SIGNS IN SOCIETY - STIBA Malang

192. I Social Theory and Social Action
I / trary to analysts and necessary to actors. In fact, for an important part of West-
/ em social theory the positivist apprehension of convention involves the effort to
reduce arbitrariness to rational (Hobbes), practical (Morgan), or adaptive (Fox)
logic. As we have seen, naturalization of convention can be found even in theorists
who stress the importance of unconstrained agreement as the foundation of
social order. On the other hand, the ethnographic cases presented illustrate various
modes of articulation of the natural and conventional poles within societies.
Conventions of masculine domination operate hegemonically among the Baruya
so that women are trained to accept their subordination as an immutable result
of biological differentiation, while men concentrate on perpetuating the elaborate
rituals of indoctrination that ensure their legitimizing power. In Belau, conventions
are subject to hierarchical typification as a function of social rank; though
accepted as given, stable, and binding, "paths" of convention are essentially cultural,
without any naturalization to some extra-cultural standard. The French
example shows that conventions stipulating couttly behavior are viewed as second
nature by those who live and die by their social indexical implications. And
finally in the Russian case, the aristocratic class presents itself to the larger society
as if it were a foreign culture by adopting "poeticized" and idiosyncratic
forms of behavior and thereby encourages a contrasting ideology of naturalness
for rural, peasant life.
The tension between the naturalization of convention and the poeticization
of convention exhibited within societies makes it impossible to adopt a theoretical
stance which tries to reduce or transcend the opposition of nature and convention.
In other words, there can be no strictly positivist theory of society which
VV does not profoundly distort its object of inyesïïgatïolï."FuTthermore, arguments
' similar "to"that proposed by Roland Barthes (1967:89—98, 1972:115,
1983:285-86, i988b:i9o), according to which the naturalization of convention
is a process restricted to societies dominated by commodity fetishism, overlook
the obvious fact that naturalization occurs in all types of social formations and,
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conversely, that conventions can appear as arbitrary, fabricatecLTor "semiotic"
even in modern industrial societies (cf. Baudrillard 1981:158—59). There will
always be, to return to Plato's Cratylus, those who insist that the basis of social
convention is collective agreement and those who posit a natural or rational fitness
in existing rules and customs. But so long as this tension continues to be
observed by social theory we stand in little danger of the fate envisioned by
Markus for a philosophy which fails to see the nature/convention opposition as
a problem.
Notes
1. Peirce Divested for Nonintimates
1. Exemplary summaries of Peirce's semiotic theory can be found in Fisch 1986; Oehler
1981; Randsell 1977; Savan 1987-88; and Tejera 1988.
2. The classical traditions are surveyed in Eco 1984:2.6-33; Kretzmann 1974; Telegdi
1982; and Todorov 1982:15-35. On Peirce's use of the Stoic tradition see Cosenza 1988.
3. I cite Peirce's writings using the abbreviations established in Fisch I986:xi: CP: Collected
Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce (1931-1958); MS: Peirce manuscripts in the collection
of Harvard University, catalogued in Robin (1967); N: Charles Sanders Peirce: Contributions
to The Nation (1975-1979); NEM: The New Elements of Mathematics (1976); SS: Semiotic
and Signifies: The Correspondence between Charles S. Peirce and Victoria Lady Welby ( 1977);
W: Writings of Charles S. Peirce: A Chronological Edition (1982.-).
4. It is erroneous to say, as several commentators do, that the icon is a First, the index
a Second, and the symbol a Third. As signs, all three of these are triadic.
5. It is important not to think of icons, indices, and symbols as exclusive classes of signs.
As Fisch (1986:333) helpfully explains: "We may therefore call a sign, for short, by the name
of that element or aspect which is most prominent in it, or to which we wish to direct attention,
without thereby implying that it has no element or aspect of the other two kinds."
6. For further discussion of Peirce's views on language see Brock 1981; Dewey 1946;
Eco 1981; Jakobson 1980a; and Ransdell 1980.
2. Peirce's Concept of Semiotic Mediation
I. Several stylistic conventions need to be briefly noted. I use quotation marks to indicate
the first occurrence of a technical term from Peirce's often bizarre semiotic vocabulary. (Peirce's
own convention is to use capitalization). For bibliographic abbreviations see Note 3 in Chapter
I. Other studies of the development of Peirce's semiotic ideas include Deledalle 1986; Fisch
1986; Kloesel 1983; and Reiss 1984.
1. Peirce refined his definition of the sign constantly from 1867 to 1911. A few key
references include: CP 1.541, 1903; CP 2.228, 1897; CP 2.230, 1910; CP 2.274, 1902; CP
5.484, C.1907; CP 8.177-85, 1902; NEM 3.233, 1909; NEM 4.239, C.1904; NEM 4.297;
SS 31-33, 1904; SS 80—81, 1908; SS 196, 1906.
3. For "mediate determination" and "mediate representation" see, e.g., CP 1.553, ^ 6 7 ;
CP 6.347, 1909; NEM 3.233, 1909; NEM 3.867, 1909; NEM 3.886, 1908; NEM 4.242!
1904; SS 80—81, 1908; MS 2783.10; MS 283.128.
4. Ayer (1968:161) argues that Peirce is confusing because he "conflates" the view of
semiosis as an infinite series of sign production and the view of semiosis as an "infinite metalinguistic
hierarchy." It seems to me that Peirce never doubted that these are equivalent conceptualizations.
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