Preventive Resettlement of Populations at Risk of Disaster - GFDRR

Table 5.9. Main Challenges and Solutions
Challenges
Some community leaders opposed DPAE decisions on preventive
evacuation and the resettlement process.
156 new land occupations in the area, after the 2004 census,
which were not eligible for resettlement. Some were the result of
lot sales “including the right to resettlement.”
Legal difficulties in dealing with the new land occupations.
Difficulty locating households that left by their own means after
the DPAE ordered the evacuation.
Reluctance of the population to provide information about origins
and income, which made it harder to (a) assess their socioeconomic
conditions, (b) do the financial analysis for the house
purchase and (c) cover the costs of notarizing the deeds to the
new houses.
Insufficient supply of housing in the required price range.
Households’ insistence that properties be built on 72 m 2 lots
(although 76 percent had houses built of recycled material with an
average area of 40 m 2 ).
Some community leaders pressured households to request
housing alternatives other than those arranged by the CVP, which
delayed the selection process.
Pressure from leaders who carried out new land occupations to be
included in the resettlement.
Delays in delivering the new houses by the builders, after heavy
rain postponed construction;
The host population resented the resettled population, believing
they were among those demobilized from illegal armed groups;
Resettled population was blamed for difficulties in achieving
peaceful coexistence and security in the areas where they moved.
Solutions
Awareness-raising with each household and a standing invitation
to leaders and delegates of the three sectors to round- table talks,
as well as community meetings.
Inter-sectoral monitoring by the District Habitat Secretariat’s Sub-
Directorate of Inspection and Surveillance, District Environment
Secretariat, DPAE and CVP; proceedings brought by the local
mayor’s office.
Installing a zonal security committee, headed by the local mayor
and police chief.
Involving the Government Secretariat to persuade families to
leave.
Establishing a grassroots housing association.
Inter-agency and local authorities address the problem.
The CVP posted notices in various offices calling for those families
to report and a few appeared.
The CVP and households jointly analyzed each household’s
income-expenditure structure, by constructing life plans in
which family members assumed responsibility for commitments
connected to the resettlement and sustainability.
The CVP promoted construction of two housing projects, with
500 housing units and urban facilities.
The CVP and households jointly analyzed the advantages of
houses in urban districts with the kind of development, social and
community facilities they offer.
Households signed certificates for the housing option they
selected.
Involvement of the local mayor’s office, District Habitat Secretariat,
Government Secretariat, and data from prior studies, the census,
and aerial photographs.
Authorities offered to evacuate these households and pay one
month’s rent; together, the actions were effective in most cases,
as were the Government Secretariat’s efforts to persuade families
to withdraw voluntarily and establish a grassroots housing
association.
The CVP supervised construction.
Meetings in the host communities to inform them of the District’s
risk management actions and its project to resettle the at-risk
population;
The CVP assured host communities that the households were
resettled people, not part of the demobilization process;
Manuals on harmonious civic relations were developed,
agreements reached, and conflict resolution bodies were created.
80 Preventive Resettlement of Populations at Risk of Disaster: Experiences from Latin America