Secularization as Kenosis
Secularization as Kenosis
Secularization as Kenosis
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186 | postmodern condition and secularity<br />
centering around such notions <strong>as</strong> ‘freedom, choice, and unpredictability of behaviour’. 60<br />
The emergence of nihilism, and the historizing of difference, lead to a culture in<br />
which the human subject is no longer in the center. Vattimo thus agrees with Heidegger’s<br />
critique of humanism. For Heidegger, humanism lies at the root of the reification,<br />
technologization, and secularization characteristic of the modern world. 61 Instead of<br />
trying to save the core of humanism, Vattimo suggest seeing the crisis of humanism<br />
<strong>as</strong> a part of the crisis of metaphysics. The centrality of the subject is at the root of<br />
both metaphysics and its ‘most advanced development’: technology. We can neither<br />
reappropriate humanism, nor leave it behind. Instead we relate to it in the mode of<br />
Verwindung. For Heidegger, Verwindung means healing. We have to recover from humanism<br />
and metaphysics. What we cannot do is simply ‘amputate’ it. Vattimo sees the<br />
emergence of a m<strong>as</strong>s culture, made possible by technology, <strong>as</strong> the postmodern mode<br />
of humanism. 62 Thus secularization, in the meaning Vattimo <strong>as</strong>cribes to it, not only<br />
concerns the relation of Church and state, but is also characterized by a post-human<br />
perspective. The human self is now considered <strong>as</strong> composed of ‘many mortal souls’. 63<br />
In Vattimo’s reading of Heidegger, there is one more element that is significant for<br />
Vattimo’s understanding of secularity. In the wake of Heidegger, there is also a philosophical<br />
reflection on the idea of Lebenswelt. Vattimo describes this <strong>as</strong> a philosophy<br />
centering around the idea of a world that ‘stands prior to any possible fixing of categories.’<br />
A turn to the world would, for Vattimo, imply staying within the scheme of<br />
subjectivity and objectivity. His rejection of Gadamer’s interpretation of the notion of<br />
Erde in the work of Heidegger is instrcutive here. For Gadamer, the idea of Erde functions<br />
<strong>as</strong> a critique of the centrality of subjective consciousness. For Vattimo, however,<br />
Heidegger is after a perspective that leaves the duality of subject and object behind. As<br />
Vattimo sees it, the ‘recovery’ of the irdisch or earthly character of D<strong>as</strong>ein, cannot be<br />
understood in terms of a reappropriation. 64 Being, for Vattimo, is an immanent experience<br />
of Ereignis, but this immanent experience may not be understood in a material<br />
sense. The immanentism Vattimo h<strong>as</strong> in mind is characterized by a differential logic,<br />
according to which Being shows itself in the experience of the continuously changing.<br />
Vattimo’s position in contemporary philosophy can thus be located more precisely.<br />
As a postmodern thinker, he confronts the reappropriative intention. Instead of saving<br />
from nihilism a core of human subjectivity and humanism, Vattimo’s effort is to get<br />
1.<br />
60 Vattimo, End of Modernity, 34.<br />
61 Gail Soffer, ‘Heidegger, humanism, and the destruction of history’, The Review of Metaphysics 1 (1996),<br />
62 “Technology does not represent the crisis of humanism because the triumph of rationalization subverts<br />
rationalistic values, <strong>as</strong> superficial analyses have led us to believe; rather, it does so because – in representing<br />
the fulfillment of metaphysics – it calls humanism to an act of overcoming or Verwindung.” He<br />
sketches the perspective of an overcoming of metaphysics, which is also an overcoming of humanism, <strong>as</strong> follows:<br />
“. . . humanity can take leave of its own subjectivity, which is defined in terms of the immortality of the<br />
soul, and can instead recognize that the self is a bundle of ‘many mortal souls’, precisely because existence<br />
in a technologically advanced society is no longer characterized by continual danger and consequent acts of<br />
violence. Vattimo, End of Modernity, 41.<br />
63 Vattimo, End of Modernity, 41.<br />
64 “The intensity with which Heidegger explores in his late works the notion of Ereignis and the related<br />
concepts of Vereignen, Ent-eignen, and Über-eignen, can be explained <strong>as</strong> more than just a concern for<br />
the nature of Being <strong>as</strong> an event which is not simply present; rather, it is an effort to free his original concept<br />
of Eigentlichkeit, or authenticity, from any suggestion of potential reappropriation which would still be<br />
metaphysical and humanistic.” Vattimo, End of Modernity, 44.