crimes committed by totalitarian regimes - Ministrstvo za pravosodje
crimes committed by totalitarian regimes - Ministrstvo za pravosodje
crimes committed by totalitarian regimes - Ministrstvo za pravosodje
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Crimes <strong>committed</strong> <strong>by</strong> <strong>totalitarian</strong> <strong>regimes</strong><br />
differently in the rest of Yugoslavia. There the peoples councils, or even more simply – the partisan<br />
commands, passed judgment on civil and military matters. They based it on natural law, which was<br />
widespread in those parts of Yugoslavia before the war.<br />
After the capitulation of Italy, lawyers met on the liberated territory (in conferences and congresses)<br />
in Croatia and Slovenia to debate the problems of the future legal system. At the same time, their<br />
leaderships passed several decrees, such as compulsory mobilisation (the partisan movement was not<br />
a voluntary one any more), with sanctions for avoiding it. These decrees defined the <strong>crimes</strong> of national<br />
treason and <strong>crimes</strong> against the people. Penal law and the judiciary, both in the forefront of political<br />
activity, had the task of protecting the so-called accomplishments of the liberation movement, meaning<br />
the revolution. The partisan authorities defined and listed the most important <strong>crimes</strong>, in order of priority:<br />
high treason, which was not only collaboration with the occupier, but the organisation of military forces<br />
outside the liberation movement or against this movement, as well; then ordinary treason (lesser deeds<br />
such as panic, other kinds of sabotage, obstruction of rules, etc.). The last, and least important ones,<br />
were <strong>crimes</strong> against personal safety and military transgressions. They also made it clear that the ‘old’,<br />
i.e. pre-war laws could not be the basis for passing judgment; but instead, judges should follow the<br />
spirit of the official and political decrees of the partisan movement. It was up to the judges to interpret<br />
and make use of them correctly. In the meantime, they were to translate and study Soviet laws, as well<br />
as the works of Vyshinsky. The principles of Soviet law were to be incorporated into the legal decrees<br />
and practise, such as: the ultra vires principle, the idea of social justness, as well as the principles of the<br />
Soviet policy of punishment – they introduced correctional labour, and later on, labour camps. Other<br />
aspects of law were neither then, nor later (in the immediate post-war period) of great importance.<br />
A true legislative offensive followed the meetings of the Slovene National Liberation Assembly in<br />
February 1944 and the third session of ZAVNOH in May 1944. It went on until the fall of 1944, when<br />
the politburo of the CPY stopped it, for reasons we shall try to explain. By that time, the central partisan<br />
leadership was in Belgrade, from where it started to run the whole country.<br />
Both assemblies acquired legislative powers, beside their political ones, powers that corresponded<br />
to those of AVNOJ (as did other lands, as well). Both appointed Legislative Committees that were to<br />
prepare new laws and regulations. They also passed decrees regarding the organisation and jurisdiction<br />
of people’s councils (narodni odbori, then narodnooslobodilački odbori), rules for their elections,<br />
decrees on civil courts of law, etc. Slovenia went a bit further and established its own institution of Chief<br />
Public Prosecutor, modelled on the Soviet example. Croatia took a different step, and prepared a Code<br />
of Criminal Law and a Code of Criminal Procedure, which was the sole such example in Yugoslavia<br />
for years to come. Both assemblies passed bills on peoples and citizen’s rights (the Croat one differing<br />
slightly, accentuating the rights of Serbs in Croatia). By electing such an Assembly, the Slovenes now<br />
had to determine a new role for their all-purpose Liberation Front. They transformed it into a purely<br />
political organisation that was to operate on the basis of political unity – the pre-war party system was<br />
being disqualified on a daily basis in the party propaganda. In the summer of 1944, elections of the<br />
people’s councils and local OF committees took place on the liberated territory. The Slovene assembly<br />
also set up its own intelligence service (based on the previous VOS). Now it was not a party service any<br />
more, but it became part of the commissariat (future ministry) of internal affairs. They even went so far<br />
as to make independent arrangements to obtain a loan from the Anglo-American military mission for<br />
these purposes. 28 A very similar process was going on in Croatia, where there was a specific situation in<br />
the organisation of the United People’s (or Popular) Front (JNOF – Jedinstveni narodnooslobodilački<br />
front, later called Narodni Front) regarding the position of the Croat Peasant Party. 29 Both lands were<br />
leading a policy of lenience (“politika širine”) towards the non-communists in the movement at the<br />
time. In Croatia it meant a policy against sectarianism and of respect for the demands of the Croat<br />
Peasant Party. In Slovenia, where such demands could not be made, it meant respecting the voice of the<br />
experts – the intelligentsia, which had massively joined the liberation movement after the capitulation<br />
of Italy. There was, of course, no talk of a reinstitution of a coalition within the Front, and there was no<br />
change in policy towards the parties outside the Front. Both leaderships stressed that there would be<br />
28<br />
This encountered a harsh reaction from the central party leadership and Boris Kidrič was suspended and “isolated” (imprisoned) for a<br />
while, because of it, until matters were straightened out. He wrote a “self-critical” letter to the central leadership, pointing out his sincere<br />
allegiance to the Party (J. Vodušek Starič, op. cit., pp. 81–82).<br />
29<br />
The relationship of the Croat leadership towards the Croat Peasant Party and their legislative autonomy, are in my judgement, the main<br />
reasons for relieving Hebrang of his functions in Croatia in October 1944.<br />
33