SIGNS IN SOCIETY - STIBA Malang
SIGNS IN SOCIETY - STIBA Malang
SIGNS IN SOCIETY - STIBA Malang
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ijz I Comparative Perspectives on Complex Semiotic Processes<br />
Rotfeld and Rotzoll (1980) the effects of five nationally distributed commercials<br />
were examined through questionnaires designed to ascertain what claims were<br />
communicated and whether claims independently judged to be puffs were believed.<br />
These researchers found that on average 39.6% of puffery claims were<br />
believed, and on average 11.4% of claims implied by puffs were also believed.<br />
For example 43% of the survey respondents believed the puff that St. Joseph's<br />
aspirin is "fast and gentle"; 62% believed that Kaopectate is "a lot of relief";<br />
and 69% beliëvëcTthat Head &C Shoulders shampoo "lathers nice." The conclusion<br />
drawn from this study was that the present legal definition of puffery as<br />
advertising messages not stating any factual claims is contradicted by empirical<br />
research. Rotfeld and Rotzoll do not argue, however, as I do here, that the consumer's<br />
contextually specific understanding is, in part, the result of ah ideology<br />
of'-commercial spiëécn"is'"Beïng, as a rule, referential.<br />
A second study conducted by Shimp (1978) focused on "incomplete com-<br />
«^. parative" statements, such as "Mennen E goes on warmer and drier.'* Aithough<br />
^ctffiFts have been stricter in ruling against such open-ended comparisons as allowable<br />
puffery, favoring to allow more obviously mflated claims in the superior<br />
degree ("the best," "the freshest," etc.), many comparatives do appear in commercials.<br />
Shimp found that consumers tend to believe that open-ended comparatives<br />
make claims, since they filled in the missing term themselves, as, for example,<br />
"Mennen E goes on warmer and drier than a lot of other spray<br />
deodorants." In this survey, 60% agreed that the ad claim was directly stated,<br />
and 38% believed that the claim was intended bu^joydirectly stated. This type<br />
of language is especially effective since it engagMjheœnsumeF-^-the^unwitting<br />
partner in propositional construction.<br />
Other experiments support the general contention that puffs are interpreted<br />
as true statements. Surveys by Bruskin Associates (cited in Rotfeld and Preston<br />
1981) found that people judged the statement in an Alcoa ad, "Today, aluminum<br />
is something else," to be completely true (47%), or partly true (36%). Similarly,<br />
the statement in a Hallmark ad, "When you care to send the very best," was<br />
rated as completely true by 62% of those surveyed, and the Kodak ad, "Kodak<br />
makes your pictures count," was judged completely true by 60%. In an experiment<br />
conducted by Rotfeld and Rotzoll (1981) consumers were presented with<br />
commercial advertisements containing factual claims ("helps control dandruff")<br />
and puffs ("makes hair look terrific"), the distinction having been previously de-<br />
Al*)termined by an independent group of legally trained "labelers." The respondents<br />
t H'^^f}^^ n o t t n a t t n e ^act a n^ fact-implied claims possessed greater credibility<br />
Vf&KX t n a n puffs and puff-implied claims. As these researchers conclude: "What<br />
does emerge is that puffery does not possess an inherent and distinct inability to<br />
be believed" (Rotfeld and Rotzoll i98i:ioT)r "—<br />
Experiments have shown that ads containing puffs are more likely to catch<br />
consumers' attention, that puffs which communicated little information did so<br />
The Semiotic Regimentation of Social Life I 153<br />
with high levels of confidence, and that puffs contributed to an overall higher<br />
evaluation of products in comparison with ads without puffs. Oliver (1979:14)<br />
summarizes these and other empirical studies of the effects of puffery:<br />
Specifically, the studies show that if ambiguous words or symbols of a superlative<br />
or inflated nature are used to describe Tp7c^rx,-peopIereither perceive «»—"""<br />
the implied content to be accurate (thus increasing the "certainty of the beliefs<br />
. . . ), demonstrate a" tendency to increase attribute levels or the evaluations<br />
of these same attribute levels, infer a greater number of highly rated attributes •""<br />
(inflating the favorable attribute set size), or rate the product higher than if an<br />
-J<br />
accurate description had been used (so that one's overall attitude or subsequent<br />
purchase intention is overrated).<br />
These results suggest that advertisers can use puffs to cause a product to be overappraised<br />
relative to the objective qualities the product has. This, in turn, provides<br />
a clue to the mechanism by which ads inculcate symbolic values not found<br />
in products independent from their ads: that this creativity is largely accom- ' ' (J 0% ,<br />
pushed through' puffery. ' w<br />
I have argued that three legal trends converge to destroy consumers' semiotic<br />
acuity in interpreting ads: (1) the puffery exception in the post-caveat emptor<br />
period, (2) the FTC's regulation of false and deceptive messages, and (3) the Supreme<br />
Court's extension of constitutional protection to commercial speech. Each<br />
of these trends in its own way reinforces the notion that commercial speech is<br />
informational, a notion shared by both sides of the debate over regulation. Voices<br />
in favor of government regulation stress the need for scrutiny to keep the messages<br />
truthful, while voices against regulation argue that regulations (such as a<br />
ban on all cigarette ads) constitute, in the words of an ACLU legal director, "paternalistic<br />
manipulation of the individual through governmental control of information<br />
. . . covertly manipulating that choice by controlling the flow of information<br />
about it" (cited in Lowenstein 1988:1222). What both sides of the debate<br />
overlook is that advertising as efficacious language succeeds in part by misdirecting<br />
consumers' attention away from awareness of persuasion by postulation of<br />
an ideology of reference and by constructing messages that appear to be propositional,<br />
as "indicatives without sentences" (Baudrillard 1990:94).<br />
There are two additional recent tendencies which must be noted briefly in<br />
conclusion. The first involves attempts to expand the regulatory aura to noninformational<br />
or "symbolic" dimensions of advertising. Some legal scholars have<br />
concluded that courts, legislatures, and regulatory agencies should reverse the<br />
contemporary move toward recognizing First Amendment protection for commercial<br />
speech and increase the degree of consumer protection by looking into<br />
not just factually false claims but the "symbolic" features of advertising as well.<br />
These critics realize that continued reliance on the assumption that advertising is<br />
informational guarantees that only a small part of the total communicative range<br />
of ads will be addressed. While the regulators at the FTC obviously view their<br />
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