Nicolai
Nicolai
Nicolai
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<strong>Nicolai</strong> Hartmann and his philosophy of music<br />
By Robert Carroll<br />
In an essay entitled Om musik och mening, STM 1976/2 (pp. 5-18), Ingmar<br />
Bengtsson writes, "Intresset för vissa grundläggande musikfilosofiska och musik-<br />
estetiska frågor, inte minst sådana avseende 'mening', 'innehåll', 'förståelse', har<br />
alldeles påtagligt blossat upp på nytt-och på nya sätt-just under 1970-talet."<br />
Discussing the understanding of music in the light of ontology, semiology, and<br />
hermeneutics, Bengtsson refers to a number of thinkers, continental and other.<br />
One of these is the German philosopher <strong>Nicolai</strong> Hartmann (1882-1950), whose<br />
analysis of the "Seinsweise und Struktur des ästhetischen Gegenstandes" and theory<br />
of strata are mentioned (Bengtsson pp. 12, 16). It is my intention to follow up<br />
with a fuller presentation of Hartmann and his philosophy of music for Scandi-<br />
navian readers.<br />
Hartmann came from Riga and was first a student of medicine and classical<br />
philology. He later pursued philosophical studies at Marburg, then a center of<br />
Neo-Kantianism under the leadership of Hermann Cohen and Paul Natorp. He<br />
was also active in Cologne, Berlin, and Göttingen. Hartmann was a prolific writer<br />
in almost all areas of philosophy and his production reveals scholarly penetration<br />
of an astounding scope and breadth. His sentences, often short and pithy, are a<br />
model of clarity and logic, contrasting sharply with the long-winded and unwieldy<br />
writing of much German philosophy, past and present. Also typical of Hartmann<br />
is an unusually keen sense for the organization and systematizing of his material.<br />
Hartmann broke away from the Neo-Kantian school and forged his way in the<br />
direction of a new critical ontology. A certain influence from the phenomenolo-<br />
gists can be discerned, especially Edmund Husserl and Max Scheler. Hartmann<br />
did not have too much in common with the "philosophy of existence" as it was<br />
represented e.g. in the thought of Karl Jaspers and Martin Heidegger. He rejected<br />
the idea that anxiety and death are privileged sources of philosophical insight.'<br />
Hartmann was not given to mysticism but wrote in a matter-of-fact sort of way,<br />
conceiving his ontology to be a universal science. His oeuvre has an encyclopedic<br />
character-in the tradition of Aristotle and Hegel.<br />
1 "Das metaphysische Gaukelspiel der Angst, gesteigert durch die Unmoral zuchtloser Selbst-<br />
quälerei, ist die unversiegbare Quelle endloser Irrung. Es berührt wunderlich, wenn man sieht,<br />
dass ernsthafte Denker in der Durchbildung philosophischer Theorien diesem Gaukelspiel ver-<br />
fallen und die Angst zum Ansatz der Selbstbesinnung auf das Echte und Eigentliche des Menschen<br />
machen ... So Martin Heidegger in seiner bekannten Analyse der Angst; und zwar mit aus-<br />
drücklicher Bevorzugung der Todesangst. Er folgt darin dem unseligsten und raffiniertesten aller<br />
Selbstquäler, den die Geschichte kennt, Sören Kierkegaard." (Zur Grundlegung der Ontologis, p.<br />
197.) See also Hartmann's criticism of Heidegger's "Seinsfrage" in the same book-the chapter<br />
entitled "Ein heutiger Versuch. Fehler im Ansatz" (pp. 43-46).
Hartmann believed that the world could be investigated and understood as a<br />
system, but was just as convinced that the days of speculative metaphysical system-<br />
building were over. In the foreword to his book Der Aufbau der reden Welt<br />
(1940) he writes, ”Ich höre immer wieder den Vorwurf, ich hatte der Philosophie<br />
das Recht, auf ein ’System’ hinzuarbeiten, abgesprochen, täte dabei aber selbst<br />
nichts anderes als ein philosophisches System zu bauen.” (P. VI.) He answers his<br />
critics, however: ”Da ist doch den Herren Kritikern ein mir kaum begreifliches<br />
Missverständnis untergelaufen. Sie haben das System der Welt mit dem System<br />
der Philosophie, das Suchen nach ersterem mit dem fabulierenden Gedankenspiel<br />
des letzteren verwechselt. Niemals habe ich bestritten, dass die Welt, in der wir<br />
leben, ein System ist, und dass die philosophische Erkenntnis dieser Welt auf Er-<br />
kenntnis ihres Systems hinauslaufen muss. Bestritten habe ich stets nur, dass solche<br />
Erkenntnis von einem vorentworfenen Systemplane ausgehen dürfe-gleich als<br />
wüssten wir schon vor aller Untersuchung, wie das Weltsystem beschaffen ist-,<br />
um dann hinterher die Phänomene hineinzuzwängen, soweit das geht, und abzu-<br />
weisen, soweit es nicht geht. Dieses haben die spekulativen Systeme der Metaphysik<br />
von den Anfangen der Philosophie bis auf unsere Zeit getan. Darum hat sich<br />
keines von ihnen halten können. Systeme dieser Art sind es, die m. E. in der Tat<br />
heute ausgespielt haben.” (P. VIII.)<br />
Hartmann’s conception of knowledge2 is probably pretty much the same as<br />
that of the ordinary man. There is a basic separation (gegenseitige Urgeschieden-<br />
heit) between the knower (subject) and the known (object), which is called ”trans-<br />
cendence’’. Knowledge consists in a ”siezing” (erfassen) of an object. Being-in-<br />
itself becomes an object when it is ”objiziert” or exposed to a subject The subject<br />
reaches out, siezes, and gathers in information about the object. What is brought<br />
back is, of course, not the object itself but an image (Bild) of the object<br />
Hartmann’s theory of culture is given its most extensive treatment in Das<br />
Problem des geistigen Seins (1933). An examination of the structure of the world<br />
reveals the following strata: matter and physical processes, the realm of the or-<br />
ganic, the human soul, and spirit (Geist). This last realm of being can be under-<br />
stood to include, besides knowledge and the laws of logic, ”die Sphäre des Wollens<br />
und Handelns, der Wertung, des Rechts, des Ethos, der Religion, der Kunst” (p.<br />
14). Each stratum has its own principles or categories and the being of each stra-<br />
tum can be comprehended only from the standpoint of its own categories: ”Das<br />
Reich der Kategorien ist nicht monistisch angelegt; Erklärung der ganzen Welt<br />
aus einem Prinzip oder Prinzipiengruppe ist ein Ding der Unmöglichkeit. Wo<br />
und wie immer sie versucht wird, da fuhrt sie zur Vergewaltigung kategorialer<br />
Eigenart (P. 15). Futhermore, in the structure of the world, the higher strata<br />
are borne (getragen) by the lower strata. In this sense, the higher strata do<br />
not have independent being, but only ”aufruhendes Sein”-i.e. they ”rest upon”<br />
the lower strata. ”Man kann dieses Aufruhen als durchgängige Abhängigkeit<br />
des Höheren vom Niederen verstehen: ohne materielle Natur kein Leben, ohne<br />
2 Grundzüge einer Metaphysik der Erkenntnis (1921). See also Das Problem des geistigen<br />
Seins, Chapter 10, ”Die Objektivität” (pp. 99-106).<br />
Leben kein Bewusstsein, ohne Bewusstsein keine geistige Welt.” (P. 15.) Although<br />
the lower categories are the stronger and the higher are dependent on them,<br />
the higher are nonetheless autonomous: ”Die besondere Gestaltung und Eigenart<br />
der höheren [strata} hat Über ihr {the lower) unbegrenzten Spielraum. Das<br />
Organische ist zwar getragen vom Materiellen, aber sein Formenreichtum und<br />
das Wunder der Lebendigkeit stammen nicht aus ihm her, sondern treten als<br />
ein Novum hinzu. Ebenso ist das Seelische über dem Organischen, das Geistigen<br />
über dem Seelischen ein Novum. Dieses Novum, das mit jeder Schicht neu ein-<br />
setzt, ist nichts anderes als die Selbständigkeit oder ’Freiheit’ der höheren Kate-<br />
gorien über den niederen.” (P. 15.)<br />
There are three forms of spirit (types of cultural being): ”der personale Geist”,<br />
i. e. the person as a cultural human being who works his way up from a state of<br />
vital instincts and tension (Spannung) to the realm of consciousness and freedom,<br />
who achieves a ”Distanz zur Sache” and orients himself objectively in the world;<br />
”der objektive Geist”, which includes the realms of language, science, law, morals,<br />
life-style, religion, art, and technology-in other words a ”Weltanschauung”; and<br />
”der objektivierte Geist” (objectified spirit)-created works of art and thought<br />
which are passed on to each succeeding generation. These have being and meaning<br />
”for” a human being who can understand them and they bear witness of the ”Zeit-<br />
geist” of former epochs. Moreover, there is a struggle between the living and<br />
objectified spirits (Ringen des lebenden Geistes mit dem objektivierten) which we<br />
recognize as that eternal ”Auseinandersetzung” of the new with the old, the revo-<br />
lutionary against the conservative. In this way the living spirit can free himself<br />
from the ”Fessel des Geistes” (fetters of the spirit), i. e. reject what is not genuine<br />
in a ”Weltanschauung” but preserve what is valuable in tradition. Thus, art can<br />
be a kind of ”Selbstbefreiung” from that which burdens and oppresses.<br />
The primary source for Hartmann’s philosophy of music is his Ästhetik (1953),<br />
although he does touch briefly upon music in Das Problem des geistigen Seins.<br />
The former work, which was published posthumously and edited by his wife, Frida,<br />
appears in only about one-third of the final draft. This book not only includes<br />
ontological investigations of the arts in general but also deals with the structure<br />
of the aesthetic act and object. I will present here some results of the investigations<br />
concerning the aesthetic act and object and extract from the book the more im-<br />
portant thoughts on the art of music.<br />
The philosophical attitude of the aesthetician differs from the visionary attitude<br />
of the creative artist and from that of a person experiencing a work of art. Ӏsthe-<br />
tik ist eine Art Erkenntnis, und zwar mit der echten Tendenz, Wissenschaft zu<br />
werden.” (Ästhetik, p. 1.) The object of this knowledge is just that artistic ex-<br />
perience and visionary attitude, and also the beautiful. It is a mistake to assume<br />
that the aesthetical ”view” (Anschauung) is a comprehension (Erfassen) in the<br />
same way that the comprehension of knowledge is. This theory was held by Alex-<br />
ander Baumgarten (with his ”cognitio”) and Schopenhauer. Nevertheless there<br />
is an element of ”Erkennen” in the aesthetical ”Schau” or ”viewing” and that is<br />
the sensual perception which is the basis of the act. But other act-elements are<br />
more characteristic of this ”Schau”, namely evaluation (Bewertung), being attrac-
ted (Hingezogensein), being gripped (Festgehaltensein), surrendering (Hingege-<br />
benheit), enjoyment (Genuss), and being enraptured (Entrücktsein). ”Auch die<br />
Anschauung selbst bekommt hier einen anderen Charakter als im theoretischen<br />
Felde. Sie eben ist weit entfernt, bloss sinnliches Hinschauen zu sein. Und die<br />
höheren Stufen der Schau sind kein bloss hinnehmendes Auffassen mehr, sondern<br />
zeigen eine Seite produktiven Erschaffens, wie sie das Erkenntnisverhaltnis weder<br />
kennt noch kennen darf.” (P. 4.)<br />
The beautiful is always related to a ”viewing” subject, whose special act-attirude<br />
is presupposed. Thus, the investigation can proceed in two directions: analyses can<br />
be made of the aesthetic object and of the aesthetic act. Another division makes<br />
four possible directions: regarding the aesthetic object, investigations can be made<br />
of the structure and way of being (Seinsweise) and also the aesthetical value-<br />
character (Wertcharakter); regarding the aesthetic act, the perceiving (empfang-<br />
enden) act of the viewer and the productive act of the creative artist can be ana-<br />
lyzed. This last act poses almost insurmountable difficulties for investigation:<br />
”Nichts ist dunkler und geheimnisvoller als das Tun des schaffenden Künstlers.<br />
Auch die eigenen Aussagen des Genialen über sein Tun bringen in das Wesen<br />
der Sache nur wenig Licht. Meist beweisen sie nur, dass auch er von dem Wunder,<br />
das in ihm und durch ihn vollbracht wird, nicht mehr weiss ais die anderen.” (P. 8.)<br />
The act-element of pleasure has been discussed by Plotinus, and Kant in his<br />
analysis of beauty has two expressions for this: ”Lust” (pleasure) and ”Wohl-<br />
gefallen’’ (satisfaction). Furthermore, what Kant called ”Geschmacksurteil” ( judg-<br />
ment of taste) was nothing else than the expression of satisfaction. According to<br />
Hartmann, however, the most important element in this act-structure is the<br />
”Schau”: ”Die Lust oder der Genuss und das darin verborgene Werturteil haben<br />
schon mehr den Charakter der Reaktion auf den im Schauen empfangenen Ein-<br />
druck, sie sind beantwortende Akt-momente und darum im ganzen Aktgefüge<br />
nicht das Erste.” (P. 16.)<br />
Hartmann distinguishes two types of ”viewing” in the aesthetic act. The first,<br />
”Schau erster Ordnung”, is simply the sensual perception of the art-work. The<br />
second ”viewing”, ”Schau zweiter Ordnung”, is imaginative and creative, and<br />
sees what the senses cannot directly perceive, e.g. the atmosphere in a landscape,<br />
emotion or passion in the human soul, conflict in a drama. I would add the pas-<br />
toral atmosphere in an opera of Rameau, the Christmas mood in a ”pastorale”<br />
of Corelli or Locatelli and the ”Awakening of pleasant feelings upon arriving<br />
in the country” in Beethoven’s sixth symphony. These two types of viewing are<br />
always together and complement each other: ”es handelt sich im ästhetisch auf-<br />
nehmenden Akt um die Hintereinanderschaltung von zweierlei Anschauung; und<br />
erst das Zusammenwirken beider macht das Eigentümliche der künstlerisch<br />
schauenden Haltung aua” (P. 18.)<br />
In Kritik der Urteilskraft Kant characterizes this relationship as a ”Spiel der<br />
Gemütskräfte”, the ”powers” involved being the imagination (Einbildungskraft)<br />
and understanding (Verstand). However, according to Hartmann one of the two<br />
is obviously sensual (sinnlich). But ”Einbildungskraft” would be an adequate<br />
expression for ’’Schau zweiter Ordnung”. Therefore Kant has gone too high in the<br />
hierarchy of powers with ”Verstand”. Hartmann agrees, however, with Kant in<br />
that ”...das Geschmacksurteil ist nur der gedankliche Ausdruck dessen, was die<br />
Lust unmittelbar fühlbar macht” (p. 19).<br />
Hartmann distinguishes between representing (darstellende) and non-represen-<br />
ting (nichtdarstellende) arts. In the former type of art something is represented,<br />
there is a theme. Sculpture, painting, poetry, and drama are of this first type. In<br />
the non-representing type, including architecture and music, there is nothing<br />
represented but there is a play with form (Spielen mit der Form) in a particular<br />
material. The material is heavy mass in architecture and the tone in music. There<br />
are, of course, mixed forms, e. g. songs with a text and the special case of program<br />
music. Architecture serves practical ends which in themselves have nothing to do<br />
with beauty. Music, however, is the freest of all the arts in that it (absolute music)<br />
is free from both a non-aesthetic theme and an end: ”In der reinen Musik gelangt<br />
das Prinzip des ’Spieles’ zur vollen Selbständigkeit. Musik ist ein Spiel in Tönen,<br />
Tonfolgen, Harmonien, Klangfarben-in einer Materie also, die sich im weitesten<br />
Masse den ausserästhetischen Zwecken entzieht.” (P. 115.) A very high degree<br />
of productivity or ”invention” is reached in music where the musical ”theme”<br />
is freely created, a pure product of musical fantasy.<br />
In his analysis of the aesthetic object Hartmann distinguishes a foreground<br />
(Vordergrund) and a background (Hintergrund). Beauty is the appearance (Er-<br />
scheinen) of the imaginary (irreal) background in (or through) the real fore-<br />
ground. The unreal background then has being only ”for” us: ”Denn nur der<br />
Vordergrund, das materielle, sinnliche Gebilde, ist real, der erscheinende Hinter-<br />
grund, der geistige Gehalt, ist irreal. Jener besteht mitsamt seiner Formung an sich,<br />
dieser dagegen nur ’fur’ einen empfangsbereiten lebenden Geist, der dabei das<br />
Seinige einsetzt und im Erfassen reproduktiv wird.” (P. 89.) Clearly, the fore-<br />
ground corresponds to the ”Schau erster Ordnung” and the background to the<br />
”Schau zweiter Ordnung”.<br />
The foreground in a musical work is the succession and relationships (Zusam-<br />
menhang) of the tones. However, ”mit der Realität dieser ’Realschicht’ darf man<br />
es freilich nicht buchstäblicher nehmen als bei der Materie der Dichtung, dem<br />
Wort, das auch ja Klanggebilde ist. Klänge sind nicht im strengen Sinne real,<br />
weil sie als solche nur für den Hörenden bestehen. Aber davon kann hier ab-<br />
gesehen werden. Denn das Wesentliche an der ’Realschicht’ eines Tonwerkes ist<br />
und bleibt die sinnliche Gegebenheit, das Dasein für die Wahrnehmung; und<br />
diese ist im vollen Sinne des Wortes erfüllt.” (P. 116.)<br />
A piece of music-a composition, a movement-is more than what is heard<br />
sensually. Over and above this, there is a synthesis achieved by consciousness,<br />
namely that which is ”musically” heard. The purely acoustical hearing cannot<br />
accomplish this. What is heard musically forms a greater whole, the no longer<br />
sensually perceived background. What is heard acoustically is only a very small<br />
portion of a piece lasting as long as the acoustical retention, which is only a few<br />
seconds. And the music continues with ever new material taking the place of the<br />
tones just heard: ”Folglich ist er {the movement) in keinem Augenblick seines<br />
zeitlich ausgedehnten Erklingens als ein Ganzes beisammen. Der Satz braucht
Zeit, er zieht an unserem Ohr vorüber, er hat seine Dauer; in jedem Augenblick<br />
ist dem Hörenden nur ein Bruchstück präsent. Und dennoch wird er dem Hörer<br />
nicht auseinandergerissen, sondern wird als Zusammenhang, als Ganzes erfasst.”<br />
(P. 117.) In musical listening the movement as a whole is heard as a ”Beisammensein”,<br />
not simultaneously, of course, but as a ”Zusammengehöriges”, an<br />
“Einheit”. The unity of a musical work has the character of a synthesis; the Latin<br />
word ”compositio” is, after all, a translation of ”synthesisss. It is a synthesis that the<br />
listener himself must achieve, and in doing so he is creatively active.<br />
The listener must be continually bearing in mind what has been heard and<br />
anticipating what is to come. Often the outcome or resolution of the musical<br />
suspense is other than what has been anticipated. This phenomenon can also be<br />
observed in the novel and drama.<br />
In some unsuccessful musical works the unity is lacking: ”Es gibt einen Typus<br />
von Kompositionen, in dem die Einzelheiten sich dem Hörer nicht recht zusammenschliessen<br />
wollen, sondern auseinanderfallen. Die Einzelheiten können auch<br />
da noch in ihrer Wirkung gefällig sein, können fesseln, anregen, zur Antizipation<br />
reizen; sie können sogar auf ein Ganzes verweisen. Aber wenn dieses Ganze dann<br />
schliesslich doch ausbleibt, wenn kein Aufbau erscheinend sich herausentwickelt,<br />
empfinden wir das Stück doch als uneinheitlich, flach, nichtssagend. Es ist dann<br />
keine innere Verbundenheit spürbar, es fehlt die Einheit der inneren Gestalt.” (Pp.<br />
120-121.) Such works are failures in genuine composition. And this has nothing<br />
to do with the opposition between serious and ”lighter” music: ”Auch die oberflächliche<br />
Musik, wenn sie wohlgelungen ist-und das will sagen, wenn sie schön<br />
ist-entbehrt der Einheit nicht, und darum auch nicht des erscheinenden Hintergrundes.”<br />
(P. 121.)<br />
Like the drama, music needs a second art (Kunst zweiter Ordnung), which<br />
makes it possible for the composed and written music to be heard. In fact, this<br />
second art is required even more for music than for the drama. Anyone can<br />
”read” a play and with a little imagination can ”see” it. To read a piece of music<br />
is an entirely different matter, requiring special skill and a good deal of practice.<br />
The musical layman is more apt to be able to play a piece than to ”read” it.<br />
The realization of a piece of music is thus dependent upon the musician: ”Dieser<br />
hat freie Hand in der Ausgestaltung zahlloser Einzelheiten der unwägbarsten<br />
Art, die sich im Notenblatt nicht schreiben lassen, an denen aber doch wesentlich<br />
die Gestaltung des Ganzen hängt. Er rückt zum Mitkomponisten auf und ist<br />
insofern nicht bloss ’reproduzierender Künstler’, sondern durchaus produktiv schaffender-nicht<br />
weniger als der Schauspieler im Schauspiel.” (P. 123.)<br />
The composer needs a performing artist who can understand and interpret his<br />
composition. The musician receives from the composer the notation of a musical<br />
work only generally sketched which he completes. But this means that a piece<br />
of music is different for each rendition. Every artist has his personal conception<br />
and thus the identity of a musical work is split up into the qualitative differences<br />
of interpretation. The musician gives full concreteness to a musical composition,<br />
but only for a fleeting moment: ”Die Kunst des ausführenden Musikers bleibt dem<br />
Wesen nach Augenblickskunst.” (P. 12 3.)<br />
Of special importance in the analysis of the aesthetic object are what Hartmann<br />
calls ”Schichten” or strata. A phenomenological analysis reveals strata in the<br />
different art-forms and Chapter 14 is devoted to ”Schichten des Musikwerkes”.<br />
There are “outer” and ”inner” background-strata (Hintergrundsschichten) in the<br />
musical work The outer background-strata are degrees (Stufen) of musical unity:<br />
”Da ist z. B. das bekannte Viertaktgesetz, das für solche Einheiten sorgt. An<br />
seine Stelle kann natürlich auch ein anderes treten: immer aber wird es sich um<br />
kleinere geschlossene Ganzheiten handeln, die als solche musikalisch aufgenom-<br />
men und wie Bausteine verwandt werden.” (P. 198.) These basic phrases or<br />
periods are near being within retention and have the effect of sensually heard<br />
unity, although they are, strictly speaking, beyond retention. ”Die zeitlich aus-<br />
einandergezogene Ganzheit beginnt in ihnen sich zusammenzuschliessen.” (P.<br />
198.) Then there is the recurrence of the motive together with its development.<br />
This is the principle of the variation. From this principle comes the form ”theme<br />
with variations” which can also be incorporated in the sonata form. The outer<br />
background-strata include: 1) basic phrases or periods, 2) theme and variations<br />
(in the wide sense), 3) musical movements (Satze), and 4) the unity of the<br />
movements in a large work.<br />
The transition to the inner strata of the musical work is without doubt a leap<br />
(Sprung). In the outer strata we are still dealing with musical form and the ”Spiel<br />
der Töne und Harmonien”, and are not yet in the realm of emotions and moods<br />
(Stimmungen). But with the inner strata there is a transition to another kind:<br />
”Dieses ist ein höchst Subjektives, ganz dem Seelenleben Zugehörendes, jenes<br />
{the outer strata} ist das Objektivste, das man sich denken kann, ist rein konstruk-<br />
tiver Aufbau, analysierbar, gegenständlich. Das mit den Innenschichten Auftre-<br />
tende, das Seelische, wird niemals ganz gegenständlich, verharrt in seiner Sub-<br />
jectivität, ist schwer greifbar, meist kaum benennbar, wenigstens nicht adäquat,<br />
ist überhaupt nur im hingegebenen Hören da und ausserhalb seiner selbst schwer<br />
vorstellbar.” (Pp. 199-200.) ”Das Seelische” is only there in the musical ex-<br />
perience. Thus musical listening can be characterized as ”Erleben”. ”Ist dieses<br />
Erleben vorbei, die Musik verklungen, so bemüht man sich vergebens, das Er-<br />
lebte wieder in die Gegenwärtigkeit hineinzuzwingen.” (P. 200.)<br />
No wonder, says Hartmann, that the strict music theory rejected all considera-<br />
tion of emotional content as sentimentality (a famous proponent of this type of<br />
theory was Hanslick). According to this type of musical theory, music is a strict<br />
architectonic structure and has its own laws (Eigengezetze), which are purely<br />
structural. Thus music ”kommt also gam ohne Gefühle aus”. And the structural,<br />
including timbre, transitions, modulations, etc., is enough in itself to let a whole<br />
world arise, purely in tone. Those who defend this theory point to an architectu-<br />
rally strict form of composition, namely the fugue, to show that the autonomy of<br />
counterpoint is proof of the superfluity of all ”interpreted in” emotions. However,<br />
according to Hartmann, the master of counterpoint, J. S. Bach, is proof of precisely<br />
the opposite. Take, for example, the first four pieces from the Art of the fugue,<br />
the ricercar from A musical offering, or any fugue from The well-tempered clavier:<br />
’’man wird, sobald man die Technik des angemessenen Hörens einmal erfasst hat,
ausser der Freude am Aufbau stets noch etwas ganz anderes darin finden: die im<br />
hingegebenen Hören selbst sich vollziehende Erhebung, und zwar echte, seelische<br />
Erhebung, die wir als ein Enthobensein in eine andere Welt, eine solche der<br />
Reinheit und Grösse, empfinden.” (P. 200.)<br />
We experience this ”seelische Erhebung” in an objective form-as belonging<br />
to the music; as having being in the music-and yet as a thrilling in our inmost<br />
being. All designations for this are much too general: “Wir sagen etwa: ’das<br />
Feierliche’ oder ’das Erhabene’, die ’dunkle Tiefe’, das ’Strahlende’, das ’Hin-<br />
reisende’, das ’Aufgeregte’, oder das ’Abgeklärte’ . . . Aber man sieht leicht, das<br />
sind alles nur Bilder, und zwar schwache Bilder. Denn es handelt sich hier nicht<br />
um blasse Anklänge, sondern um mächtige, wahrhaft die Seelen ergreifende Ge-<br />
walt der Musik-eine Gewalt, die mitreisst und die Seele des Hörenden erfüllt, und<br />
dennoch im Tonwerk ihm gegenständlich gegenüber bleibt und die ästhetische<br />
Distanz wahrt.” (Pp. 200-201.) All such characterizations are only feeble de-<br />
scriptions of the mystery of the musical work of art. Indeed, the inner strata are of<br />
primary importance. Here the sounds let the innermost and unutterable life of<br />
the soul appear.<br />
Moreover, music is genuine revelation (Offenbarung)-a revelation which can<br />
be expressed in no other language: ”sie ist Verkundigung und zwar durch Er-<br />
weckung der Seele des Hörenden-zum Mitgehen, Mitschwingen, zu innerster<br />
Lebendigkeit; Anteilgabe am ungreifbaren Empfinden.” (P. 201.)<br />
All works of art require of the viewer an inner act of accomplishment (Mit-<br />
vollziehen). Painting and sculpture require that the viewer ”see” as the artist sees;<br />
poetry requires that the hearer or reader imagine as the poet imagines. In music,<br />
however, the main thing is the ”Erfasstsein” and ”Mitgerissensein”: ”subjectiv ge-<br />
sehen, kann man es so schildern, dass das eigene Seelenleben von der Bewegung<br />
des Tonwerkes ganz aufgenommen und in seinen Bewegungsmodus hineingezogen<br />
wird ... die Musik dringt gleichsam in den Hörer ein und wird im Hören die<br />
seine.” (Pp. 201-202.) Music has an unusual power of uniting people-as<br />
exemplified in the well-known ”phenomenon of the concert hall”. Here the au-<br />
dience as a whole can experience the music, with all individuality dissolved. This<br />
phenomenon is observable especially at concerts of truly great artists. ”Wohl haben<br />
alle Künste etwas von dieser verschmelzenden Macht: sie stellen die Seelen um,<br />
richten sie aus, stimmen sie gleich. Aber keine hat es in dem Masse wie die<br />
Musik.” (P. 201.)<br />
The ego of the listener is dissolved in the music-and yet the music remains<br />
objective. Here lies an antinomy. And how can the inner strata, in which we<br />
feel ourselves enraptured, at the same time remain an object of our observation?<br />
There are two ways of enjoying music. In the one the listener is simply over-<br />
whelmed in the movement of the music. This is what Nietzsche called the ’‘Zer-<br />
fliessen in Tristan-Stimmung”. Such a listener misses the structural fine points.<br />
He makes it easy for himself. In the other way the listener gives attention to the<br />
structure of the musical work and masters the complicated whole. Only the latter<br />
type of listening can be called strictly aesthetical enjoyment: ”Nur sie dringt<br />
wirklich ein-durchläuft die ganze Reihe der Schichten und würdigt die Kompo-<br />
sition.” The first type, however, skips over the structural outer strata, ”wühlt sich<br />
von vornherein in die billigeren Gefühlstöne ein und endet im Selbstgenuss der<br />
eigenen Gefühle, des angeregten Seelenzustandes”. (P. 202.) Thus the aesthetical<br />
relationship is invalidated or very seriously disturbed. Hartmann calls Iisteners<br />
who have this musical ”pseudo attitude” ”Schwelger” (gluttons). On the other<br />
hand, ”Die ästhetisch richtige Einstellung. . . greift nicht, verleitet durch be-<br />
stimmte ’Effekte’, vor, sondern geht Schritt für Schritt mit dem Komponisten,<br />
lässt im inneren Hören den Aufbau des Werkes entstehen und erst an diesem<br />
erscheint ihr das Seelische...” (P. 203).<br />
The antinomy is resolved in this way: the inner strata move the listener and<br />
let him be one with the music in enjoyment; the outer strata are objects of<br />
observation and direct the listener toward an observing attitude.<br />
Hartmann discusses the important and difficult question of how sounds and<br />
sound-sequences let the inner strata appear-or in other words, how music expresses<br />
what is innermost and unutterable in the soul. Tones and sounds arc<br />
indeed something different from human emotions.<br />
Upon closer scrutiny, however, the world of sounds on the one hand and the<br />
world of the emotions on the other are not found to be so heterogeneous as they<br />
seem at first glance. Both are immaterial (unräumlich, undinglich); both are in<br />
flux, transition, and movement. Both develop in stimulation and calming down;<br />
tension and resolution. If there is any medium which can express emotional being,<br />
it should be of the same kind: it ought not to produce in its formations things or<br />
bodies; it should not be a thing-but ”Vollzug”. It must be flowing and in movement<br />
over time, and must be able ro delineate the dynamics of emotional processes.<br />
”Dazu ist in einzigartiger Weise die Welt der Klänge und Klangfolgen befähigt:<br />
in ihr ist alles Bewegung, alles Erregung und Beschwichtigung, ein Wogen und<br />
Schwellen, Abschwellen und zartes Verklingen, leises Raunen und Flüstern oder<br />
dunkles Grollen; wildes Brausen, Stürmen, Entfliehen und Jagen, sowie Bändigung<br />
der entfesselten Gewalten in der musikalischen Form.” (P. 204.)<br />
The arts of the optical sense do not possess these dynamics in the degree that<br />
music does, because they are dependent on the seeing of things. Moreover, ”Zweitens<br />
gibt es in den tonischen Elementen der Musik einen affektiven Gehalt, der<br />
weit stärker ist als der in den Elementen des optischen Sinnes” (p. 204). There<br />
is an emotional element in perception, which is usually repressed in the practical,<br />
everyday life, but which comes to the fore in the aesthetical attitude. And this<br />
emotional element is more prominent in the sense of hearing than in sight. ”Dafür<br />
spricht schon das reich differenzierte Gepräge der menschlichen Stimme, der wir,<br />
ohne es uns klar bewusst zu machen, mit grosser Feinheit charakterliche Züge<br />
der sprechenden Person oder auch ihren augenblicklichen Gemütszustand ’anhören’-und<br />
zwar relativ unabhängig vom Inhalt der Rede.” (P. 204.) Music<br />
intensifies these emotional elements by means of timbre, melody, and harmony.<br />
I will quote in full Hartmann’s enumeration and explanation of the inner<br />
strata (p. 205):<br />
1) diejenige des unmittelbaren Mitschwingens des Hörenden. Sie beginnt schon<br />
im Wiegen der Tanzmusik, ist aber wohl aller Musik eigen. Ihre Wirkung
ist die eines Ansprechens und Mitführens, das sich bis zum Hinreissen stei-<br />
gern kann.<br />
2) die Schicht, in welcher der Hörenden bei tieferem Eindringen in die Kom-<br />
position von diezer zu innerst ergriffen wird. Sie ist nicht aller Musik eigen,<br />
sondern nur Werken von einer gewissen Grösse und Tiefe. Diese Schicht<br />
wühlt die Seele auf, ist offenbarend und verkündigend, holt aus der dunklen<br />
Ich-Tiefe des Hörenden Verborgenes herauf. In den Bahnen dieser Schicht<br />
bewegt sich fast die ganze ernste Musik. Sie ist ausserordentlich differenziert<br />
und hoch individualisiert.<br />
3) die Schicht der letzten Dinge, man kann auch sagen, die metaphysische, in<br />
der Art, wie Schopenhauer ein Erscheinen des Weltwillens meinte, es braucht<br />
nicht das zu sein, wohl aber wird es stets den Charakter einer Fühlung mit<br />
dunkel geahnten, schicksalhaften Mächten haben. Diese Schicht ist nur selten<br />
wirklich aufweisbar.<br />
The third and last inner stratum of the musical work, despite its rareness, is<br />
easy to discern, and is prominent in religious music. Here it is not dogmatic reve-<br />
lation but that of the human soul and has the character of the metaphysical.<br />
Moreover, even secular music, says Hartmann, manifests the same phenomenon<br />
of the third inner stratum: symphonies, quartets, sonatas, baroque concertos, and<br />
specifically Bach’s preludes and fugues.<br />
It should be noted also that Hartmann considers greatness (Grösse) to apply<br />
even to miniature pieces (äusserlich kleinen Werken); by greatness is here meant<br />
”innere Grösse” (one thinks e. g. of François Couperin).<br />
Also, according to Hartmann, the greater and richer the tonal structure, the<br />
more the emotional element (Seelisches) can make its appearance. They are in<br />
error who think they can skip over the structural in a tonal work; who are<br />
content to experience only a ”leichtes Mitschwingen”. There are, of course, com-<br />
posers who ”leichtansprechende Stücke schaffen, welche keinen grösseren An-<br />
spruch an das musikalische Verstehen stellen” (p. 207). Such music attracts many<br />
people who seek relaxation and amusement. Although this type of music has its<br />
justification, one looks in vain for any greater emotional content.<br />
Hartmann turns next to the problem of program music. He understands this<br />
concept in the wide sense-including the art song, song for chorus, and opera.<br />
There is something special about music in that it is able-as a ”second art”-to<br />
serve a ”first”, namely poetry. ”Second art” here means dependent; in many<br />
cases interpreting, serving, illustrating. The relationship of music to poetry is<br />
quite different from that of the art of theater to the latter: ”Die Musik bringt<br />
nicht den Inhalt zur ’Darstellung’, sie stellt auch gar nicht dar-darin kann sie<br />
es der Dichtung nicht gleich tun-, sondern leiht nur ihr Vermögen, reine Ge-<br />
fühlstöne ’erklingen’ zu lassen, weil die Dichtkunst als blosse Wortkunst das nicht<br />
kann.” (P. 207.)<br />
But the main question is: how can music take up and present such a special<br />
content as human life, which by no means comprises only emotions, but even<br />
persons, happenings, destinies, conflicts, etc.? We can appreciate and consider<br />
valid a musical program knowing the title beforehand. But it would not be<br />
expected that we could tell about the program of a piece which we heard not<br />
knowing the title. We would probably just guess at related programs-reIated<br />
in the sense of having the same emotional tone (Gefühlston), which is quite<br />
general. Thus music cannot really present the content of a program but can only<br />
say what is sayable in tone. This ”Gefühlston”, however, can be more adequately<br />
expressed by music than by poetry. Thus the possibility of the lied. In the text<br />
of the art song, i. e. lyric poetry, the main thing is the mood and emotions.<br />
Music can grasp and express these, and there is a great deal of freedom in the<br />
choice of musical motives. When Loewe and Schubert each compose a lied to<br />
the text of Goethe, they choose different musical themes which each underline<br />
a different aspect of the poem.<br />
Hartmann thinks there is a questionable principle inherent in dramatic music,<br />
in opera. Here where so many elements come together, there is a danger to the<br />
unity of poetry and music. On the stage the dramatic element is of primary im-<br />
portance. But music has the tendency to draw the happening which it accom-<br />
panies into the lyrical, and this is hardly compatible with action and dramatic<br />
dialogue. Hartmann discusses problems of the older Italian opera, the opera reform<br />
of the eighteenth century, and the Wagnerian leitmotif technique. The problem<br />
is always a conflict between the dramatic and the musical. Are there cases where<br />
the text in diction and rhythm really meets the demands of the music? Hartmann<br />
believes so; in Hugo Wolf and Brahms, for example-but this is not the rule.<br />
Hartmann includes a section on the performing artist, his role and ideal. For<br />
the right musical effect two conditions must be met: the artist must technically<br />
master his instrument (including the voice) and he must be congenial with the com-<br />
poser. There are, accordingly, two types of performing artists: ”auf der einen<br />
Seite steht im Extrem der geschulte Musiker, der die technische Beherrschung<br />
hat, aber das Innere schuldig bleibt, weil er die Tiefe nicht hat, es selbst zu<br />
empfinden; meist ist es so, dass er in seinen Darbietungen schon daraufhin die<br />
Auswahl trifft: Konzertstücke, mit denen er glänzen kann. Auf der anderen Seite<br />
steht im Extrem der Dilettant, der die Musikalität hat, tieferen seelischen Gehalt<br />
herauszuhören, aber nicht die Technik beherrscht, ihn erklingen zu lassen.” (P.<br />
210.) Only in rare cases, Hartmann believes, is technique matched with musical<br />
maturity.<br />
I will conclude this exposition with a few words about Hartmann’s genera of<br />
the beautiful. The most important of these are: the sublime (das Erhabene), the<br />
gracious (das Anmutige), and the comical (das Komische). The sublime is mani-<br />
fested in: the great (das Grosse, Grossartige), the serious (das Ernste), the solemn<br />
(das Feierliche), the profound (das Tiefsinnige), the monumental and the tragic,<br />
etc. I would consider this aesthetic quality to be expressed in a great deal of<br />
the music of the Barque era, but even in Mozart’s Magic flute-act two, scene one,<br />
”The march of the priests” and ”O Isis und Osiris”. Here the aspect of the solemn<br />
is prominent. Indeed, this quality is present in music from all periods.<br />
Related to ”das Anmutige” are the following qualities: the charming, attractive<br />
(das Reizende), the amiable (das Liebenswürdige), and the graceful and elegant
(das Zierliche). It seems to me that much of Mozart’s music incorporates both<br />
”das Erhabene” and ”das Anmutige”. The latter quality is also abundantly present<br />
in Der Rosenkavalier.<br />
In Hartmann’s opinion absolute music is not capable of the comical. However,<br />
”Doch selbst von der reinen Musik muss man sagen, dass sie in gewissen Werken<br />
dem Komischen sehr nahe kommt: sie ist des Heiteren und Lustigen fähig, des-<br />
gleichen des Launigen, Kapriziösen, Leichtfüssigen und Sprunghaften, ja des<br />
Ausgelassenen und unbesorgt Leichtsinnigen. Ist es von dort nicht nur ein geringer<br />
Schritt zum Komischen?” (P. 453.) But this should not lead us to think that music<br />
is really comical. These qualities are more nearly associated with the gracious, and<br />
thus we leave the realm of the comical.<br />
Finally, a few words by way of commentary. One salient feature of Hartmann’s<br />
philosophical outlook becomes apparent to anyone who has penetrated his works-<br />
and that is that he is so overwhelmingly positive. There is little trace of scepticism<br />
or pessimism in his practical philosophy (ethics and aesthetics). Hartmann also<br />
recognizes absolute values and a value-hierarchy. One can not help but admire<br />
the boldness of his value-intuitions, but there is undeniably a risk of dogmatism.<br />
Any philosophy of musical evaluation which aspires to universality is bound,<br />
in this day and age, to face insurmountable difficulties. Historians of music are<br />
always evaluating-indeed, it would seem impossible to write a book on music<br />
history and not do so. But they evaluate music within the same tradition. It seems<br />
to us perfectly objective and convincing when a historian compares, say, a can-<br />
tata by Telemann with one by Bach and finds the one by Bach to be greater;<br />
or compares a violin concerto by Spohr with one by Mendelssohn, finding the<br />
latter’s to be greater. All well and good. But enormous difficulties present them-<br />
selves as soon as an attempt is made to evaluate in comparison two truly great<br />
composers who are great in different ways. Take, for example, a comparison of<br />
Mozart with Beethoven. One is the supreme embodiment of the elegant, playful,<br />
dreamy, the profound; the other is the quintessence of the titanic, Faustian,<br />
Dionysian. This is, of course, an over-simplification, since Mozart had a darker,<br />
romantic side and Beethoven could be classical in his earlier works and meditative<br />
in the later. Nevertheless, each master has produced the utmost in musical creation<br />
within the aesthetic categories congenial to his spirit. And what passes for an<br />
absolute value-judgment here may be in reality more an expression of the<br />
affinity of the aesthetician’s psyche with one or other of the masters. Accordingly,<br />
there is wide divergence of opinion.<br />
Yet there are those who dare to be categorical and whose assertions may be<br />
grounded in deeply penetrating value-intuitions. Despite these hazards, an onto-<br />
logy of music in the Western tradition may be possible, but in consideration of<br />
music after the turn of the twentieth century the investigation is complicated by<br />
an unprecedented diversity of musical types and styles, many of which are suppor-<br />
ted by their own theorerical systems. And reference is made here only to currents<br />
within the modern ”serious” or art music-music which follows in the wake of<br />
the Western tradition. It is just this diversity which makes comparative evaluation<br />
so hard. Richard Strauss’s Vier letzte Lieder and Lars-Eirik Larsson’s Förklädd gud<br />
on the one hand, and Karlheinz Stockhausen’s Gesang der Jünglinge on the other,<br />
were composed only a few years apart.<br />
Moreover, our musical culture today is permeated by various types of popular<br />
and folk music-music which is consumed by the vast majority of the population<br />
and much of which is genuine and ”serious”. And nowadays music from other<br />
than Western cultures has achieved great popularity. It should be mentioned<br />
in view of this, that <strong>Nicolai</strong> Hartmann confines himself exclusively to art in<br />
Western civilization without thinking it necessary to even discuss or vindicate<br />
that limitation. Furthermore, there is no discussion of theoretical systems of tonality<br />
or atonality-aspects which are certainly relevant in a philosophical investigation<br />
of music?<br />
Our ”Weltanschauung” is characterized by a musical pluralism. Composers<br />
and musicians the world over are all working within their particular styles, traditions,<br />
and tone systems; they are expressing themselves and with their creations<br />
giving people art-experience, pleasure, and entertainment. And not the least im-<br />
portant in all this is the sheer joy in music-makmg, the ”spelgladje”. We just have<br />
to switch on the radio to hear an electronic piece by Ralph Lundsten, Swedish<br />
folk music, an Indian raga, or ABBA. And all these different traditions have<br />
their own norms which are applied in musical criticism. Today all types of music<br />
are reviewed regularly in the newspapers and a host of periodials has sprung up<br />
to meet the growing need for information about all varieties of music.<br />
<strong>Nicolai</strong> Hartmann’s view seems to be that the spiritual world of art, and more<br />
specifically music, is a realm to which we can gain access, granted that we have<br />
the sensitivity; a realm which we can evaluate objectively in intuitions gained<br />
through emotional-transcendent acts. The fact that every experienced listener has<br />
the conviction that his taste has become more mature and objective seems to<br />
corroborate this view. This view of objective evaluation entails that it would thus<br />
be possible, in the event of disagreement of other investigators, that one investi-<br />
gator or some investigators could evaluate a musical work according to its true<br />
value; know the truth and be right. Whereas the disagreeing investigators would<br />
necessarily miss the mark and be wrong, since they lack the proper value-organ<br />
or value-feeling. Sometimes one hears talk of the ”Weltanschauung” ”going” in<br />
this or that direction, or that most authorities now recognize such and such com-<br />
posers etc.-the assumption here being that whatever most authorities agree on<br />
must be as close to what is right as is possible.<br />
There is a general tendency in modern philosophy to attempt to establish<br />
aesthetics as a scientific discipline. Indeed, Husserl wanted to ground philosophy<br />
itself as a rigorous science (Philosophie als strenge Wissenschaft). And Hart-<br />
mann makes the same claim for aesthetics (Ӏsthetik ist eine Art Erkenntnis,<br />
3<br />
There is currently going on a discussion of tonality in the USA. Leonard Bernstein in The<br />
unanswered question (1976)-originally a series of lectures delivered at Harvard University in<br />
1973-takes the following stand: ”On the one hand tonality and syntactic clarity; on the other,<br />
atonality and syntactic confusion.” Bernstein is criticized by Allan Keiler in an article in The<br />
musical quarterly (April 1978) entitled, ”Bernstein’s The unanswered question and the problem<br />
of musical competence” (p. 195).
und zwar mit der echten Tendenz, Wissenschaft zu werden”). Hartmann’s theory<br />
of the cultural realm owes much to Hegel and to Wilhelm Dilthey, one of the<br />
pioneer philosophers who paved the way for a better understanding of the differ-<br />
ing methods of the natural sciences and the ”Geisteswissenschaften”. Dilthey’s<br />
concept of ”Verstehen” has proved very fruitful in the humanities. Yet it must be<br />
admitted that there is an element of risk in aesthetics, a type of risk not shared<br />
by the natural scientist who gathers information from the outside world. In<br />
aesthetics the phenomenologist describes what he experiences, what he ”views”<br />
in an inner world. He experiences aesthetic pleasure and satisfaction, can appre-<br />
ciate a well-structured work of art, discern emotional qualities and aesthetic cate-<br />
gories, and make value-judgments. The risk, it seems, lies in the discrepancy<br />
between the individual investigator’s inner world, i. e. subjectivity, and a postu-<br />
lated objective cultural realm, a ”geistige Welt”. In view of the familiar fact that<br />
the ”experts” can radically disagree in these matters, it cannot be precluded that<br />
the ”viewing” may be conditioned or ”colored”, as it were, by the psyche of the<br />
individual investigator.<br />
According to Hartmann, there is a direct proportion between the complexity<br />
of the musical structure and the amount of emotional content: ”je grösser und<br />
reicher der tonischen Aufbau, um so mehr Seelisches kann in ihm {the inner<br />
stratum) zur Erscheinung kommen”. (Ästhetik, p. 206.) This might be interpreted<br />
in favor of the type of music represented by the Netherlanders, Johann Sebastian<br />
Bach, and the late Beethoven, etc.-canons, fugues, and complex polyphony.<br />
However, that which can be achieved by an economy of means should not be<br />
underestimated. There are some lovely passages in Mahler’s Lieder eines fahrenden<br />
Gesellen, where the atmospheric effect and emotional content are attained more<br />
by brilliant orchestration and beautiful melodies than by intricate counterpoint.<br />
Other examples of pregnant expression through an economy of means are:<br />
François Couperin’s harpsichord works, Schubert’s lieder, and Ravel’s Pavane<br />
pour une infante défunte.<br />
Much has happened in music since Hartmann’s time. Some of the latest in-<br />
strumental and electronic music seems to elude the genera of the sublime and<br />
gracious, instead giving an expression in sound of our modern era, of the Electronic<br />
Age. The new music is sometimes very cool and cerebral, eking out with extreme<br />
virtuosity all the possible ways of sounding the instruments, or showering us<br />
with cascades of synthesized sound. Here there is no more ”Mitschwingen” as<br />
in the older music. And Hartmann’s opinion that music is incapable of the comi-<br />
cal is questionable. Certain overtures of Rossini are genuinely comical.<br />
Ästhetik deals with many more problems than those mentioned here. The book<br />
is full of phenomenological descriptions and intuitions, and the style, although<br />
abstract and scientific, radiates the humanistic warmth of a mature philosopher<br />
steeped in the ”Geisteswissenschaft” tradition. And the concentration is on the<br />
”phenomena”. Ästhetik is therefore highly recommended for anyone wishing to<br />
partake of the wisdom and art-experience of this German genius.