crimes committed by totalitarian regimes - Ministrstvo za pravosodje

Crimes committed by totalitarian regimes
Meaningful access to Communist secret police files is certainly not the only means to (re-)establish
the record, but it is an important vehicle in this process. It is a vehicle over which lawyers seem to
exercise disproportionately powerful controls, whether acting in the name of protecting the personal
data of those mentioned in the records, or in order to protect national security (a concern which is at
least questionable in the case of these files which were collected by secret police of antidemocratic
regimes engaged in large-scale human rights violations).
The quality of the public discourse on revelations unearthed from these files tells much about
a polity’s readiness to face its past. In many post-Communist democracies, it has become a pattern
for exposed collaborators to defend themselves by explaining how their actions in the particular
circumstances contributed to defending the “nation” from the Soviets, from complete demise, or to
defending the target person from others who might report on her in a more harmful fashion. Alternative
explanations – such as one’s young age or fear of torture – are presented in the contemporary discourse,
second order justifications with low pedigree, and are often dismissed from a moral high ground which
is not sensitive to the harsh realities faced by the victims. A series of even the most well-intended
misconceptions come to hinder the public discourse on how the Communist system operated in its
own true logic. It might be worth recalling, that in the post-Communist context, dialogue might still
entail a real exchange between victims and perpetrators, although examples of sincere encounters and
reflections are rare – at least in Hungary. 25 This is a unique opportunity, which will disappear with the
slow passage of time. It is crucial to keep in mind that missing this moment also means missing yet
another opportunity for repentance, for forgiveness, and ultimately for reconciliation.
Sadly, courts of law are dragged to take part in these national self-denial and disinformation
sessions every time widely published findings from secret police records get contested in defamation
cases. Ironically, the files which are not useful for establishing the collaborators’ guilt or innocence
in a criminal case become her best friend in defending her honor and good name from accusations of
collaboration. Discussing judicial pronouncements in such cases comes to replace honest exploration
and unhindered reflection on the participants’ roles in regrettable events.
4. By way of conclusion
Uncomfortable as it sounds, once the rhetorical veil of achievements is pierced, it becomes
apparent that the majority of post-Communist democracies rose to international recognition as stable
and reliable constitutional democracies without having meaningfully confronted their totalitarian pasts,
without having accounted for the grave and shallow wrongs their states committed, perpetrated or
simply let happen, and without having ever seriously engaged in a laborious and painful process of
societal reconciliation. These are very strong claims. Many might feel the need to interject, either to
call to our attention positive national examples where steps were taken towards the above aims, or
to add that the overall success of post-Communist constitutional democracies makes these critical
remarks largely obsolete. My goal is definitely not to question national achievements. Post-Communist
democracies have unquestionable achievements, which are truly amazing in the light of their challenging
national pasts. And apparently, this rather weak record on coming to terms with the past and in seeking
reconciliation did not prevent them so far from becoming successful members of the most prestigious
international organizations.
It is exactly due to the success of post-Communist democracies that, in conclusion, I feel the need
to point out an important – though subtle – link between the missed or failed reconciliation in a posttotalitarian
polity and the quality of constitutional democracy. When talking about quality of democracy,
I do not mean how Communist successors parties are still in national parliaments (since they obtained
sufficient support in fair and free elections), nor do I plan to lament any further on meager compensation
laws which were more humiliating than reassuring for the victims of Communist wrongs. Rather, I hope
to draw attention to declining public trust in the democratic and political sphere, in which (for lack of a
better word) populist voices are destined to obtain a rather disturbing appeal around Central Europe.
25
For an exemplary exchange, see the one between Sándor Tar, a writer who reported on his patron and mentor János Kenedi (a leading
figure of the underground opposition) for years to the Hungarian secret police. Their exchange of notes in the public press was an event
which offered much hope in Hungary.
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