SIGNS IN SOCIETY - STIBA Malang

z6 I Foundations of Peircean Semiotics
Peirce's Concept of Semiotic Mediation I 27
zation of the interprétant, so that the object is considered as the "determinant"
and the interprétant the "determinand" (MS 499). Thus, color is a determination
of an object, red is a determination of the color of an object, and scarlet is a
determination of the red color of an object (CP 1.464, 1896; CP 8.177).
Representation, in this triadic scheme, works in the opposite direction from
determination and is defined as the act or relation in which one thing stands for
something else to the degree that it is taken to be, for certain purposes, that
second thing by some interpreting mind. Because the representation substitutes
or is regarded as substituting for the object, the interpreting mind acquires
knowledge about the object by means of experience of the representing sign.
Peirce's notion of representation includes a broad range of phenomena:
The term representation is here to be understood in a very extended sense,
which can be explained by instances better than by definition. In this sense, a
word represents a thing to the conception in the mind of the hearer, a portrait
represents the person for whom it is intended to the conception of recognition,
a weathercock represents the direction of the wind to the conception of him
who understands it, a barrister represents his client to the judge and jury whom
he influences. (CP 1.553, l 8 é 7; cf. MS 389, c.1873)
Obviously there must be some constraint or limitation on the ability of an interpreting
mind to form representations of aspects of reality if these representations
are to afford true knowledge of that reality:
If a thing has whatever characters it has utterly regardless of what any men
existing either now or at any assignable future date may opine that its characters
are, that thing is, by definition, perfectly real. But in so far as it is whatever
the thinker may think it to be, it is unreal. Now I say that the object of a sign
must resist in some measure any tendency it may have to be as the thinker
thinks it. (MS 499)
This need for the object of the sign to "resist" the interprétante powers of representation
is answered in the definition of the sign relation cited earlier: the object
specifies the sign in a particular way so that the sign determines a third
element in a particular way, namely, that this third element (the interprétant)
represents or stands for the same object in similar respects that the sign represents
(see Figure 1.1).
It is important to note that the position of the sign or representamen is mediate
between the object and the interprétant both for the vector of determination
and for the vector of representation. Also, the triad of elements at one semiotic
moment implies a constant expansion of the process of semiosis as the interprétant,
in turn, acts so as to determine a further sign, becoming thereby a sign
to that further interprétant. It is clear why Peirce says, first, that the action of
the object upon the interprétant is "mediate determination" and, second, that the
interprétant itself is a "mediate representation" of the object. 2
The first is the
\ case since the specifying potential of the object must pass through the representa-
I men, which functions to convey or translate its determinate properties mediately
j to the interprétant. Wind blowing from the east determines a weathercock to
point in that direction and mediately determines a cognition in the mind of an
I observer who understands the function of the instrument that the wind is from
the east. The second is the case since the particular representation formed by the
interprétant of the object is constrained by the "stood for" relation already existing
between the representamen and the object; the accumulation of determined
qualities present in the object apart from all representation is attributed to the
sign of that object by the interprétant in the case of a true representation. Thus
the sign itself faces simultaneously in two directions: it faces toward the object
in a "passive" relation of being determined, and it faces toward the interprétant
in an "active" relation of determining (MS 793). This interlocking of the vectors
of representation and determination implies that the three elements in the sign
relation are never permanently object, representamen, and interprétant, but
rather each shifts roles as further determinations and representations are realized.
Semiosis is, thus, an "infinite process" or an "endless series" (MS 599.32,
ci902) in which the interprétant approaches a true representation of the object
as further determinations are accumulated in each moment. This process operates
in two directions, "back toward the object" and "forward toward the interprétant"
(MS 599.38, C.1902).
The object of representation can be nothing but a representation of which the
first representation is the interprétant. But an endless series of representations,
each representing the one behind it, may be conceived to have an absolute object
at its limit. ... So there is an infinite regression here. Finally, the interprétant
is nothing but another representation to which the torch of truth is
handled along; and as representation, it has its interprétant again. Lo another
infinite series. (CP 1.339 = NEM 4.309; cf. MS 599.33, c.1902; MS 792)
An important implication of the processual nature of semiosis is that there
is an inherent asymmetry in what can be termed the level of semiosis between
the vector of determination and the vector of representation. This asymmetry
derives from the fact that the representamen is fit to stand for the object in several
distinct ways. The representamen can be taken for the object because of a particular
quality or form which both share, and so in that respect they are practically
interchangeable (CP 1.558, 1867; CP 3.362, 1885). Alternatively, the spatial
or temporal position of a representamen may make it naturally fit to stand
for some object in the same experiential field. But Peirce recognizes a third pos^Tj
sible mode of relation between representamen and object that transcends both I
the realm of common quality and the realm of common context, and this is what I
j he calls a symbolic relation, in which the representamen and object are related H
I only because the interprétant represents them as related.
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