crimes committed by totalitarian regimes - Ministrstvo za pravosodje

Crimes committed by totalitarian regimes
August 1944. And secondly, the Allied troops were approaching Yugoslavia through Italy, and were expected
to enter the province of Venezia Giulia, a territory also claimed by the partisans. The arrival of the Allies
presented a constant threat (even when the invasion of Istria failed to happen) of the West interfering in
the revolution. On 14 October, a delegation of the politburo of the CPY replaced Hebrang, as well as the
president of the Croat Legislative Commission, Dr Čulinović, and others. A letter by Kardelj followed to the
Slovene Politburo, clearly stating that the Slovenes are showing similar tendencies as in Croatia. These errors
were not yet grave, he said, but you should cut down such tendencies in their roots. Then Kardelj made his
point: only the Politburo of the CPY had an oversight of the whole situation, and they should all respect its
initiative and decisions. 34
During this party and state centralisation, talks went on and two agreements were reached (in June
and in November–December) with the president of the Yugoslav government in exile, Dr Ivan Šubašić.
Tito’s tactics were to postpone formation of the joint government for reasons of internal consolidation
of the partisan power, but at the same time to gain international recognition. Thus, as the first meeting
with Šubašić was approaching, the leadership of AVNOJ and the CPY restrained from elaborating the
future system (as described above). After the June 1944 meeting, they concentrated on the liberation
of Serbia in the fall of 1944, which had strong political implications for the partisans (the final defeat
of the chetnik movement); in the meantime they also strengthened their grip over the whole country
(also mentioned above). While doing all of this, they kept postponing Šubašić’s next visit, when Tito
was to sign an agreement with him on the future joint government. They finally signed the agreement
in Belgrade in November 1944, with annexes in early December. This also, by no accident, followed
the renowned meeting of Churchill and Stalin in Moscow (the Percentage Agreement). Therefore, the
November agreement contained some concessions to Šubašić regarding the future system, especially
the annex, which included guarantees for the freedom of organising political parties, for free elections,
the distribution of power among the independent legislative, executive and judicial spheres, democratic
organisation of the judiciary, respect for the laws of the country and arrangements for the interim period
until the elections. 35 The same tactics went on after Šubašić returned to London in December 1944,
postponing formation of the Tito-Šubašić provisional government. When the Allies intervened again
(in the statement of the Yalta conference), the provisional government was finally set up on 8 March
1945. The partisan leadership welcomed all the diplomatic delays in the meantime, gaining time, and
organising the central ministries in Belgrade, to which they appointed their political ‘commissars’ and
cadres, and from which they cleansed unwanted personnel. 36 They conscientiously did that in the future
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, for instance, knowing that Šubašić was to become foreign minister.
In March 1945 Kardelj took over the Constitutional Ministry, thus gaining strong party control
over the preparation of the future elections, as well as the constitution. In February 1945, the central
leadership also abolished all pre-war laws of Yugoslavia that were in conflict with the principles of
the liberation movement, i.e. revolution, but never gave any further explanation which laws it meant.
The presidency of AVNOJ set up a Supreme Court and Public Prosecutor of Yugoslavia and defined
the hierarchical system for both institutions. The primary task of both institutions was to protect the
achievements of the liberation movement. Meanwhile a new form of martial law was introduced – the
Tribunals for the Protection of People’s Honour (sodišče narodne časti). Protests from the opposition in
Serbia and from Šubašić followed, stating that the Agreement was not being respected, but to no avail.
A very similar dynamic took place in the case of the renewal of the pre-war political parties, even
though they were part of the Tito-Šubašić Agreement. They were constantly put down in favour of the policy
of a unified popular front. The CPY tactically conceded the revival of some political parties. However,
this was only in the case of Serbia, and only for as long as it was tactically opportune, to appease the fears
and protests of the West. In Slovenia the question never even arose, as it never came up in Bosnia and
Hercegovina or Macedonia (where there was an aversion towards the pre-war parties, all of them Serb).
34
Dokumenti centralnih organa KPJ (Documents of the central organs of the CPY), NOR i revolucija 1941–1945, Izvori za istoriju SKJ
(Sources for the History of the Party), IC Komunist, Beograd 1987, vol. 20, pp. 275–280.
35
It appears that Stalin gave support to Šubašić on these matters during the visit Kardelj and Šubašić paid to Moscow in November 1944.
Stalin obviously insisted on democratic elections in Yugoslavia, saying that they should not try some revolutionary experiment or imitate
the Soviet system. (D. Šepić, Vlada Ivana Šubašića, Globus, Zagreb 1983, p. 336.) That would be very much in accord with Stalin’s
general policy towards Yugoslavia, although it strongly disappointed Kardelj at the time (E. Kardelj, Spomini (Memoirs), Ljubljana 1980,
p. 68).
36
As the partisan movement gradually took over the liberated parts of Yugoslavia, it issued many decrees, among them: those that
suspended all administration personnel and submitted them to a thorough check. A detailed account on all these measures can be found in
my book.
35