crimes committed by totalitarian regimes - Ministrstvo za pravosodje
crimes committed by totalitarian regimes - Ministrstvo za pravosodje
crimes committed by totalitarian regimes - Ministrstvo za pravosodje
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Crimes <strong>committed</strong> <strong>by</strong> <strong>totalitarian</strong> <strong>regimes</strong><br />
and psychologists (just to name a few of the potentially relevant disciplines here.) However, no criterion<br />
of validation can be applied without proper access to the sources of information. Therefore, at best,<br />
lawyers should aspire to create such legal frameworks which assist in meaningfully preserving the<br />
source and form of this information, and do not prevent access to (and, thus, a better understanding of)<br />
the record on even the most regrettable and traumatic segments of the past.<br />
Regrettably – with the notable exception of Germany – access to the files generated <strong>by</strong> numerous<br />
actors of the Communist <strong>regimes</strong>, or even only to the files of the Communist secret services, has not<br />
been on the top of the agenda of the new <strong>regimes</strong>. In the early years the emphasis was on lustration or decommuni<strong>za</strong>tion,<br />
i.e. on excluding the echelons of the former oppressive regime from the governmental<br />
elite of the new one. Lustration laws were typically focusing on exposing the agents and – more<br />
dubiously – the collaborators of the Communist secret services, without paying much attention to where<br />
and from whom the information of collaboration came from. The weaknesses of lustration laws became<br />
readily apparent in most countries which adopted them. Constitutional courts typically could not stop<br />
the political steamroller of de-communi<strong>za</strong>tion. The rule of law was made to yield again to temporary<br />
measures of exception.<br />
It has become normal for former collaborators of the Communist secret services to pass lustration<br />
procedures only to be exposed in the press <strong>by</strong> political opponents at a convenient subsequent date.<br />
Lustration procedures were also extended and redesigned according to the momentary political needs of<br />
the ruling political powers of the day. The most notorious recent lustration attempt is the former Polish<br />
government’s move to expand the scope of the lustration law, well beyond the reach of the previous law,<br />
and beyond the stricto sensu political sphere. Former Polish prime ministers 13 refused to adhere to the<br />
reinvented procedure as they found it humiliating. When the Polish Constitutional Tribunal declared the<br />
new law unconstitutional, Chief Justice Jerzy Stepien stated that “a state based on the rule of law should<br />
not fulfil a craving for revenge instead of fulfilling justice”. 14<br />
An imagined alternative to lustration, the so-called “agent lists” have for a long time been a center<br />
of popular fascination. The most recent wave of exposure in Slovakia 15 , Poland 16 or Hungary 17 had<br />
a much broader audience than in previous cases due to the publicity potentials of the World Wide<br />
Web. What distinguished the Slovak example from the others is that in Slovakia, publishing the data<br />
of communist secret police agents and collaborators is part of the normal operations of the National<br />
Institute of Memory (Ústav Pamati Národa), while in the other countries, the lists emerged as a result<br />
of uninvited private contributions – attracting unusual interest and stirring considerable animosity in<br />
the public sphere. 18 The Slovak solution in its current form does contribute to setting the record straight<br />
and – directly and indirectly – to a better understanding of the past. While the emerging agent lists in<br />
early 2005 also prompted several actors on the Hungarian scene to assemble a more reliable record on<br />
the agents and prominent collaborators of the Communist secret services, 19 it is crucial to see the most<br />
important difference between the Slovak and the Hungarian case. Imagining that the same amount and<br />
13<br />
Poland’s first post-Communist prime minister Tadeusz Mazowiecki, and former Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs of Poland<br />
Wlodzimierz Cimoszewicz both refused to sign the statements required <strong>by</strong> the new law, claiming that the aim of the new procedure<br />
was simply to humiliate others. See http://www.polskieradio.pl/<strong>za</strong>granica/news/artykul51621.html (April 26, 2007). Mazowiecki’s refusal<br />
followed Bronislaw Geremek’s speech in the European Parliament.<br />
14<br />
Quoted in English from “Poland’s anti-communist law ‘unconstitutional’”, The Daily Telegraph, May 12 (2007), http://www.telegraph.<br />
co.uk/news/main.jhtml?xml=/news/2007/05/12/wpoland12.xml. See also Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe Resolution<br />
1096 (1996) on measures to dismantle the heritage of former communist <strong>totalitarian</strong> systems at para 12, emphasizing that “Revenge<br />
may never be a goal of such measures, nor should political or social misuse of the resulting lustration process be allowed. The aim of<br />
lustration is not to punish people presumed guilty – this is the task of prosecutors using criminal law – but to protect the newly emerged<br />
democracy.” As available at http://assembly.coe.int/Documents/AdoptedText/TA96/ERES1096.HTM.<br />
15<br />
The Slovak Institute of National Remembrance started publishing the files of secret service collaborators in 2004. In the case of Slovakia,<br />
the situation is further complicated because of the Czechoslovak heritage of the services.<br />
16<br />
See in 2005, the Wildstein list, published <strong>by</strong> journalist Bronislaw Wildstein (then working for Rzeczpospolita) of 240,00 names – http://<br />
www.dw-world.de/dw/article/0,1564,1480985,00.html.<br />
17<br />
In early 2005 a so-called agent list was posted (including 219 names and a signature ‘Expert 90’) on the website angelfire.com (http://<br />
www.angelfire.com/zine2/s<strong>za</strong>kerto90/). The list appeared in the aftermath of the scandal in the autumn of 2004, in which it was revealed<br />
that Péter Medgyessy, the freshly elected Prime Minister of the Hungarian Socialist Party had been a counter-intelligence agent. The news<br />
were shocking mostly because PM Medgyessy safely obtained a lustration clearance before.<br />
18<br />
The English language website of the Institute is accessible at http://www.upn.gov.sk/v2/index.php?page=about-nations-memory-institute.<br />
19<br />
At the peek of the scandal in early 2005 (mentioned at note 18, above), the Hungarian weekly Heti Világgazdaság posted its<br />
comprehensive and critical ‘agent dossier’ at http://hvg.hu/ugynok.aspx (in Hungarian). In the academic community the effort was<br />
pioneered <strong>by</strong> the historians of the 1956 Institute. See their Hungarian language portal at http://www.rev.hu/rev/html/hu/ugynok/_ugynok.<br />
html.<br />
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