Mysticism and Philosophy
Mysticism and Philosophy Mysticism and Philosophy
Are Pure Consciousness Events Unmediated? 223 experiential implications cannot be assumed to hold for this bit of intentional grammar. What the mystic needs is a language for experience which carries no dualistic implications. Much of their language may be seen (as I have just noted) as an attempt to develop or push toward such a syntax. Expressions like "merges with," "is engulfed by," "like a drop becoming the ocean," and so on, may be thus construed. HOW THE EXPERIENTIAL EVENTS CAN BE PHENOMENALLY IDENTICAL WHILE THE SUPPOSED "OBJECTS" OF THE EXPERIENCE ARE DIVERSE A second problem arises from the divergence between intentional language and nonintentional experiences. If experiences of Purusha, Maharishi's Absolute, or Eckhart's Godhead may all be described as instances of pure consciousness events—vis-a-vis what it is like to have the experience (hereafter simply "vis-a-vis phenomenal properties")—and if scholars are not mistaken when they say that the experience of Purusha, the Absolute, or the One are states of consciousness without content, then it follows that vis-a-vis their phenomenal properties these experiences are identical. However, this is not to say (what would be absurd) that the experiences are numerically identical. Any two pure consciousness events are had by definite persons at certain times and places; the mystics' bodies and positions and conditions differ; they got into their respective states in a certain way; and so on. All these militate for a numerical nonidentity. Therefore, when I say that the experience of Purusha, the Absolute, and the One are identical, it is a form of type identity that I affirm. I mean that the experiences are identical vis-a-vis their phenomenal properties. From now on I will say simply that they are "phenomenally identical." The problem raised is this: the identification of the experiences of the One, Purusha, and the Absolute affirmed herein might seem to imply that my position presupposes or entails the identification of Patanjali's Purusha, Maharishi's Absolute, and Eckhart's Godhead. After all, if the event described in each system is described as an experience of some X, how could the experiential event in these cases be identical if that X is different in each case? Again, I do not propose to determine whether or not any particular set of mystics is, indeed, describing pure consciousness events. My attempt here is to show what must be the case if two mystics can be said to have phenomenally identical experiences.
224 The Problem of Pure Consciousness Here is my proposed solution: two pure consciousness events may be identical insofar as what it is like during those experiential are identical. To explain, let me distinguish between an objective and a subjective sense of "what is experienced" as inspired by the work of Thomas Nagel. 10 In the objective sense of the phrase, a bat and a human being each experience the same thing when a insect is two feet in front of their noses. "What is experienced" in both cases is an insect. However, in the subjective sense of the phrase, what is experienced is quite different. For what it is like to sense an insect by means of sonar must be quite different from what it is like to sense one by vision. Here there are two distinct subjective experiences—a human's and a bat's—of a single object of experience. In the case of the pure consciousness event, the reverse is true: there is a single subjective experience which the mystics claim to be the experience of quite different objects. Another example of the difference between the objective and subjective senses of "what is experienced" is a mirage. This is more symmetrical with the pure consciousness case. When a man dying of thirst in a desert hallucinates an oasis in the distance, what it is like for him to "see" that oasis is (at least with respect to what it is like visually) much the same as what it is like to really see an oasis. If it were not, we would not call it an hallucination of an oasis and not something else. For the very reason we call it a mirage of X is that what it is like to have it is much the same (we might even say exactly the same) as what it is like to have a veridical experience of X. However, it is not veridical: in the objective sense of "what is experienced," there is a difference between his oasis and ours. The point is that "what is experienced" in the subjective sense can be identical, whereas "what is experienced" in the objective sense differs. Claims of objective identity or divergence are not enough to guarantee subjective identity or divergence. Turning now to mystical texts, after careful textual analysis, we may determine that no characteristics are apparent to the subject while the mystical event is taking place. If this is true of events reported in two texts, then there are no differences on the basis of which we can differentiate the subjective sense of what it is like to experience the one mystical event (say of Purusha) from another (say of the Godhead). If any two texts describe contentless events, then we might reasonably conclude that what is experienced in each case is phenomenally the same. Under these circumstances the differences between the supposed "objects" of these experiences is immaterial to the phenomenal identity of the subjective sense of the experiences themselves. In conclusion if we maintain that there may be a difference between the
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224 The Problem of Pure Consciousness<br />
Here is my proposed solution: two pure consciousness events may be<br />
identical insofar as what it is like during those experiential are identical.<br />
To explain, let me distinguish between an objective <strong>and</strong> a subjective<br />
sense of "what is experienced" as inspired by the work of Thomas<br />
Nagel. 10 In the objective sense of the phrase, a bat <strong>and</strong> a human being<br />
each experience the same thing when a insect is two feet in front of their<br />
noses. "What is experienced" in both cases is an insect. However, in the<br />
subjective sense of the phrase, what is experienced is quite different. For<br />
what it is like to sense an insect by means of sonar must be quite different<br />
from what it is like to sense one by vision. Here there are two distinct<br />
subjective experiences—a human's <strong>and</strong> a bat's—of a single object of<br />
experience. In the case of the pure consciousness event, the reverse is<br />
true: there is a single subjective experience which the mystics claim to be<br />
the experience of quite different objects.<br />
Another example of the difference between the objective <strong>and</strong> subjective<br />
senses of "what is experienced" is a mirage. This is more symmetrical<br />
with the pure consciousness case. When a man dying of thirst in a desert<br />
hallucinates an oasis in the distance, what it is like for him to "see" that<br />
oasis is (at least with respect to what it is like visually) much the same as<br />
what it is like to really see an oasis. If it were not, we would not call it an<br />
hallucination of an oasis <strong>and</strong> not something else. For the very reason we<br />
call it a mirage of X is that what it is like to have it is much the same (we<br />
might even say exactly the same) as what it is like to have a veridical<br />
experience of X. However, it is not veridical: in the objective sense of<br />
"what is experienced," there is a difference between his oasis <strong>and</strong> ours.<br />
The point is that "what is experienced" in the subjective sense can be<br />
identical, whereas "what is experienced" in the objective sense differs.<br />
Claims of objective identity or divergence are not enough to guarantee<br />
subjective identity or divergence.<br />
Turning now to mystical texts, after careful textual analysis, we may<br />
determine that no characteristics are apparent to the subject while the<br />
mystical event is taking place. If this is true of events reported in two texts,<br />
then there are no differences on the basis of which we can differentiate the<br />
subjective sense of what it is like to experience the one mystical event (say<br />
of Purusha) from another (say of the Godhead). If any two texts describe<br />
contentless events, then we might reasonably conclude that what is experienced<br />
in each case is phenomenally the same. Under these circumstances<br />
the differences between the supposed "objects" of these experiences<br />
is immaterial to the phenomenal identity of the subjective sense of<br />
the experiences themselves.<br />
In conclusion if we maintain that there may be a difference between the
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