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• existence of certain rules of the game and norms which are known to the subjects of corrupt activities; • established terminology of corruptive actions; e.g. “to get things settled” means to solve the issue through a bribe or a common friend; • an established fee for services known to those involved in it. According to a number of experts, there are set fees for not initiating a criminal case, for release from custody, or for remission of a penalty. Normally, fees depend upon the resolution and category of cases; e.g. in economic cases, the fee for settling the issue depends on the cost of the specific action. However, other experts say there are no fixed bribe rates, since every case is looked at individually. Some authors talk about such corrupt actions as rule-based corruption, “when judges ask for a bribe to fulfill their duties which they should fulfill by law” [10, p. 111]. Such cases are very common in the judiciary (making a legal court decision or announcing a legal sentence for a bribe), which involves no visible violation of the law. The issue of judicial corruption is common in all post-Soviet countries. For example, in 2004 V. Zor’kin, Chairman of the Russian Constitutional Court, said that bribery in the courts had become one of the most severe sites of corruption in Russia. Judicial corruption is integrated into various corrupt networks functioning at different power levels, e.g. in the network of destroying criminal cases and taking over someone’s business [15]. Journalists from the newspaper 24, in a study of different court cases, interviewed prominent Ukrainian lawyers and human rights activists, who helped them reach almost the same conclusion: “Ukrainian courts are stuck in corruption. There a certain scheme in the existing judicial system through which money reaches its beneficiaries, with concrete rates for the services of judges” [12]. Many publications in other CIS countries publish the same information. Top-ranking officials also recognize the existence of corruption, although indirectly. The president of Kyrgyzstan, K. Bakiev, speaking at a gathering of judges, said that the community of judges should get rid of inappropriate staff who view the position of a judge as a business, and thus severely damage the image of justice. We should part with such judges, he said, with no regret [2, p. 11]. In 2000, a large sociological survey on corruption was conducted in Kyrgyzstan, when 2,100 respondents were interviewed. According to the survey data, gathered from the public, the courts and prosecutor’s offices are number two in the list of most corrupt organizations (83 percent of the respondents said corruption is spread widely there) [8, p. 28]. Most experts interviewed believe that the situation is not likely to have changed drastically since that time, although in recent years (starting in 2005) the level of public trust toward courts and law enforcement agencies has become somewhat higher. In 2000, those who researched corruption reached the conclusion that, when corruption permeates uniformed services, and particularly law enforcement agencies (police and prosecution), it is especially dangerous for society. In the long run, this may lead to the merging of corrupt elements in the state with economic crime, and result in the following: – launching “complex brigades” that making money from destroying criminal cases; – pressure of law enforcement agencies on business rivals in return for bribes; – precedents of law enforcement officers who also join commercial structures and embrace both roles [8, p. 32]. 146
The evidence demonstrates that the researchers’ forecasts were accurate. It is worth mentioning that it is not possible to identify the scale of judicial corruption accurately, because such crimes are typically well concealed. Judicial corruption schemes The system of corruption in Kyrgyzstan is similar to other such schemes in other countries. Often, a professional lawyer who acts in the interests of his client also becomes a mediator in bribing a judge, and sometimes even initiates this process. An experienced lawyer does his best to make his client’s case go to a particular judge (usually decided by a Chairman of court), who is already bribed by the same lawyer. In the area of combating corruption among law enforcement agencies, there is a notion called a pocket lawyer. Normally, a pocket lawyer hints to his or her client about personal contacts, saying that all issues could be settled if the client pays for it. More often than not, pocket lawyers become permanent intermediaries in bribery between corrupt judges and prosecutors, on the one hand, and their clients, on the other. Garmaev speaks about such a set of judges (investigators, prosecutors) and pocket lawyers as a criminal group that extorts large amounts of money from suspects and their relatives, and members of criminal groups, for making decisions in their favor. This might include either legal and illegal decisions [3]. Sometimes relatives, friends or assistants of a judge may act as go-betweens. Intermediaries guarantee that a case will end in favor of the person who gave the bribe. Typically, part of the money is transferred before the hearing and the rest afterwards. If, for some reason, the person giving the bribe is not satisfied with the ruling, he or she may get the money back through the same intermediary. This happens in cases when a judge is bribed instead by the other litigant, or higher-ranking officials use administrative pressure. Corrupt judges rarely take bribes, though this happens in extreme cases, or when they are too self-assured. For example, in August 2008, officers of the National Security Committee arrested the Chairman of the Jumgal rayon court in his own office at the moment of receiving a bribe of twenty thousand Kyrgyz soms. Some judges fulfill their duties in good faith. However, even individual cases of corrupt judges may blemish the entire judiciary. Peculiarities of judicial corruption For a number of political and economic reasons, the level of corruption varies across different regions of Kyrgyzstan. Since Bishkek, the official capital, and Osh, the southern capital, are the locations of major financial flows, money and human resources, or the so-called business centers, certain markets of corruption-oriented services emerged in these two towns (mostly in Bishkek). The existence of corruption networks is logical, as are the numerous clashes of interests between business structures, criminal groups, controlling and supervisory organizations. The overwhelming majority of large business structures is located in the capital. Since the regions develop differently, there is a clear difference between provincial areas and the capital, including the level and scale of corruption. According to experts, the scale of corruption varies across the range of court levels. Clearly, judges in the courts of review and courts of appeal where cases are reviewed 147
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Social Research Center American Uni
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The Social Research Center (SRC) at
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Galina Plakhotnikova, Aida Kurbanov
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Sheradil Baktygulov, Independent Ex
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among decision-makers and in genera
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References and Sources 1. Bates R.
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Kyrgyzstan, they did not have a cle
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awareness of implementation of thes
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also tried to participate in develo
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and its regional programs, to devel
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development in both urban and rural
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the participants of public hearings
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Social Development as the spokesper
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Nookatbek Idrisov, Director of the
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membership fees, donations, grants)
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its founders, members, participants
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Kanykey Jailobaeva, PhD Candidate a
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NGOs to involve the government and
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over the implementation of its init
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presence of those major elements of
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arises; this problem is now apparen
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Page 153 and 154: Many factors contribute to this cor
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Page 157 and 158: To university students: 1. To chang
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