crimes committed by totalitarian regimes - Ministrstvo za pravosodje

Crimes committed by totalitarian regimes
The party propaganda also kept stressing that the future of the Slovene nation was bound to the
future of the ‘great Russian people’, the Soviet Union and praised Stalin. The Slovene communists
believed that world revolution was just about to erupt, that it was unavoidable. A revolutionary upheaval
was imminent in Germany and this would end the anti-fascist coalition. 10
Their belief was so strong, that even the signature of the mutual aid pact between Great Britain and
the Soviet Union in May 1942, did not deter them. Boris Kidrič, one of the leading Slovene communists
besides Edvard Kardelj, explained (at a Slovene party conference in July 1942) that the pact was only
a slight postponement and we must be patient and wait for the moment when the SU will announce the
fight for the sovietisation of the world. 11 Such an analysis naturally brought about the conclusion that
the time has come for the second phase of the revolution and for open class struggle. Action followed:
persecution and liquidation of the clergy, the opposition, etc., on ideological grounds started in Slovenia
and in other parts of Yugoslavia (Hercegovina and Montenegro). So did the consequences of such a
policy. There was a downfall of the movement in Slovenia. Now the parties inside the Liberation Front
started to turn their backs on the communists. There was a serious decline in the numbers of the partisan
forces all over Yugoslavia. 12
The CPY was forced to abandon this revolutionary policy. However it did not do so for internal
reasons only. It came also as a result of pressure from Moscow. This pressure originated from Soviet
interests in keeping its good relations with the Western Allies. Moscow knew about all these military
and political moves of the Yugoslav partisans, since Tito was in regular contact with the Comintern. He
also made many allusions to political moves that would be useful for their common cause. At first their
communication was indirect and slow, through Kopinić in Zagreb. But from 9 February 1941, there
was a direct radio-link and political and military reports travelled back and forth daily. There was also
a partisan radio station in Moscow, Radio Free Yugoslavia. For some time even the communication
between the Slovene and Tito’s Supreme headquarters travelled through Moscow.
The Western allies were in the dark regarding these links the partisans had with the Comintern at
that time. The British kept trying to bring about a unification of the Tito and Mihajlović forces. But they
met with several obstacles: their communications with the Allied missions in Yugoslavia were irregular,
assessment of the situation in Yugoslavia was almost impossible, as was their co-operation with the ever
disputing Yugoslav government in exile. At one point, their contacts with Yugoslavia were so low, that
they tried to reach Mihajlović through the Russians (March 1942). They appealed to Moscow many
times that it should try to discipline the partisans. In return they got elusive answers and delayed replies
that the SU did not want to get involved in the partisan-chetnik quarrel. 13 However, the Comintern
did reprimand Tito because of his policy. On March 5 he got a message, that instead of a patriotic
war, he was leading a communist partisan movement and carrying on sovietisation, it questioned his
assessments of the co-operation of London with the Germans, reprimanded him for allowing a situation
to arise in which the British succeeded in organising anti-partisan forces in Yugoslavia, which again was
against the goal of their common communist cause. Other critical remarks followed in June (on behalf
of accusations of partisan reprisals) and on August 9 (regarding sectarianism of the CPY and naming
partisan units proletarian brigades). This criticism then travelled down through the hierarchy of the
partisan movement in Yugoslavia, the name proletarian brigade was replaced by udarna brigada (shock
brigade), and the policy changed to a broader patriotic one. It was, of course, only a tactical move,
well known in the communist movement. At the same time the Soviet government gave a thorough
explanation to the British government why it did not wish to back up Mihajlović and presented them
a memorandum containing proof of his collaboration with the Germans. 14 Slowly, the British began
10
This was prompted by the policy of the CC of the CP of Yugoslavia. At the turn of 1941–42, it assessed that, due to the Soviet victories
on the eastern front and Stalin’s speech on Nov. 7 1941, the war was going to end in a few months or at most in a year. Thus the time for
class struggle was right (and the counter-revolution was uniting its forces), therefore we must fight it out with all means (J. B. Tito, op.
cit., vol. 8, pp. 77, 218, 235, 236). In Slovenia talk of civil war also intensified.
11
Bojan Godeša, “Priprave na revolucijo ali NOB” (“Preparations for a Revolution or a Liberation Fight”), Slovenski upor 1941, Ljubljana
1991, pp. 74–75.
12
The same occured in other parts of Yugoslavia. For example, by July 1942, Tito had a force of only about 3,800 men left, which was also
partially due to the strong Italian offensive in May and June 1942.
13
The British-Yugoslav relations at the time are discussed in extent in: Mark Wheeler, Britain and the War for Yugoslavia, 1940–1943,
CUP, New York 1980.
14
At this point we must agree with the points made by L. J. Gibianskij, The Soviet Union and New Yugoslavia, Moscow 1987, pp. 49–52,
where he stresses that the partisan movement was receiving full support of the SU and not as some authors like to stress, especially after
the 1948 split, that Moscow supported the Yugoslav London government in exile, i.e. Mihajlović, for practical political reasons.
28