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Application Security - An Inside Story - TCS

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White Paper<br />

<strong>Application</strong> <strong>Security</strong> –<br />

<strong>An</strong> <strong>Inside</strong> <strong>Story</strong><br />

<strong>Application</strong> security has become ‘the’ requirement!<br />

Not so long ago it used to be a mid-summer reverie.<br />

<strong>Application</strong> owners took pride in their functionally<br />

meticulous and performance rich applications, they<br />

did not envisage or prepare their applications to<br />

withstand untoward intrusive attempts. I do not<br />

blame them, you do not think too much about the<br />

main door lock when you are building a house. You<br />

deal with the lock when the house is built and the<br />

main door is ready and considering how much you<br />

are left with in terms of finance, you choose a lock. All<br />

through there has been an over the top optimism that<br />

your house won’t be burgled or “why should anyone<br />

be interested in my house!”<br />

Web applications or owners of such applications<br />

suffer from the same ‘main door lock’ syndrome. They<br />

are left with no budget to provide any security for<br />

their application and they take it for granted that no<br />

intruder will ever target their application.<br />

Some recent high-profile application breaches have<br />

brought ‘application security’ to the fore again. It has<br />

re-emerged as a requirement; it seems the house is<br />

being built around the main door lock now! Who can<br />

enter the house is influencing a lot design changes to<br />

how the house is going to be built. A five year weather<br />

prediction is being sought to make sure the place<br />

does not run dry of water, the soil supports vegetation


and solar panels can generate enough electricity for<br />

the house. All threats imagined and more importantly<br />

all threats are factored into the design of the house.<br />

Is this for real? Do we really have to spend money in<br />

securing applications? Spending money for security<br />

has long been considered as the same thing as<br />

splurging money. If you have enough, you of course<br />

do and nobody seems to have enough! <strong>Security</strong> or for<br />

that matter application security is conveniently<br />

postponed to yet another rosy day in spring, where<br />

you think you will have enough to splurge on<br />

security. Like the utopia that day never arrives or even<br />

if it does, you have something else to splurge on.<br />

<strong>Application</strong>s, especially the ones on the web have<br />

long suffered this lack of attention from their owners.<br />

The world it seems has been divided into two kinds of<br />

species, ethical and unethical hackers. The ethical<br />

ones are honing their skill at intrusion to stop the<br />

unethical ones. Intrusion to random applications<br />

remains the common objective of both the groups.<br />

The ethical community will warn before they strike,<br />

the unethical ones will simply strike.<br />

<strong>Application</strong>s have many stakeholders – sponsors,<br />

users, architectures, designers, developers, data<br />

modelers, testers, system integrators, server<br />

administrators and other support personnel. Who<br />

needs to own and ensure security? When we say<br />

security, what kind of security? Is it source-code,<br />

database, client based front-ends? What needs to be<br />

protected? Expectedly it’s not as simple as it seems.<br />

2


<strong>Security</strong> runs deep and runs through (or should) all<br />

veins of the application. Bring in a security team and<br />

make them jell well with developers and you will have<br />

a secured application for sure! A bit of optimism but<br />

we will see!<br />

Running through 200 applications last FY 2011-12 was<br />

a gargantuan task. Without any intention of being<br />

condescending it was actually running through other<br />

people’s private stuff and trying to find hidden<br />

bombs. Passing comment on what people call source<br />

code is risky business and it touched a lot of raw<br />

nerves and created many a frictions<br />

3


About the Author<br />

Srimant Acharya<br />

4


Table of Contents<br />

1. Introduction 6<br />

2. Who Needs It & When? 6<br />

3. Intricacies of <strong>Application</strong> <strong>Security</strong> Assessments 8<br />

4. The 200 Assignment <strong>Story</strong> 10<br />

5. The Buzz and the Hoopla! 12<br />

6. The Future 14<br />

5


Introduction<br />

Introducing application security is a great responsibility. Let me try.<br />

For the uninitiated this is about doing ‘everything’ to reduce the chances of the application from being<br />

breached. The ‘everything’ then of course fans out to various kinds of security assessments, reactive at<br />

large though. It takes time for the application owners to realize that a major portion of the effort can be<br />

reduced through proactive measures. The realization does not dawn easily and in most cases seen as<br />

unnecessary expenditure in dealing with something which has not happened yet!<br />

Those who are aware of the hustle and bustle of application security, will always come with their own<br />

opinion of how it should be done, they will force a tool and a certain kind of report customized to their<br />

requirement and if that’s not all, will also require a certification or warranty that the application has been<br />

secured and thereby breach-proof!<br />

However from a security group’s perspective it is probably neither. I’ll come back to my favorite ‘building a<br />

house’ analogy. To secure a house which has been in existence for about 2-3 years and where the ecosystem<br />

around it is constantly changing, it is not a one-day job. You have to analyze and visualize the<br />

possible threats and then see what can be done. You have to invite pseudo robbers (i.e. ethical burglars-)<br />

and see what they have to tell you about how easy or difficult it was to break into your house. (Ah! The<br />

black-box mode) or invite another set of experts to look at the inside of your house, look at potential<br />

articles inside which could provoke a burglary. (Ah! The white box mode)<br />

Securing an application is a continuous activity and is not confined to any pre-defined set of activities, at<br />

best you are thwarting a set of rookies from attacking your application, you are never far off from being<br />

attacked by a pro who might have a specific agenda or otherwise! There is not anything full-proof so far<br />

and probably, there will never be but a current application security assessment will at least ensure that<br />

you have taken care of some of the most fundamental loopholes in your application. Looking at high<br />

application breaches in the last 5 years and the type of attacks exercised, it is worth the effort to ensure<br />

that applications go through this fundamental scanning (Ah! The black box mode again!)<br />

Who Needs it and When?<br />

Great! Finally we have arrived at the age old consumer-provider story. Let us find out who needs<br />

application security and who is providing it? Or who should provide it?<br />

There are a lot of stakeholders to an application.<br />

n<br />

n<br />

n<br />

n<br />

n<br />

Owner/Sponsor<br />

Developer<br />

Data Modeler<br />

Database administrator<br />

Server administrator<br />

6


n<br />

n<br />

n<br />

n<br />

n<br />

n<br />

n<br />

n<br />

n<br />

n<br />

Architect/Designer<br />

GUI designer<br />

Functional testers<br />

Performance testers (optional)<br />

<strong>Security</strong> testers (optional/non-existent)<br />

Network administrator/IS team<br />

Quality assurance<br />

Hosting server/deployment team<br />

Compliance team (if any)<br />

Other third party vendors (if any)<br />

So among the above who is responsible for security of the application? A consistent answer to this<br />

question is ‘Not us’. The classical SDLC does not factor in security in its testing phase, testing is implicitly<br />

known to be functional, performance is factored in only when asked for and security is ignored with over<br />

the top optimism of ‘Our application will not be attacked’. <strong>Security</strong> is passed in the name of following<br />

project or customer specific best practices on coding which in reality does encourage writing code in a<br />

manner to minimize server or other software/hardware resources but does little to encourage writing<br />

code in a secure manner. The owner or the sponsor is not necessarily worried about security unless<br />

he/she has the requisite budget, though he is accountable for any subsequent security breaches. The<br />

developer is under pressure to conform to the best practices coding standard and looks forward to<br />

having the minimum functional issues reported against his specific module or pages. All other<br />

stakeholders conveniently blame it on the developer and this ‘passing the buck’ game continues<br />

throughout the life-time of the application.<br />

So who needs security is not answered easily, however when it is needed is beginning to throw up some<br />

interesting trends. The deployment team or the hosting server team nowadays needs a security<br />

assessment for applications to be hosted on a particular server and that has got the owner of the<br />

application to commission a last minute security scan, almost always, 8-24 hours before the deployment.<br />

The owner has no time and budget to get this done, so it gets done somehow by somebody! This<br />

marginalizes the chances of the application withstanding any future attack, be it by a rookie or a pro.<br />

Let’s look at assessment options for the application owner/team.<br />

n<br />

n<br />

n<br />

n<br />

Project’s own security team<br />

The IS team<br />

Various security teams in the organization<br />

Third-party vendors from outside the organization<br />

7


Usually if this is happening at the behest of the hosting server team, which is most often the case, then<br />

they have their own list of accredited teams from whom they will accept the security assessments as<br />

valid. (However more often than not, the word of mouth is the biggest advert in bringing a lot of security<br />

assessments to a particular team) On other fronts, large industry solution units are beginning to invest in<br />

having their own security teams but that is perhaps intended to take care of security, more in a proactive<br />

manner than otherwise.<br />

In bigger organizations, there are horizontal security center of excellence teams devoted to serving a<br />

multitude of operational units. Such teams use a combination of commercial and open source tools and<br />

have experienced security analysts manning a variety of assignments. Then there are small vendors who<br />

have collaborated with bigger organizations to serve such needs. Traditionally the security industry has<br />

gone through a jostle in addressing the unsecured cauldron of applications. IT organizations have tried to<br />

come to the fore with stringent SDLCs and a fix-as-you-develop methodology. A lot of organizations are<br />

also going in for commercial automated tools to scan their applications periodically. The efficacy of such<br />

tools is yet to be established but they do achieve the basic separation of the chaff from the grain.<br />

Intricacies of <strong>Application</strong> <strong>Security</strong> Assessments<br />

Let me provide you some cold statistics from our<br />

group having performed over 200 security<br />

assessments in the last FY (2011-12). About 80% of<br />

the application owners/groups were not very clear<br />

about the objective of such an assessment, they<br />

wanted a report and wanted it in a jiffy. 75% of the<br />

applications did not come back to verify if the<br />

issues reported were actually fixed by their<br />

A security assessment at the least is expected<br />

to make the application secure! The<br />

expectation is borne out of severe lack of<br />

awareness about the application’s potential to<br />

expose/leak information. The traditional focus<br />

areas of the application still continue to be its<br />

functionality and performance.<br />

Development team: 90% of application owners did<br />

not know what constituted a security assessment. Everybody had heard of a magic tool and they all<br />

thought it could rid the application of all its security maladies. Against this background every opportunity<br />

that came our way was serviced on two fronts, one on education/training of the application owners and<br />

the other on the assessment itself.<br />

As such there is a lot of mythical expectation from a security assessment. The assessment at the least is<br />

expected to make the application secure! A big enough responsibility for all security teams around the<br />

world. The expectation is borne out of severe lack of awareness about the application’s potential to<br />

expose/leak information. The traditional focus areas of an application around functionality and<br />

performance have blinded many a developers and architects into ignoring basic safety measures around<br />

authentication and privilege to access data.<br />

In the current scenario, an ideal security assessment would be a combination of dynamic and static<br />

scanning of the application. Dynamic mode of scanning (also called black-box scanning) would scan the<br />

application while it’s running in a pseudo environment and would react to a dummy user (the automated<br />

8


tool) in a dynamic manner. Static scanning would be scanning the source code of the application using a<br />

variety of technologies including using a different set of automated commercial tools.<br />

In the dynamic mode, the application can be scanned with or without authentication to the application,<br />

though mostly it runs with authentication mode to expose maximum issues. A brief questionnaire is<br />

shared with application team to estimate the effort of assessing a particular application. The tools and the<br />

team are decided according the importance accorded to the assignment by the application team.<br />

Generally automated (commercial/open source) tools are employed and they generally take 2-40 hours<br />

depending upon the size and complexity to scan one application. Assessment policy is by default set to<br />

unearthing the OWASP top 10 issues (OWASP- Open Web <strong>Application</strong> <strong>Security</strong> Project). OWASP (a nonprofit<br />

organization) releases top 10 security issues every three years and are considered to be the most<br />

notable contributor to the initiative of making applications secure.<br />

In the static mode, the application code is reviewed with the help of automated tools (both commercial<br />

and open source) and is also targeted to unearth the OWASP top 10 issues. The static assessment mode is<br />

a more comprehensive method of security review and helps in unearthing and fixing of fundamental<br />

issues. A security expert is the ideal person in recommending the priority and frequency of the above<br />

assessments.<br />

There are other forms of security assessments too though not as popular as the ones mentioned above.<br />

Threat analysis and architecture review add substance and spice to a security assessment though the<br />

application owner is least likely to ask for the same.<br />

This is about as much that can be done till the tool churns out a report. Generally tool reports are bulky<br />

and esoteric. They report issues which may not be relevant to the application. One classic example of<br />

such a false positive was when an application reported an issue pertaining to alibaba.exe. The application<br />

team feigned their knowledge on the existence of such a “exe” and without any other apparent logic the<br />

security team declared that as a false positive. False positives are difficult to remove and are a manual<br />

process and are based on the bias and expertise of the security analyst working on a particular<br />

assignment. To remove such bias, security COEs keep a centralized repository of false positives which<br />

helps them to take consistent decisions in removal of such issues.<br />

Automated commercial tools do not always find all the issues and do not claim to do so either. The<br />

security analyst plays as important a role as the tool in getting the optimum set of issues. Many open<br />

source tools also help the analyst in addressing specific vulnerabilities. Tool reports almost always need<br />

customization and are prepared to cater to developers (technical) and to mangers/sponsors (nontechnical).<br />

Developers usually require help in remediation of issues and though general remediation is<br />

provided in the report, the security team is expected to offer specific solutions to different issues.<br />

9


The 200 Assignment <strong>Story</strong><br />

In Tata Consultancy Services Pvt. Ltd. (<strong>TCS</strong>) there<br />

are several horizontal groups in existence,<br />

essentially to serve the verticals. (Industry Solution<br />

Units) Technology Excellence Group (TEG) is one<br />

such group, which has a dedicated sub group<br />

looking at all the niche technologies of tomorrow<br />

and building competencies for them. <strong>Application</strong> &<br />

Network <strong>Security</strong> (ANS) is one such group under<br />

200 assignments were carried out in FY 11-12<br />

with a delivery pool of 10 resources, 4<br />

commercial licenses and two different security<br />

labs on isolated network (non-<strong>TCS</strong>) and labs<br />

having separate physical access for security<br />

associates only.<br />

the umbrella of NTDG (Niche Technology Delivery Group) which is devoted to ensuring security for<br />

<strong>Application</strong>s and Infrastructure surrounding them.<br />

ANS has two dedicated security labs and several commercial tools to carry out various forms of security<br />

assessments. Majority of our assignments are on web applications in the black box mode. Here’s some<br />

cold stats regarding doing 200 of them in the last FY 2011-12<br />

Black-box or dynamic assessments are all about the<br />

critical issues, everybody from application owners<br />

to developers to security analysts are after this.<br />

Surprisingly average no. of critical issues is only 2 to<br />

3 out of about 12-15 issues that is reported for an<br />

application. These issues are generally around<br />

Cross Site Scripting (XSS), Broken Authentication and<br />

forced browsing.<br />

n<br />

n<br />

n<br />

Avg. critical issues found per apps 2-3<br />

10% of apps without a single critical finding<br />

Avg. issues per app is 12-15<br />

Two very important observations made were that<br />

half of the applications did not seek any issue<br />

closure verification with us. The other 50% who<br />

followed up their closure verification had only<br />

solved 60% of the issues reported for various<br />

reasons.<br />

20% of applications actually instituted a 2nd round<br />

of assessment within the first 3 months of the first<br />

one.<br />

The stats may seem very economical but trust me<br />

when I say, these took about 2 years to achieve this<br />

speed and a different security team might portray a<br />

different set of figures for this.<br />

False positive removal is an important part of a<br />

security assessment and requires some discipline<br />

and consistency to achieve an accurate set of<br />

n<br />

n<br />

n<br />

n<br />

20% of apps come back for a reassessment<br />

and 60% of issues are closed by 2nd<br />

assessment<br />

50% of apps failed to come back for any<br />

sort of issue verification<br />

Avg. span of an assessment 3-7 days<br />

60% of false positives reported and 1 day is<br />

spent on their removal<br />

n 1 day on report customization<br />

10


esults. Report customization is dependent on customers but two sets of reports are provided to<br />

developers and managers respectively.<br />

We observed some interesting trends post<br />

scanning of the applications. Only about 15% came<br />

back to us until all issues were closed, they did not<br />

care how many iterations it required. 30% required<br />

formal remediation sessions and 10% asked for<br />

specific solutions to issues reported.<br />

From all categories of issues reported, 70% simply<br />

ignored the ‘low’ category issues and did not take<br />

any action on them.<br />

n<br />

n<br />

n<br />

Only15% of application owners ensured<br />

100% closure of issues<br />

30% insisted on remediation sessions &<br />

10% sought specific technical help<br />

70% of apps do not prioritize or fix ‘low’<br />

category issues<br />

The common excuse of not fixing issues were always given to be ‘ will be fixed by the time it is deployed<br />

to production’<br />

As expected, the top 2 issues of OWASP top 10<br />

were in news! While most issues pertaining to XSS<br />

were reported against 80% of apps, injection issues<br />

it seemed were handled better with only 15% of<br />

apps reporting such issues. Majority of scans ran<br />

with default policy (which includes OWASP top 10<br />

issues), the exception being 2-3% of app owners<br />

asking for a specific or customized policy.<br />

The 200+ assignments were possible due to<br />

diligent resources and availability of automated<br />

commercial tools and security labs. Support from<br />

senior management along encouragement to go<br />

for the unknown and unseen, also helped us to<br />

chase down these impressive numbers.<br />

n<br />

n<br />

n<br />

n<br />

n<br />

n<br />

70-80% of applications reported Cross site<br />

scripting(XSS) issues<br />

10-15% reported SQL injection issues<br />

Only 2-3% app owners dictated a specific<br />

scan policy<br />

Total of 4 automated commercial tools and<br />

5-6 open source tools<br />

Two dedicated security labs<br />

About 10-12 app security associates<br />

We have already shifted focus and now look at<br />

enterprise wide security issues and plan to ensure app security for 100s of applications and not just one.<br />

Static scanning or source code review of<br />

application is an integral part of security<br />

assessment, however the cost and expertise<br />

involved in carrying out such a requirement is very<br />

complex. Commercial automated tools are three<br />

times more expensive than dynamic scan tools.<br />

Secured source code review has not gained<br />

momentum and only 5% applications considered<br />

doing a SCR after/before doing a dynamic scanning.<br />

n<br />

n<br />

n<br />

5% assessments were on source code review<br />

Source code review tools are more<br />

expensive<br />

Only 5% of applications went through SCR<br />

after Black-box<br />

11


SCR does reveal a lot more issues but these are<br />

actually multiple instances of the same issue. False<br />

positives are less but do vary across tools used. Av.<br />

Assessment period is less but does require more<br />

manual intervention and substantial expertise in a<br />

particular programming language.<br />

n<br />

n<br />

n<br />

A6-10 critical issues per app out of a total of<br />

35-40 issues<br />

False positives are about 20%-70% on a<br />

range of tools<br />

Avg. assessment period is 2-4 days<br />

The issues in the mode scanning are more or less<br />

same. However some typical issues are not<br />

reported as they can only be exposed in active<br />

(dynamic) mode of scan. There is not any magic<br />

formula to decide as if this precede or succeed a<br />

black-box scan and is usually decided best by a<br />

security analyst.<br />

n<br />

n<br />

XSS & Injection also dominate the issues<br />

found<br />

Issues pertaining to URL manipulation<br />

session are difficult to find(by tools)<br />

The Buzz and the Hoopla!<br />

The buzz and hoopla is created by some high-profile<br />

security incidents with best known enterprises. The<br />

Every organization wanted to scan all their<br />

incidents, if not anything else, have come as a major<br />

applications in the first month itself! Every<br />

advert for the security industry or vendors<br />

major security incident would create this<br />

providing security solutions. All leading research<br />

frenzy. Unfortunately security incidents<br />

analyst firms have predicted increased spending<br />

involving major organizations are on the rise!<br />

and increased focus on security, more so on<br />

application security. However it remains to be seen if<br />

the buzz can withstand the stark reality of how enterprises function and operate with respect to security.<br />

Apparently the security breaches hurt the enterprises severely at different levels. It cripples their finance<br />

and puts a question mark against their brand value. It’s not easy to defend a security attack nor is it any<br />

easier to recover from one. <strong>Security</strong> incidents are often around poor ‘best practices’ and a laxity in terms<br />

responsibility and accountability. Hardening your firewalls, servers and applications post to an attack is<br />

like bolting the gate after the horse has left.<br />

Let’s look at some interesting case studies from our own experience of dealing with such incidents.<br />

Incident 1: Site defaced. Hacker had left behind a message!<br />

Post-incident paranoia: Attempt to back up the site is unsuccessful, important forensic imprints are<br />

compromised in the process, logs have not got the whole story; finally handed over to cyber crime<br />

investigators, all breached instances are seized for further investigation. Our security team was contacted<br />

to help!<br />

12


Our investigation: Our preliminary request to have all original logs was stalled due to the unavailability<br />

of production instances. We suggested a vulnerability assessment of the backed up version hoping to<br />

find some glaring loopholes. A black box assessment on the replica application did not reveal much. We<br />

then targeted the upload functionality suspecting that to be the major offender through which the<br />

hacker might have uploaded something. We did find certain laxities in the uploading functionality; it did<br />

not have a maximum upload limit, it did not limit the type of files that could be uploaded and moreover it<br />

duly provided the path of upload when it failed to do so. For the hacker guessing the landing page of a<br />

site is not very difficult and one such file was put in every conceivable folder in the application directory.<br />

The pattern suggested that it was a blind attack and in all probability an automated script was used.<br />

Incident 2: Database cleaned up. Database log wiped clean.<br />

Post-incident paranoia: Heavily suspected to be an insider job; all database administrators are stopped<br />

from attending to production instances.<br />

Our investigation: It was revealed that the information security policy was very weak and best practices<br />

were non-existent or were flouted openly. It was a case of an unfortunate accident where one DBA<br />

accidentally deleted a table of records and then panicked enough to erase the log records. Since the<br />

databases were not backed up real-time and there was no proper induction it became a major incidence<br />

and the company providing DB support lost their contract.<br />

Incident 3: Major web site hacked. Personal information put on blogs.<br />

Post-incident paranoia: Major policy change. Sudden keenness to invest in security. All applications to<br />

be scanned in a month!!! Plans are afoot to form a security COE.<br />

Our investigation: Subsequently it emerges that one of the so called ‘non-sensitive’ database was hacked.<br />

The DB contained personal details of employees and their family members who participated in the<br />

organization’s internal fun events. The database was not accorded the usual rights that another sensitive<br />

DB would have enjoyed in terms of back-up, archival or encryption, the data it contained was treated as<br />

informal and was lying stale in a DB. The hacker(s) used simple SQL injection queries to steal data and<br />

later put it in their personal blogs as prized possessions.<br />

A lot of buzz happened due to these incidents and there was a sudden increase in the frequency of<br />

applications being lined up for scanning, it was like an epidemic had broken out and there was a long<br />

queue for vaccination shots. Organizations suddenly discovered hidden funds and ridiculous deadlines to<br />

make their applications secure. Every organization wanted to scan all their applications in the first month<br />

itself. Each one of them wanted to know what was wrong and how soon they could fix it. The scanning<br />

factories around the world went into a tailspin unable to cater to this mad rush. Some common sense<br />

began to prevail as soon as it was realized that a mere vulnerability scan was not going to make the<br />

application secure, instead there would have to be long term measures combined with a sustained<br />

campaign on application security that would solve this malady.<br />

What compounded the problem was the availability of automated commercial tools with the promise<br />

that all or almost all vulnerabilities can be found out, thereby making the application breach-proof. The<br />

original intent of these tools was lost in this buzz around the sudden necessity of application security.<br />

13


Though all the tools were after the same set of vulnerabilities, they employed different technologies to<br />

find them. Some were found, some were not but each tool reported lots of ‘false positives’. False positives<br />

are essentially issues not relevant to the application it is reported against. It kept the security analyst on<br />

tenterhooks and it created a genre of reports that were heavily tool dependent and did not match against<br />

one another in terms of issues reported against the same application. Manual effort in unearthing<br />

vulnerabilities began to exceed the estimation as applications owners became more and more aggressive<br />

in pursuing vulnerability free applications.<br />

Ensuring security for applications is not always about vulnerability scans and code reviews, it should be<br />

treated as much proactively as it is done reactively. As the application is conceived, a security threat<br />

landscape should be drawn and all phases of SDLC should factor in security. Where the concept of<br />

secured SDLC has failed is in its ideology. It requires thorough understanding of the applications<br />

architecture and its business functionality. Developers have traditionally ignored security having been<br />

brought up on the culture of error-free functionality and adequate response time. Even when prompted<br />

by automated tools or otherwise they are least expected to change their style of coding to accommodate<br />

a looming threat that has not happened yet!<br />

Project managers have harped on coding tools and aids that would prompt and persuade the developers<br />

to fix and eliminate security loopholes creeping into their code. Many are trying to win this capital space<br />

of development lifecycle through smarter IDEs or plug-ins but none have emerged as a clear winner. No<br />

single tool has been able to catch an unsecured flow or approach thus rendering the whole effort to be a<br />

‘something is better than nothing’ approach. Many a firewalls are now being supplemented with IPS/IDS<br />

etc. trying to catch unwarranted traffic as it flies past. No doubt they have had their prized catches but<br />

they also stop legal traffic which has been a staggering concern. Maintaining a list of false positives<br />

around IPS/IDSes has become a humongous job requiring round the clock manning of such devices.<br />

Web <strong>Application</strong> Firewalls are also being touted as another life saver but it suffers from the same<br />

syndrome as well. Blocking of real and legal traffic has been a growing concern though it serves its<br />

purpose by only concentrating on the application layer. They have been a welcome addition to the ever<br />

evolving security potpourri to protect applications.<br />

The Future<br />

If there is anything that has remained consistent, it is our inability to predict the future. <strong>Security</strong> incidents<br />

despite increased awareness will actually increase and they will be immune to the security posture of an<br />

application. Hackers are always a step ahead of the current technology and defense mechanisms. With<br />

increased cyber warfare and state level sponsoring of security attacks, applications are going to be<br />

targeted now based on the country, race and business they represent and that is a frightening prospect<br />

as applications classified as ‘not of interest to anybody’ will now be in the radar of organized hackers.<br />

It becomes essential that the applications are armed with real-time monitoring tools and adequate<br />

logging mechanisms so that potential attempts to break into an application can be stopped before any<br />

potential damage in terms of loss of data, brand and money.<br />

14


List of Abbreviations<br />

Abbreviation/ Acronym<br />

ANS<br />

COE<br />

FY<br />

IDE<br />

IDS<br />

Expansion<br />

<strong>Application</strong> & Network <strong>Security</strong><br />

Center of Excellence<br />

Financial Year<br />

Integrated Development Environment<br />

Intrusion Detection System<br />

IPS Intrusion Prevention System<br />

IS<br />

NTDG<br />

OWASP<br />

SDLC<br />

<strong>TCS</strong><br />

TEG<br />

Information <strong>Security</strong><br />

Niche Technology Delivery Group<br />

Open Web <strong>Application</strong> <strong>Security</strong> Project<br />

Software Development Life Cycle<br />

Tata Consultancy Services<br />

Technology Excellence Group<br />

15


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<strong>TCS</strong> offers a consulting-led, integrated portfolio of IT and IT-enabled infrastructure, engineering<br />

TM<br />

and assurance services. This is delivered through its unique Global Network Delivery Model ,<br />

recognized as the benchmark of excellence in software development. A part of the Tata Group,<br />

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