Preventive Resettlement of Populations at Risk of Disaster - GFDRR

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Table 5.9. Main Challenges and Solutions Challenges Some community leaders opposed DPAE decisions on preventive evacuation and the resettlement process. 156 new land occupations in the area, after the 2004 census, which were not eligible for resettlement. Some were the result of lot sales “including the right to resettlement.” Legal difficulties in dealing with the new land occupations. Difficulty locating households that left by their own means after the DPAE ordered the evacuation. Reluctance of the population to provide information about origins and income, which made it harder to (a) assess their socioeconomic conditions, (b) do the financial analysis for the house purchase and (c) cover the costs of notarizing the deeds to the new houses. Insufficient supply of housing in the required price range. Households’ insistence that properties be built on 72 m 2 lots (although 76 percent had houses built of recycled material with an average area of 40 m 2 ). Some community leaders pressured households to request housing alternatives other than those arranged by the CVP, which delayed the selection process. Pressure from leaders who carried out new land occupations to be included in the resettlement. Delays in delivering the new houses by the builders, after heavy rain postponed construction; The host population resented the resettled population, believing they were among those demobilized from illegal armed groups; Resettled population was blamed for difficulties in achieving peaceful coexistence and security in the areas where they moved. Solutions Awareness-raising with each household and a standing invitation to leaders and delegates of the three sectors to round- table talks, as well as community meetings. Inter-sectoral monitoring by the District Habitat Secretariat’s Sub- Directorate of Inspection and Surveillance, District Environment Secretariat, DPAE and CVP; proceedings brought by the local mayor’s office. Installing a zonal security committee, headed by the local mayor and police chief. Involving the Government Secretariat to persuade families to leave. Establishing a grassroots housing association. Inter-agency and local authorities address the problem. The CVP posted notices in various offices calling for those families to report and a few appeared. The CVP and households jointly analyzed each household’s income-expenditure structure, by constructing life plans in which family members assumed responsibility for commitments connected to the resettlement and sustainability. The CVP promoted construction of two housing projects, with 500 housing units and urban facilities. The CVP and households jointly analyzed the advantages of houses in urban districts with the kind of development, social and community facilities they offer. Households signed certificates for the housing option they selected. Involvement of the local mayor’s office, District Habitat Secretariat, Government Secretariat, and data from prior studies, the census, and aerial photographs. Authorities offered to evacuate these households and pay one month’s rent; together, the actions were effective in most cases, as were the Government Secretariat’s efforts to persuade families to withdraw voluntarily and establish a grassroots housing association. The CVP supervised construction. Meetings in the host communities to inform them of the District’s risk management actions and its project to resettle the at-risk population; The CVP assured host communities that the households were resettled people, not part of the demobilization process; Manuals on harmonious civic relations were developed, agreements reached, and conflict resolution bodies were created. 80 Preventive Resettlement of Populations at Risk of Disaster: Experiences from Latin America
12. Lessons Learned Because the resettlement program was still being conducted and the Nueva Esperanza Rehabilitation, Reconstruction and Sustainable Development Plan will not be completed until 2015, there have not yet been any evaluations to compare the different resettlement options or the restoration of socio-economic conditions. However, the case provides important lessons related to: ■■ ■■ ■■ Incorporation of preventive resettlement programs in comprehensive disaster riskreduction plans, and land-use plans; Participation and coordination of government institutions to respond properly to the multiple resettlement dimensions; Advantages of having an institution that only directs the resettlement of at-risk populations; ■■ ■■ ■■ ■■ ■■ ■■ Control of at-risk areas to reduce the number population exposed to natural hazards; Innovative sources of financing of disaster riskreduction plans; Government subsidies for supporting low-income populations to offer access to adequate, safe houses; Community participation in the resettlement process; Promotion of risk-reduction culture in all the processes; Recovery of at-risk areas and their incorporation in the ecological structure of the Capital District. It is expected that these lessons will help other cities and countries. Chapter 5 Nueva Esperanza: A Resettlement Case with Risk Management and Land Use Planning Approach | Colombia | 81
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Preventive Resettlement of Populati
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Contents Abbreviations ............
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9. Lessons Learned During the Reloc
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10. The Transition from the Informa
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Table 6.2. Institutions Involved in
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Chapter 3 CIA COAH-INA CONAE EM-DAT
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NEPO NUDEC PPDC PROCAV SEHAB SINDEC
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CIAAP COCODE COE COMUDE CONRED DICA
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Foreword Latin America and the Cari
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options to resettle the population,
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Figure 1.1. Occurrence of Geologica
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Figure 1.4. Percentage of Deaths by
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words, 72.2 percent of the deaths w
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(Figure 1.8). In that same period,
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Ecuador and Peru) are estimated to
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the solid waste discharged into the
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Figure 1.13. The Hyogo Framework fo
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grinding poverty and weak governanc
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———. 2009a. Global Assessment
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■■ for the population affected
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Mechanisms for consulting and negot
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Photo: Willie Heinz/IDB
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Figure 3.1. Percentage of the Urban
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the unit again, to the National Dir
Page 52 and 53: ity to floods within the participat
Page 54 and 55: ecame active subjects in transformi
Page 56 and 57: These agreements could have been te
Page 58 and 59: unable to do the actual constructio
Page 60 and 61: 4.10 Use Made of Reclaimed Flood-ri
Page 62 and 63: The self-effort and mutual assistan
Page 64 and 65: References Arnold, Margaret. 2004.
Page 66 and 67: The most significant natural disast
Page 68 and 69: ■■ Organize and coordinate SIND
Page 70 and 71: canalizing streams, and carrying ou
Page 72 and 73: 4. Profile of the Population The fa
Page 74 and 75: In this option, families were tempo
Page 76 and 77: lished when PROCAV II was launched
Page 78 and 79: housing, they more readily accepted
Page 81 and 82: Chapter 5: Colombia Nueva Esperanza
Page 83 and 84: Table 5.1 Effects of the Five Sever
Page 85 and 86: B. Capital District of Bogotá Bogo
Page 87 and 88: SDPAE includes 25 institutions in t
Page 89 and 90: Initially, the amount assessed due
Page 91 and 92: Table 5.3. Participation of Capital
Page 93 and 94: Figure 5.4 Types of Houses BUILT WI
Page 95 and 96: Table 5.6 Continuation Activities E
Page 97 and 98: 7.2 Support for Moving to the New H
Page 99 and 100: in municipalities in the Andean, Ca
Page 101: were maintained. The teams of profe
Page 105: Bibliography Alcaldía Mayor de Bog
Page 108 and 109: worst threat, followed by tropical
Page 110 and 111: In its prevention activities, CONRE
Page 112 and 113: 4.3 Disaster Risk Management Model
Page 114 and 115: This integrated and culturally sens
Page 116 and 117: 4. Consequences of Tropical Storm S
Page 118 and 119: To that end, the Santiago Atitlán
Page 120 and 121: Table 6.2. Continuation Component C
Page 122 and 123: tion Commission consisting of the l
Page 124 and 125: ■■ ■■ ■■ ■■ Cultura
Page 126 and 127: ■■ ■■ ■■ ■■ ■■
Page 128 and 129: Bibliography INSIVUMEH (Instituto N
Page 130 and 131: emarkable growth is not accompanied
Page 132 and 133: synergies created to overcome one o
Page 134 and 135: and status: They went from being in
Page 136 and 137: eligious beliefs - converged to cre
Page 138 and 139: Glossary * Acceptable risk The leve
Page 140 and 141: Hazard A dangerous phenomenon, subs
Page 142 and 143: About the Authors and Contributors
Page 144: Preventive Resettlement of Populati
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