SIGNS IN SOCIETY - STIBA Malang
SIGNS IN SOCIETY - STIBA Malang
SIGNS IN SOCIETY - STIBA Malang
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z8 I Foundations of Peircean Semiotics<br />
Peirce's Concept of Semiotic Mediation I 2Q<br />
representamen.<br />
interprétant,<br />
représentâmes<br />
itself, making it the object of another thought-sign. Thereupon, we can repeat<br />
the operation of hypostatic abstraction, and from these second intentions derive<br />
third intentions. (CP 4.549, 1906; cf. MS 283.146, 1905)<br />
object,<br />
objectj<br />
("ground")<br />
Figure 2.1. Hypostatic abstraction<br />
interpretant 2<br />
It is this third symbolic 3<br />
mode of relation between representamen and object<br />
that causes the asymmetry between determination and representation, since the<br />
first vector passes through the representamen to the interprétant at the same level<br />
of semiosis, while the second vector introduces a metasemiotic level at which the<br />
interprétant represents its object only by virtue of having formed a conception<br />
of the relation between the initial representation and the object. Because the interprétant<br />
is determined not just to represent the same object that the representamen<br />
represents but also to represent that object in the "same respect" and with<br />
the "same meaning" (although more highly determined), it must first form a representation<br />
of "second intention" in order to form a representation of first intention.<br />
4<br />
("Second intention" [intentio secunda] is a term used by medieval philosophers<br />
to refer to knowledge involving not the thing itself but the mental or<br />
linguistic act of knowing the thing.) Figure 2.1 suggests an approximation of this<br />
essential asymmetry and is to be interpreted as follows: all the vectors of determination<br />
and representation that existed in Figure 1.1 are assumed to be in place<br />
linking the three elements labeled with subscript 1. The second level of semiosis<br />
occurs when the interprétant] functions as a représentâmes by representing the<br />
relation between representamen] and object] as a new semiotic entity, namely,<br />
object2. The solid and broken arrows depict, respectively, the vectors of determination<br />
and representation at this second level of semiosis.<br />
Peirce has a technical term for what is labeled here object2, namely, the<br />
"ground" of the relation between representamen and object. The ground is some<br />
respect, character, reason, or quality that brings the sign into connection with its<br />
object (CP 5.283, 1868; cf. CP 2.228, C.1897; MS 732, sec.6). The power of<br />
the interprétant to create this new entity is called by Peirce "hypostatic abstraction,"<br />
since it involves taking a quality or predicate as an abstract subject. And<br />
this power is the key to the interpretant's capacity to fulfill its original charge of<br />
representing the same object with the same meaning that the first representamen<br />
does.<br />
That wonderful operation of hypostatic abstraction by which we seem to create<br />
entia rationis [mental entities] that are, nevertheless, sometimes real, furnishes<br />
us with the means of turning predicates from being signs that we think or think<br />
through, into being subjects thought of. We thus think of the thought-sign<br />
In shifting levels from red as a possible predicate or quality shared by representamen<br />
and object to redness conceived of as the ground of character of the sign<br />
relation between representamen and object, the interprétant exercises a synthetic<br />
function at the level of second intention. But, more important, in the special case<br />
described previously in which the sole relation connecting representamen and object<br />
is the relation of being represented by an interprétant, the ground of this<br />
relation is necessarily triadic, involving as it does the third element, the interprétant<br />
itself.<br />
And so here we have finally arrived at the derivation of semiosis at the symbolic<br />
level as triadic in the genuine sense: the interprétant must form a conception<br />
of the semiotic process itself that is not reducible to any dyadic relations existing<br />
independently of semiosis. And this triadic structure is the result of fully symbolic<br />
representation, since the function of creating a ground at the second level of semiosis,<br />
which becomes the basis for the connection of object and representamen,<br />
opens up Peirce's system to a universe of semiotic entities (Thirds) whose character<br />
of being differs vastly from that of both qualities (Firsts) and existing objects<br />
(Seconds).<br />
Semiotic Mediation and the Correlates of the Sign<br />
Peirce's comments on the nature of semiotic mediation can be located in his<br />
manuscripts, published articles, and reviews stretching from the early attempts<br />
to construct the categories of Firstness, Secondness, and Thirdness through his<br />
late writings on Pragmaticism. Historical examination of these references shows<br />
that Peirce shifted the emphasis on mediation between two general poles. The<br />
first pole focuses on the synthetic role of the interprétant in forming a represent,<br />
tation of the relation between the object and the representamen so that these two<br />
elements become linked in a semiotic web they would not be in by themselves;<br />
thus, the interprétant is said to be the "mediate representation" of the object of<br />
the sign relation taken as a whole. The second pole focuses on the idea of mediation<br />
by the representamen as the vehicle or medium of linkage between objects<br />
and further mental representation by interprétants. Thus, the sign itself, that is,<br />
the perceptible form, is said to mediate between object and interprétant, and the<br />
interprétant is mediately determined by the representation standing in place of<br />
the object. These two poles correspond to Peirce's twin concerns with, on the<br />
one hand, the level of semiosis and mediate representation and, on the other<br />
hand, chains of semiosis and mediate determination. Toward the end of his life<br />
Peirce gradually moved away from the doctrine of mediate representation and