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PDF, GB, 56 p., 1,3 Mo - Femise

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imports from taking advantage of the concessions which have been made by the<br />

parties to the preferential agreement – commonly known as trade deflection.<br />

2.1 Determining originating status<br />

The principal for determining originating status is that substantial transformation<br />

needs to have occurred. Typically one or more of three criteria are used in<br />

determining whether there has been substantial transformation:<br />

(a) The change in tariff classification rule: whether the transformation of the good<br />

results in a different tariff classification line between the inputs and the manufactured<br />

product;<br />

(b) The value content rule: whether or not the value of the imported intermediate(s)<br />

exceed(s) a certain percentage of domestic value;<br />

(c) The specific production process rule: whether a particular specified production<br />

process has been employed or not. These criteria are often given singly for a given<br />

product category, but can also be employed together.<br />

2.2 The impact of constraining ROOs on trade<br />

As rules of origin are formulated in the context of trade liberalising preferential<br />

agreements they are therefore, in principle, intended to support a process of (regional)<br />

trade liberalisation. Nevertheless, de facto, rules of origin may result in a far less<br />

substantial degree of trade liberalisation than might be, on the face it, implied by the<br />

preferences, which have been granted. There are two principal reasons for this. The<br />

first reason concerns the administrative and bureaucratic costs and difficulties<br />

involved with administering rules of origin regimes, and the second concerns the<br />

possible trade diverting or trade supressing properties of rules of origin.<br />

With regard to the former for a good to be granted originating status the exporting<br />

firm needs to be able to provide detailed documentary evidence in order to obtain the<br />

relevant certification. This requires firms to operate detailed and precise records of<br />

their use of intermediate inputs as well as requiring knowledge of the certification<br />

procedures. There is anecdotal evidence though not much formal empirical evidence<br />

to suggest that due to reasons of both costs or simply lack of organisational capacity<br />

certification may not be acquired even where there may be eligibility.<br />

With regard to the latter, the classical analysis of the impact of a preferential trading<br />

agreement focuses, of course, on the possibilities of trade creation and trade diversion.<br />

These impacts arise because of the asymmetric preferences being granted to countries<br />

as part of the regional agreement. There is a small but growing theoretical literature<br />

which shows that the ROOs underlying these agreements can also materially impact<br />

on trade flows - and thus can also be used for protectionist purposes. Hence in<br />

addition to the “classical” effects, there may be further significant trade diversion<br />

and/or trade suppression arising from the nature of the rules of origin, which are put in<br />

place.<br />

• Rules of origin provide a way of determining whether a good truly originates from<br />

the country exporting the good, as opposed to being re-routed via another country.<br />

In so doing the rules provide limits either on the amount of imported intermediates

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