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crimes committed by totalitarian regimes - Ministrstvo za pravosodje

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Crimes <strong>committed</strong> <strong>by</strong> <strong>totalitarian</strong> <strong>regimes</strong><br />

give a more precise picture of the Bishop’s interventions, completing documentation in the state<br />

archive (Arhiv Slovenije). The Bishop’s secretary, Dr Stanislavs Lenič, testified that sometimes up to<br />

50 petitioners came to the Bishop on a single day and that he helped them regardless of their political<br />

convictions. Among many documents, a letter written <strong>by</strong> Gastone Gambarra, the Commander of the<br />

Italian XI. Army corps, on 26 April 1943 testifies that 122 internees were freed because of the Bishop’s<br />

intervention. But the Italians noticed soon that the Bishop did not discriminate in his interventions, so<br />

Grazioli ordered his subordinates to treat the Bishop’s interventions as anyone else’s, because Bishop<br />

Rožman intervened for those who were unworthy. 10<br />

The position of the two Bishops towards the occupation forces did not differ considerably. It was<br />

strictly a legalistic posture regarding the obligation of obedience to authorities, which originates from<br />

the word of God (Romans 13,1-2). Church authorities took the same position towards the Communist<br />

authorities after the war.<br />

Bishop Rožman visited the Italian High Commissioner, Emilio Grazioli, on 22 April 1941. He<br />

addressed a declaration of loyalty to the High Commissioner after the publication of the Statute of<br />

Autonomy on 3 May 1941. The High Commissioner forged it and directed it to Mussolini. Grazioli’s<br />

text was published in the press and was written in terms that the Bishop himself would never have<br />

used. Rožman actually only emphasized free development in the cultural and religious spheres, and<br />

promised loyalty and sent his blessing for the efforts of the authorities for the good of the people. The<br />

falsification was so effective that, even today, many publications continue to use it as proof of Rožman’s<br />

collaboration.<br />

Rožman condemned the occupiers twice. On 24 October 1941, he addressed a letter to the clergy<br />

in which he complained about the devastation of that part of his diocese occupied <strong>by</strong> the Germans, that<br />

all Church property was confiscated, religious people of both genders ejected from their institutions,<br />

193 members of secular clergy expelled from 148 parishes, and that about 200,000 of his people were<br />

without spiritual care. In September 1942 he handed over to Grazioli a memorandum of twenty points,<br />

in which he criticized Italian means of repression. Grazioli was furious, telling the Bishop that he would<br />

have arrested anyone else but him for such a memo. The Ljubljana Bishop wanted to condemn the<br />

Italian authorities even from the pulpit, but the Pope advised him, during his visit in Rome in May 1942,<br />

not to do so because in such case the Italians would likely isolate him somewhere inside Italy, leaving<br />

the people of Ljubljana with no one to help them.<br />

The Bishop and Church dignitaries wanted people to survive the war with as few victims, and<br />

with as little damage, as possible. Rožman was convinced that for such a small nation, armed struggle<br />

against occupation forces was of no use and doomed to fail: because great sacrifices could bear no real<br />

relationship to any possible partial successes. And as it would be revealed later, various drastic (violent)<br />

acts of resistance in Slovenia changed nothing as far as the power and strength of occupying forces<br />

was concerned the subsequent withdrawal and total defeat of the enemies had nothing to do with those<br />

acts within the occupied area. Not much could be done to weaken the military and political position<br />

of power of the occupiers. Certainly the value of armed resistance, as a sign and symbol of national<br />

self-assertion and rejection of injustice, should not be overlooked, but the question must be put: in<br />

what proportion that positive signal effect could stand to release the pain of the civil population. And<br />

if, under such hopeless circumstances, the immense number of human victims that had been provoked,<br />

was acceptable. Was it acceptable to put up with catastrophes of such a dimension for the Slovene<br />

people only to attain a certain moral appearance or perhaps even to give the (Communists dominated)<br />

“Liberation front” a good starting position for taking power later on? This was the question that the<br />

Bishop of Ljubljana believed must be asked, and he answered: “No.”<br />

2.3. Territory occupied <strong>by</strong> Hungarians<br />

Hungary denied the existence of the Slovene nation too. The Slovenes in Prekmurje were, according<br />

to Hungarian interpretation, “Vendi” and for that reason the first announcements published were in<br />

“Wendish”, a Slovene dialect. Topographical names and official notices in Slovene were removed and<br />

replaced <strong>by</strong> Hungarian, and family names magyarized. Offices, educational institutions and schools had<br />

10<br />

See more: Tamara Griesser Pečar, France Martin Dolinar, Rožmanov proces, Družina, Ljubljana 1996, pp. 151–173, 253–270; Tamara<br />

Griesser Pečar, “Rožmanova posredovanja pri okupatorju”, in: Edo Škulj (ed.), Rožmanov simpozij v Rimu, Mohorjeva, Celje 2003, pp.<br />

301–314; NŠAL, Zapuščina škofa dr. Gregorija Rožmana, Prezidialni arhiv.<br />

76

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