crimes committed by totalitarian regimes - Ministrstvo za pravosodje
crimes committed by totalitarian regimes - Ministrstvo za pravosodje
crimes committed by totalitarian regimes - Ministrstvo za pravosodje
You also want an ePaper? Increase the reach of your titles
YUMPU automatically turns print PDFs into web optimized ePapers that Google loves.
Crimes <strong>committed</strong> <strong>by</strong> <strong>totalitarian</strong> <strong>regimes</strong><br />
In my presentation, I am going to concentrate on the most inhuman element: the exercising of<br />
State terror <strong>by</strong> violent means, because this is the point which has particularly traumatized the whole<br />
society, causing deep wounds that are difficult to heal.<br />
Imposed <strong>by</strong> violent means, characteristic of a regime of occupation, Romanian communism was<br />
strengthened and perpetuated on a repressive base. The analysis of administrative processes of the<br />
political police during the Romanian communist <strong>totalitarian</strong> regime proves that brutality was raised<br />
to the level of a state policy, in the name of “class war” and provoked a long-term reflex, a “rendering<br />
commonplace” of evil, maintained <strong>by</strong> the political police machine. The majority of the population,<br />
terrorised <strong>by</strong> the omnipresence and violence of this machine, re-learnt to live under an occupying regime,<br />
and also unfortunately revived a tradition of a way of life long practised <strong>by</strong> Romanians throughout<br />
history. Unlike in the past, the severity imposed <strong>by</strong> Soviet-Communist occupation of Romania, which<br />
is also true for the other countries covered <strong>by</strong> the Iron Curtain, were harder, and the violence more<br />
efficiently managed. The role of imposing this harshness fell, in the case of Romanian communism,<br />
to the Securitate, as the main instrument of State terror. Paradoxically – but not fortuitously –, the<br />
term securitatea (security) was chosen, which usually expresses a state of comfort and the absence of<br />
troubles provoked <strong>by</strong> interference in the private life of the citizen, to name an institution that actually<br />
devoted itself to the limiting of the rights of man, to the point of nullifying them. And all this to support<br />
the State-Party, in the name of the dictatorship of the proletariat and the construction of socialism.<br />
But how could this have happened? This is a rhetorical question that has often been asked in the<br />
shocking times following the reversal of the communist regime. A possible answer was offered some<br />
time before, in 1985, in an essay <strong>by</strong> a dissident from East Germany, Jens Reich, a renowned professor<br />
of bio-mathematics, who explained this <strong>by</strong> “the loss of consciousness in the shadow of STASI”, the<br />
political police of the German Democratic Republic. In his text, entitled Security and cowardice: the<br />
cockroach under the lamp glass, he remarks that the power of the regime came from the control exercised<br />
<strong>by</strong> the Securitate on the processes of fear, because “next to fear imperceptibly slides cowardice in the<br />
face of authority, the constraint of behaving well, being in the line, accompanied at the same time <strong>by</strong><br />
a deft going back into one’s shell: a mixture between submission and the reflex of playing dead. The<br />
Securitate maximised its efficiency <strong>by</strong> its very existence, and not <strong>by</strong> its actions. It triggered a subtle<br />
mechanism of self-censure in the consciousness, manifested as a reflex system, nipping in the bud any<br />
fragmentation, preventing the outbreak of possible conflicts with system.” 3<br />
Before a description of the stifling atmosphere of the 1980s, and the refining of this self-censure, the<br />
author evokes the brutal repression against all opposition during the two first decades after the death of Stalin.<br />
On the one hand, the annihilation of all contestation of the regime was pursued, not only of the foundations<br />
of its legitimacy but also the standards to be observed in daily life. On the other, violence was supposed to<br />
obtain the formal adherence of the rest of the population (those who had escaped the concentration camps or<br />
imprisonment) for the benefit of the communist authorities and the State-Party policy.<br />
Violence would maintain the state of broadcast fear. The management of such fear, the result of brutal<br />
means of repression against the adversaries of the Romanian communist regime, proved to be so efficient that it<br />
created an image of an evil power, truly supernatural, for the Securitate. Fear, first cultivated and then maintained<br />
<strong>by</strong> the political police, to the benefit of the communist power, had the same effects as monarchic absolutism two<br />
centuries before and Nazism in the mid 20 th century. Despite the fact that the number of those who had direct<br />
dealings with the Securitate is quite small with respect to the total population, the majority of the population<br />
was in extreme fear of this institution. Even if, after Stalin’s death, for a brief period of three years, there was<br />
a remission of brutalities <strong>by</strong> the repressive machine, they acted even more ruthlessly and with more violence<br />
between 1957 and 1959 and increased people’s feelings of insecurity. Continual surveillance led to fear leaving<br />
the prisons and forced labour camps and going into the streets. It entered homes to reach, after two decades of<br />
reinforcement of the regime, the performance of a manipulation that no longer needs virulent repression. In the<br />
mid 1960s, anti-communist resistance in Romania was almost wiped out. The regime had been accepted and<br />
seen as an integral part of the daily universe <strong>by</strong> a large majority of the population, its principles accepted and<br />
taken on as legitimate <strong>by</strong> an even larger number of citizens in comparison with the time at which communism<br />
was established. Repression had ceased to be obvious, instead impregnating daily life. Evil became the norm<br />
after two decades of administration of violence, carried out with scientific rigour.<br />
3<br />
Jens Reich, “Sicherheit und Feigheit – der Käfer im Brennglas”, in the volume Staatspartei und Staatssicherheit, under the coordination<br />
of Siegfried Suckut and Walter Süss, Ch. Links Verlag, Berlin 1997.<br />
106