Preventive Resettlement of Populations at Risk of Disaster - GFDRR

lished when PROCAV II was launched were met (see
Table 4.7).
The program took twice as long as was estimated; the
main delays were as follows:
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The program extended through four municipal
governments; thus, the composition of the
executing unit changed over time. Certain
works were delayed because contracts were
suspended until they were reviewed by the new
administrations.
The complexity of the program, especially
the intervention in the favelas, the slum
upgrading works, as well as the steps needed for
expropriations, were all under-estimated.
The lack of a specific contract to support the
institution in charge of carrying out expropriation
activities—such as topographic surveys of the
buildings to be purchased, identification of real
estate records for identifying owners, demolitions,
and execution of works to modify a property in
the case of partial expropriations.
Conflicts with owners because all were offered a
uniform price, regardless of the characteristics of
their homes. This practice had to be changed.
9. Lessons Learned During
the Relocation Process
The resettlement in the streams canalization program
(PROCAV) was evaluated three times: (a) a mid-term
review in 2000; (b) an ex-post review in 2004, and (c)
a participatory assessment in 2007, with the project’s
technical staff and members of the community, to write
the project completion report, which was required by
the IDB at the end of the program.
Although they used different methodologies, the evaluations
concluded unanimously that the resettlement
process was appropriate. Although the complexities
with regard to the expropriation with cash compensation
and the resettlement in housing complexes were
underestimated, the results related to the improvement
of health conditions, flood control, and improved housing
—along with other environmental and social benefits,
and public utilities and services— confirmed that
the project and resettlement process were positive.
The following are lessons learned, based on the different
evaluations of the resettlement process connected with
the streams canalization program (PROCAV).
Table 4.7. PROCAV II Objectives
General Objective
Improve the quality of life and health of the inhabitants by canalizing streams in the most critical sub-basins of São Paulo
Specific objectives
Outcomes
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Reduce the risk of flooding by increasing the hydraulic capacity
through the canalization of various urban streams.
Reduce the risk of mudslides onto buildings or roads on the
banks of the streams included in the project.
Reduce stream pollution by eliminating the discharge of solid
wastes and untreated sewage.
Improve the health and housing conditions of the families
affected by the project by moving them to better quality homes
and by urban development of the favelas, where possible.
Improve transportation facilities in low-lying parts of the subbasins
and stream maintenance by building roads parallel to the
canalized sections.
Prevent new invasions of empty land and reduce erosion and
sedimentation by establishing and protecting green areas.
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No floods or mudslides onto buildings were recorded once work
on the 11 streams in the project was completed.
Opening the Emergency Management Center (CGE) in the initial
phase of the project, which made it possible to forecast weather
for the city of São Paulo and issue storm and flood alerts. Since
the CGE was created, there have been no reports of deaths due
to floods in the municipality.
Better traffic flows in the project area and improved facilities for
maintaining streams, once parallel roads were built.
Considerably improved health and housing conditions of families
moved to housing complexes and those benefiting from urban
development in the favelas, which were integrated within the
city.
Reduced discharge of untreated sewage and garbage into urban
streams.
Education and training for health workers on environmental and
health issues.
54 Preventive Resettlement of Populations at Risk of Disaster: Experiences from Latin America