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SIGNS IN SOCIETY - STIBA Malang

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lyo I Social Theory and Social Action<br />

move in certain ways characreristic of people belonging to court society. (Elias<br />

1983:231-32)<br />

And since the king and the palace at Versailles were the focal point of the entire<br />

system, proper behavior of those at the lower reaches of the court hierarchy was<br />

rendered meaningful by being oriented toward the same point as was the behavior<br />

of their superiors.<br />

A final example of the institutional basis of conventionality comes from<br />

Lotman's (1985) analysis of Russian culture in the eighteenth century, a case in<br />

which the nobility went to extremes to highlight the hyper-conventionality of<br />

their behavior. Lotman begins by locating the natural/conventional distinction<br />

in two levels of behavior, everyday norms considered by members of society as<br />

ordinary, instrumental and "natural," on the one hand, and ceremonial, ritual,<br />

and nonpragmatic "poetic" behavior regarded as bringing to contexts of action<br />

an independent signification, on the other hand. While both levels are, from the<br />

point of view of an outside observer, fully conventional, the semiotic character<br />

of the former level vanishes from the actors' point of view, or so Lotman claims:<br />

When a language is first recorded and studied, descriptions of everyday speech<br />

are generally oriented toward rhe external observer. This correlation is not coincidental;<br />

like language, everyday behavior belongs to the sort of semiotic system<br />

that "native speakers" view as natural, a part of Nature and not Culture.<br />

Its semiotic and conventional character is apparent only to the external observer.<br />

(Lotman 1985:68)<br />

As the data Lotman presents reveal, however, this "external" perspective is not<br />

reserved for the theoretical observer but can characterize the perceptions of social<br />

groups who experience some significant "other" as proof of the relativity of<br />

custom.<br />

From the period of Peter the Great, Lotman documents a process in which<br />

the nobility increasingly adopted, even flaunted, behavior patterns borrowed<br />

from the European middle class, to the degree that they acted like foreigners in<br />

their own country. The motive for this seems to be that these nobles ensured that<br />

their conventional behavior could resist being naturalized through repetition precisely<br />

because it appeared foreign, thereby demanding—in a perfect reversal of<br />

Benveniste's argument—an attitude of externality. The resulting need for intensive<br />

instruction of children, the publication of manuals of polite conduct, and the<br />

value placed on learning foreign languages further differentiated nobility and<br />

peasants.<br />

This "semiotization of everyday behavior" took many forms, from the<br />

heightened theatricality of costume to the ritualization of what had previously<br />

been "natural" activity. What all these "poetic" forms of behavior had in common<br />

was the availability of alternative norms or styles, again contrasting with<br />

peasant behavior regulated by the invariable boundaries of the agricultural cycle.<br />

Naturalization of Convention I 191<br />

(Curiously, but predictably, Peter himself inverted this inversion by displaying<br />

strikingly unaffected, "natural" behavior in ceremonial contexts.) The extremes<br />

to which this hyper-conventionality could run is illustrated by the case of one<br />

Vasilii Vasil'evich Golovin, a learned gentleman whose daily schedule was a cross<br />

between a theatrical performance and liturgical rite:<br />

If anything prevented the master from falling asleep right away, he did not stay<br />

in bed and was restless for the entire night. In this case, he would either begin<br />

reading aloud his favorire book, The Life of Alexander the Great by Quintus<br />

Curtius, or he would sit in a large armchair . . . and intone the following<br />

words, now raising and now lowering his voice: "Satan, get thee to the barren<br />

places, to the thick woods and to the crevices of the earth, where the light of<br />

God's countenance shineth not. Satan, Enemy of Mankind, unhand me, get<br />

thee to the dark places, to the bottomless seas, to the shelterless uninhabited<br />

mountains of the wilderness where the light of God's countenance shineth not.<br />

Cursed wretch, be off to the Tartars! Be off, cursed wretch, to the inferno, to<br />

the eternal fire and appear to me no more. Thricedamned, thriceheathen and<br />

thricecursed! I blow on you and spit on you!" After finishing these exorcisms,<br />

he would rise from his chair and begin walking back and forth through all<br />

seven of his rooms shaking a rattle. These strange habits naturally provoked<br />

curiosity, and many of the servants peeked through the cracks to see what the<br />

master was doing. But this too was taken into account. The housemaids would<br />

begin shouting, employing various witticisms and proverbs, and pour cold<br />

water on the eavesdroppers from an upper window. The master approved all<br />

these actions, saying, "It serves the culprits right. Suffering means nothing to<br />

them, thricedamned, thriceheathen and thricecursed, untortured, untormented<br />

and unpunished!" Stamping his feet, he would repeat the same thing over and<br />

over again. (Quoted in Lotman 1985:79—80)<br />

Lotman observes that this carnivalization of daily life implied not only that individuals<br />

played theatrical roles but also that life itself was viewed as a textual plot,<br />

often intentionally patterned after literary heroes (see also Lotman 1976).<br />

Conclusion<br />

Philosophy commences when this immediate synthesis [of ethos and<br />

worldview] falls apart, when physis and nomos become distinguished and their<br />

relation is transformed into a problem. Its history is that of constant attempts<br />

both to reformulate this distinction and to construct a relation between the<br />

concepts distinguished. Its end is present when the relations between nature<br />

and convention, objects and values, facts and norms, science and morality, etc.<br />

are no longer seen as a meaningful problem.<br />

—György Markus (1980:24)<br />

The theoretical and ethnographic examples in the preceding sections are intended<br />

to challenge the simple idea that social conventions always appear arbi-

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