crimes committed by totalitarian regimes - Ministrstvo za pravosodje
crimes committed by totalitarian regimes - Ministrstvo za pravosodje
crimes committed by totalitarian regimes - Ministrstvo za pravosodje
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Crimes <strong>committed</strong> <strong>by</strong> <strong>totalitarian</strong> <strong>regimes</strong><br />
Sandra Kalniete<br />
Divergences within European politics with regard to<br />
communist <strong>totalitarian</strong>ism<br />
First, I would like to express my gratitude to the European Commission and the Slovenian Presidency<br />
of the European Union for organising this hearing on “Crimes Committed <strong>by</strong> Totalitarian Regimes”. More<br />
particularly, I would like to thank the President of the European Commission, Mr Jose Manuel Barroso, and<br />
the Vice-President, Mr Franco Frattini, whose personal commitment made the holding of this European<br />
hearing possible. It is the first European attempt at such a high political level to have a debate about the<br />
<strong>crimes</strong> of <strong>totalitarian</strong>ism in Europe in the 20 th century. This European hearing must become the cornerstone<br />
of the evaluation process of the political, legal and historical aspects of <strong>totalitarian</strong> communism. It is<br />
imperative in order to go beyond the consequences of the Iron Curtain in the consciousness of Europeans,<br />
to unify and render coherent, the still divided and contradictory history of Europe.<br />
In 1991, with the collapse of the Soviet Union, it seemed clear that there would be no further<br />
obstacle to the truth coming out about the <strong>crimes</strong> of communism and to their condemnation. In fact,<br />
we, who in Eastern Europe and the Baltic States, were subjected to the oppression of communist<br />
<strong>totalitarian</strong>ism, realised that the quest for justice, recognition of the truth and the condemnation of<br />
communism was meeting resistance in the corridors of power of Western democracies, in academic<br />
circles and in society in general.<br />
However, debates on post-war European history were inevitable and today that history is the basis<br />
of much dissensions among Europeans. The heated nature of discussion proves that we have not yet<br />
managed to “de-ideologise” history and that we are pursuing the political battles of the last century in<br />
this 21 st century.<br />
Until Enlargement, the post-war history of Europe was clear. To simplify, its concept was based<br />
on two mainstays – the Second World War (the winners – good and bad – and the losers) and Franco-<br />
German reconciliation (the building of the ‘common European home’). The true implications of the<br />
Iron Curtain had no place in this carefully balanced history.<br />
After Enlargement, Europeans discovered with astonishment that for Eastern Europe and the<br />
Baltic States, 1945 was not a magical year. Indeed for us, the end of the war was not a liberation, but<br />
the beginning of another tyranny, the replacing of the Nazi <strong>totalitarian</strong> regime <strong>by</strong> the Soviet <strong>totalitarian</strong><br />
regime. For Europeans from the East and the Baltic States, the war continued until the fall of the Berlin<br />
Wall and the retreat of the Red Army from Eastern Europe and the Baltic States. The last consequences<br />
of the war were wiped out on 1 st May 2004, when the Europe divided <strong>by</strong> the Iron Curtain was reunified.<br />
In the same way, the majority of Europeans did not understand that the dichotomy between “winners”<br />
and “losers” seems too simplistic for us. Our experience proves that all winners are not “good” and that<br />
all losers are not “bad”. And those who were neutral, alternatively occupied <strong>by</strong> belligerents, did not fit<br />
into this binary scheme of things.<br />
It is uncomfortable for Europeans to recognise that the building of the common European home was<br />
partly made possible <strong>by</strong> decisions taken at the Tehran Conference (1943) and the Yalta Conference (1945),<br />
when the victorious Allies accepted that the freedom of Eastern Europe and the Baltic States was to be<br />
sacrificed to the Soviet Union. The quasi-official version of post-war European history mentions but little<br />
about the ravages that followed these Allied decisions on the peoples and states left behind the Iron Curtain.<br />
These decisions left a free hand to Stalin in the Soviet Union and his henchmen in the states of Eastern Europe<br />
to carry out their repression on a grand scale. The figures show that the extreme extension of the Gulag and<br />
the large increase in the number of people deported after the war reached a paroxysm around 1950.<br />
Today each pupil in the West knows that Nazism represents Evil. They know this because, after<br />
the war there was a systematic de-nazification and the creation of a political, legal and social framework<br />
to prevent the return of <strong>totalitarian</strong> ideologies in Europe. The result of this great work is that today the<br />
majority of Europeans are conscious of the importance of thwarting at the roots any manifestation of<br />
racism, xenophobia, nationalism, religious intolerance and anti-Semitism.<br />
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