crimes committed by totalitarian regimes - Ministrstvo za pravosodje

Crimes committed by totalitarian regimes
and futile Serbo-Croat disputes in the political circles of the Yugoslav government and politicians in
exile.
Thus the first ZAVNOH (the Land Antifascist Council of People’s Liberation of Croatia) met in
Croatia in June 1943, and the second followed in mid-October. In Slovenia a meeting of the Slovene
people’s representatives gathered in October 1943 and elected the executive body of OF, which at
the same time assumed the function of a supreme liberation committee. To sustain and popularise
these steps, intensified party activity and party reorganisations followed. Party courses for the partisan
leadership started, especially for political commissars. They were organised by the central committee of
the CPY (Viša partijska škola CK KPJ) and on land (national) levels. The same went for other political
work (organisation of antifascist women, youth, etc.). The party gave special attention to intensification
of political propaganda against all those who had not yet made up their minds to join in, setting up
special departments for propaganda. This new policy gained momentum slowly, mainly due to a large
German offensive on the partisan forces, which lasted practically from January to June 1943 (caused by
the threat of a possible Allied invasion in the Balkans). However, as the Italian collapse approached, it
grew steadily.
In the months before September 1943, when it appeared that the war might be approaching its
end, another initiative to reach a settlement between the partisans and the counter-revolutionary forces
in Yugoslavia was made. The Soviet government, in spite of its ties with the partisan leadership, still
formally refused to intervene. The British made yet another of their many requests to Moscow, asking
in the spring of 1943 for Soviet assistance in establishing British-partisan contacts. However, Moscow’s
answer was still the same: no intervention into the chetnik-partisan relations was acceptable; it was an
internal matter of the Yugoslav people, a problem for the Yugoslav government in exile to solve. The SU
denied having any contacts with the partisans. Therefore the initiative came from King Peter. He gave a
public statement that the Yugoslav government wished for a united action against the occupation forces.
The government in London sent orders on these lines into Yugoslavia in mid-May, asking Mihajlović
to drop any contacts with the occupying forces and quislings. A similar request went to Slovenia, to the
Slovene Alliance, asking if it was possible to reach a settlement between the Alliance and the partisans,
pointing out some leading personalities on both sides (again liberals and Christian Socialists), who
would start the talks. Reciprocal killings should stop and both sides should start collaborating on the
grounds of Slovene national unity in a federal Yugoslavia. The leaders of the pre-war Slovene parties
welcomed this initiative and sent word to the partisans asking for talks with the OF.
But the answer of the CP of Slovenia was nebulous. They feared that an opening of a Balkan
front would split the Slovene anti-fascists into a pro-Soviet and a pro-British camp. So they issued
orders, to intensify the policy of drawing all the neutral elements into the Slovene Liberation Front,
but not giving their political leaders any power in the OF. At the same time their ‘opportunistic policy’
(the policy of non-involvement on either side) received public disqualification daily. The party had no
serious intention of taking up the proposed talks, but intended to use the proposals of the opposition for
propaganda purposes. 23 This was part of a general policy in Yugoslavia that advocated incorporating the
membership (the ranks) of pre-war parties into the liberation movement, thus cutting them off from their
leadership and causing the disintegration of such parties. It was also convenient to win over politicians
who were popular, by giving them symbolic, ephemeral positions. This policy was systematically carried
on in the months to come. An example of it was also the beginning of the incorporation of the Hrvatska
seljačka stranka (Croat Peasant Party) in Croatia, followed by the request that its members denounce
their leader Dr Vladko Maček, 24 followed by harsh propaganda against him (he namely upheld the
policy of postponing the uprising to the moment the allies disembarked in the Balkans). Tito’s answer
to King Peter’s initiative, telegraphed to the Comintern on 16 April was in line with such a policy:
the government in London should renounce Mihajlović and order the chetniks to join the liberation
struggle. 25 His main motive was also to prevent the possibility of military and political interference of
23
There were contacts between the OF and the so-called ‘middle’ at lower levels. These talks ended with reproaches to the OF – of
communist terror inside the liberation movement and their ‘crimes’ (political murders) against the opposition. (Dokumenti ljudske
revolucije, vol. 7, pp. 222–223, 605–607).
24
J. B. Tito, Zbrana dela, vol. 16, pp. 66–67. On 14 August 1943, Tito sent a telegram to the CC of the CP of Croatia, stating also that he
was against a Croat Peasant Party organisation inside the liberation movement. We can judge the importance of the political moment in
Croatia (the talks and relations with the HSS) by the mere fact that Tito sent three additional members of the Politburo of the CPY, with
instructions, to the Croat headquarters (Kardelj was already there).
25
J. B. Tito, Zbrana dela, vol. 15, pp. 3–5.
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