Secularization as Kenosis
Secularization as Kenosis
Secularization as Kenosis
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182 | postmodern condition and secularity<br />
regard to the validity of interpretations. Interpretations have to accord with weakening,<br />
<strong>as</strong> a realization of what Nietzsche called ‘the accomplishment of nihilism’. A postmodern<br />
culture, in which the need for Truth in an objective sense is no longer felt, is for<br />
Vattimo the accomplishment of this positive nihilism. 40 This nihilism is not a downright<br />
refusal to be ontological. Rather it is the specific ontology that emerges when we,<br />
<strong>as</strong> Nietzsche described it, ‘roll from the center toward X.’ The ontology proper to postmodernism<br />
is no longer related to a central human subject, rather the experience is one<br />
of a decentering of the human subject.<br />
The crucial problem of this nihilism is that the philosophy of Heidegger w<strong>as</strong> designed<br />
to describe an authentic way of being human in a nihilistic culture and in that<br />
sense Heidegger cannot be interpreted <strong>as</strong> a nihilist. Vattimo is aware of his unfamiliar<br />
interpretation of Heidegger. 41 His focus is, however, much more on the later works of<br />
Heidegger, in which no longer the ‘gap’ between beings and Being is central, but the<br />
presence of Being in beings in history. 42 Nihilism in this sense is a positive experience<br />
of the world, but it is no longer anthropocentric or humanistic. 43<br />
Another way to articulate this nihilism is to speak of a reduction of being to value.<br />
This is not to say, a reduction to the subject that <strong>as</strong>cribes value, but a reduction to<br />
exchange value. 44 Vattimo finds this version of nihilism coherent with the idea of the<br />
death of God in Nietzsche’s philosophy. Nietzsche did not give up the idea of value<br />
<strong>as</strong> such, only the idea of the highest values. The resulting nihilist account of value is<br />
the reduction of being to exchange value. Values are, so to speak, ordered horizontally<br />
and can be endlessly reinterpreted (exchanged). This replaces the metaphysical, vertical<br />
ordering of values. In a postmodern sense, there is no “terminal or interrupting instance<br />
of the highest value (God) to block the process”. In a postmodern, Nietzschean sense,<br />
values can be displayed “. . . in their true nature, namely <strong>as</strong> possessing the capacity for<br />
convertibility and an indefinite transformability or processuality.” 45<br />
With this understanding of nihilism in mind, <strong>as</strong> entailing (a) a positive nihilism<br />
and (b) an account of value <strong>as</strong> exchange value, we can see the original position of Vattimo<br />
in the philosophy of the second half of the twentieth century. In the course of<br />
the post-war period, there have been various movements that have tried to counter the<br />
advent of nihilism. In the wake of Heidegger, this h<strong>as</strong> for example been expressed in a<br />
discourse of authenticity, <strong>as</strong> in existentialism. Nihilism is understood <strong>as</strong> a loss of transcendent<br />
meaning, which leaves us more and more subject to bureaucracy, technology<br />
and an incre<strong>as</strong>ingly impersonal society. When Vattimo defines nihilism <strong>as</strong> ‘universal<br />
40 “Today we begin to be, or are able to be, accomplished nihilists.”Vattimo, End of Modernity, 19.<br />
41 He states : “Nevertheless, it would appear that Heidegger’s mode of thought is the opposite of nihilism,<br />
at le<strong>as</strong>t in the sense in which nihilism signifies that process which not only eliminates Being <strong>as</strong> foundation<br />
but forgets about being altogether. Nihilism, according to a p<strong>as</strong>sage from Heidegger’s Nietzsche, is<br />
that process in which in the end ‘there is nothing left of Being’ <strong>as</strong> such.” Vattimo, End of Modernity, 118.<br />
42 Van Reijen writes: “Diese Wahrheit des Seyns ist gar nichts vom Seyn Verschiedenes, sondern sein<br />
eigenstes Wesen, und deshalb liegt es an der Geschichte des Seyns, ob es diese Wahrheit und sich selbst verschenkt<br />
oder verweigert und so erst eigentlich in seine Geschichte d<strong>as</strong> Abgründige bringt.” Willem van Reijen,<br />
‘Heideggers ontologische Differenz. Der fremde Unterschied in uns und die Instandigkeit im Nichts’, Deutsche<br />
Zeitschrift für Philosophie 52/4 (2004), 519–540.<br />
43 Vattimo writes: “Nihilism concerns first of all Being itself, even if this point should not to be taken<br />
to mean that nihilism is a matter of considerably more and different things than ‘simply’ humanity.” Vattimo,<br />
End of Modernity, 20.<br />
44 Vattimo, End of Modernity, 21.<br />
45 Vattimo, End of Modernity, 21.