Secularization as Kenosis

secularization as kenosis | 213
ern politics the notion of difference plays a dominant role. The older utopian ideologies
were flawed in absolutizing a single particular concept; the postmodern utopia is the
‘utopia of the manifold’. 188 But if the aim of postmodern politics is to realize a society
in which theoretically endless plurality is desired, how can it be something other than
downright anarchy? For Vattimo it is clear that a society that is secular in a postmodern
sense is no longer organized according to a dichotomy of Church and state. In a postmodern
sense, the modern nation-state is also unmasked as an unjust concentration of
power in a central sovereignty. What then is Vattimo’s proposal for a postmodern politics?
How does he see the classical distinction of Church and state? And what are the
ramifications of the relatedness of secularization and hermeneutics for Vattimo’s political
ideas on secularity and religion? It is clearly not his intention to simply do away with
the history of utopian politics. His effort is to apply the Heideggerian notion of Verwindung
to the Utopian ideal. His political theorizing of secularization and hermeneutics
means first of all that Vattimo insists on the essential continuity between Christianity
and secular politics. How does Vattimo see the relation between present-day liberal
culture and the role of religion in society? Does the rebirth of religion make an end
to the privatization of religion and the Church-state divide? Vattimo does not think
this was ever really the case. It was precisely the greater – more or less unconscious –
continuity between Christian Europe and secular Europe that made secularization possible.
As Vattimo sees it ‘this separation succeeded only because it was realized on the
solid, if unacknowledged, basis of a common religious heritage.’ 189 The liberal separation
of public and private sphere and Church and state was possible on the basis of a
tacit agreement on essentially Christian values. 190 When we speak of Christianity, says
Vattimo, we also speak of ‘liberal society, of the West, and of modern democracy.” 191 It
is exactly this compatibility or even identity of (Christian) religion and liberal democracy
that is at stake for Vattimo. He wants to oppose any attempt to separate liberalism
and religion along the lines of an anti-modernity or communitarian discourse (‘cultural
apartheid’ 192 )
One of the most pressing concerns behind the quarrel over the legitimacy of the
secular is its claim to neutrality. Vattimo subscribes to the idea that in the 16th and 17th
century, starting with the Reformation, Christianity has become a source of disagreement
and violence, instead of a unifying power. He is critical about the way liberal
politics has dealt with it since. Religion was declared a private matter and increasingly
banned from the public arena. Today, however, not least as a consequence of the growth
of non-Christian religions in Europe, such as Islam, it is questionable whether the neutral
approach still works. Secularity as neutrality is experienced by Muslims as a threat
to authentic religious experience. 193 Moreover, argues Vattimo, neutrality with regard
to religious matters is possible due to a tacit agreement that has a Christian inspiration.
The success of a profane, public sphere was made possible, not despite, but thanks to
a large amount of tacit agreement on Christian morality. 194 Therefore, we will always
York: Harper Collins, 2007), 38–122.
188 Welsch, Postmoderne Moderne, 183.
189 Vattimo, After Christianity, 95e.
190 Vattimo, After Christianity, 100.
191 Vattimo, After Christianity, 97.
192 Vattimo, After Christianity, 102.
193 Vattimo, After Christianity, 100.
194 “. . . the separation succeeded, because it arose on the firm basis of a (not as such recognizable)