Marginalia to Being and Time - Religious Studies at Stanford ...

thrownness
384.6-7 384.6-7 435.27-29 351.25-26
Text in SZ:
“Only being free for death gives Dasein its goal outright and pushes existence into
its finitude.”
In the left margin:
finitude
384.7-11 384.7-11 435.29-33 351.26-29
Text in SZ:
“When grasped, the finitude of existence pulls Dasein back from the endless array
of readily available possibilities S comfortableness, sloughing off, taking matters
lightly S and delivers Dasein into the simplicity of its fate.”
In the left margin, in cursive:
fate cf. 386 186
384.11-14 384.11-14 435.33-36 351.29-32
Text in SZ:
“[By the word “fate”] we designate Dasein’s original being-historical, which lies
in authentic resolution and in which Dasein frees itself for itself S free for death S
in a possibility that it has both inherited and chosen.”
In the left margin:
N.B. 187
384.30-36 384.30-35 436.14-20 352.2-7
Text in SZ:
“But if fateful Dasein, as being-in-a-world, exists essentially in being-with others,
its being-historical is a co-being-historical, and is determinative for it as shared
fate [Geschick]. This is how we designate the being-historical of the community,
of a people. Shared fate is not cobbled together out of individual fates, any more
than being-with-each-other can be understood as the coming together of several
subjects.”
In the left margin, partly in cursive:
shared fate ([of the] community) and fate (of the individual)
385.11-14 385.11-13 437.6-8 352.19-24
Text in SZ (all in italics):
“Only an entity whose very being is essentially becoming, such that it can be
186 Husserl’s reference is to SZ-1 386.28-29. SZ-15 386.27-28, BT-1 438.22-23 = BT-2 353.20-21.
See also the following footnote.
187 This mark appears so close to the previous one that the two may well be meant as a single
marginal note.