotus, commenting on the customs of Persia, notes<br />

that ethnocentrism frequently correlates with an assumption of moral superiority:<br />

Most of all they [Persians] hold in honor themselves, then those who dwell next<br />

to themselves, and then those next to them, and so on, so that there is a progression<br />

in honor in relation to the distance. They hold least in honor those<br />

whose habitation is furthest from their own. This is because they think themselves<br />

to be the best of mankind in everything and that others have a hold on<br />

virtue in proportion to their nearness; those that live furthest away are the<br />

most base. (Herodotus 1987:96)<br />

Herodotus himself, on the other hand, was quick to locate the source of much<br />

of Greek culture, especially its religion, in "barbarian" traditions of Persia and<br />

Egypt, proposing thereby a model of borrowing and diffusion that angered Greek<br />

chauvinists such as Plutarch, who complained, "not only is he [Herodotus] anxious<br />

to establish an Egyptian and a Phoenician Herakles; he says that our own<br />

Herakles was born after the other two, and he wants to remove him from Greece<br />

and make a foreigner out of him" (Plutarch, De Herodoti Malignitate, quoted in<br />

Bernai 1987:113).<br />

In medieval Arabic culture strictly linear ethnocentrism was modified by a<br />

systematic ecological determinism according to which societies were located in<br />

zones starting just above the equator (Al-Azmeh 1992). Those peoples enjoying<br />

the temporate climes of the middle zones (China, Arabia, India, etc.) are most<br />

favored, while those existing at the southern and northern extremes are victims<br />

of distemper—lethargy for black-skinned Africans and indolence for pale-<br />

skinned Slavs. According to Al-Azmeh, the rigor of application of this deterministic<br />

model of cross-cultural typology was itself conditioned by the Arab evaluation<br />

of the societies to be understood:<br />

It was a social judgement which ultimately determined the degree to which<br />

credence would be given to geographical determinism, and this determinism<br />

was applied mercilessly only in the construction of sheer barbarism, which was<br />

not merely a distemper with varying degree of severity, but fully a disnature.<br />

(Al-Azmeh 1992:8)<br />

The inherent difficulties of comparative understanding were well articulated<br />

by Jean-Jacques Rousseau, who, despite Lévi-Strauss 's (1976:33) pronouncement<br />

of his being the "founder of the science of man," warned that the period of European<br />

exploration would not likely yield reliable knowledge of other cultures<br />

because of the ethnocentric blinders of the observers:<br />

I am persuaded that we have come to know no other men except Europeans;<br />

moreover it appears from the ridiculous prejudices, which have not died out<br />

even among men of letters, that every author produces under the pompous<br />

name of the study of man nothing much more than a study of the men of his<br />

own country. . . . One does not open a book of voyages without finding descriptions<br />

of characters and customs, but one is altogether amazed to find that<br />

these authors who describe so many things tell us only what all of them knew<br />

already, and have only learned how to see at the other end of the world what<br />

they would have been able to see without leaving their own street, and that the<br />

real features which distinguish nations, and which strike eyes made to see<br />

them, have almost always escaped their notice. (Rousseau 1984:159)<br />

Rousseau did not, however, give up on comparison, for he thought that it would<br />

be possible to replace the biased vision of these "sailors, merchants, soldiers, and<br />

missionaries" (Rousseau 1984:159) with a true scientific study of other cultures<br />

that would yield increased self-knowledge. His own reflections on the origins of<br />

inequality, for instance, performed a shocking inversion of the more usual ethnocentrism<br />

by arguing that the degree of human inequality radically increases with<br />

civilization and that individuals eager for the institutional benefits of progress in<br />

fact "all ran toward their chains believing that they were securing their liberty"<br />

(Rousseau 1984:122; see J. E MacCannell 1981).<br />

With the expansion of European colonialism and its supporting ideological<br />

matrix of evolutionism in the nineteenth century, comparison of cultures frequently<br />

involved the paradoxical principles of differential development and genetic<br />

explanation. According to the first, societies pass through a sequence of<br />

stages of evolutionary progress ("savagery," "barbarism," and "civilization," in<br />

the terms of several key writers) culminating in the scientific rationalism of modern<br />

European culture; according to the second, inexplicable phenomena later in<br />

time are accounted for by uncovering their rational origins at an earlier point in

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