KYRGYZSTAN TODAY Policy briefs on - Department of Geography

4. One of the most effective tools for controlling the courts may be the introduction
of a mechanism for electing judges by territorial communities. However, recent
experience has shown that pubic elections are not the most reliable method of removing
corrupt individuals from power. On the other hand, if the territorial community elects
a criminal or a bribe-taker for the position of a judge, they have only themselves to
blame[4].
In this regard, a democratic procedure is currently used to elect judges in many U.S.
states. In this procedure, local level judges are elected by general vote for ten years in
office, with the right to be re-elected.
5. Strengthening the competitive nature of court hearings will also help prevent
corruption. A clear norm should be added to the Civil Procedural and Criminal
Procedural Codes, specifying that during an open hearing of a case, litigants and all
those present are free to use equipment to record the hearing without permission of the
presiding judge.
6. There should be a reasonable balance between a judge’s independence and the
availability of a specific mechanism that enables physical and legal entities to submit an
objective, open complaint against the judge and have it reviewed by relevant authorities.
In turn, the judge should also enjoy the right to protection, including the possibility of
inviting a defense attorney to the meetings of the judicial council, perhaps as well as
journalists and any public organizations. The judge should also have a clearcut resignation
mechanism.
7. Increasing judicial independence to prevent the courts from turning into a subbranch
of the executive, and reducing the pressure of the executive branch in the judiciary.
In this regard, it is crucial to strengthen the role of the courts within the framework of
the most drastic qualitative reform of the overall law enforcement system.
8. Finally, if the political will exists, comprehensive measures should be taken to
prevent individuals with unacceptable thinking and behavior from becoming judges.
Other conditions for improving anti-corruption measures in the judiciary include
legislative improvements, provision of sufficient resources, appropriate qualification of
judges, reducing the number of circumstances conducive to corruption, and supporting
public opinion.
Future trends of corruption development, including judicial corruption
In a forecast of corruption development in Kyrgyzstan, three scenarios are possible:
pessimistic, optimistic, and most probable, implying half-developed solutions to
corruption.
The first scenario looks quite sinister, but it shouldn’t be excluded. Unless
appropriate practical measures are taken to minimize corruption, above all in the
judiciary, Kyrgyzstan will ultimately find itself in a mire of corruption. If all branches
of power are totally corrupt, it will be almost impossible to solve even one significant
social, economic or political issue. In this eventuality, we can speak about the African
model, in which authorities completely submit to the major economic clans that reach
an agreement among themselves, and ensures their safe existence through political
leverage. The judiciary becomes a basic and submissive sub-branch of the ruling clan.
A more optimistic scenario implies establishing order, ensuring the fundamental
principles of the rule of law, improving the vigor of moral and psychological environment
in society, and increasing the role of civil society and state agencies, while narrowing the
legal scope and organizational aspects of corruption. This scenario is the most desirable,
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