PDF, GB, 56 p., 1,3 Mo - Femise
PDF, GB, 56 p., 1,3 Mo - Femise
PDF, GB, 56 p., 1,3 Mo - Femise
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4. Summary and Conclusion<br />
In summary, in the first part of this paper we have shown the impact of diagonal<br />
cumulation at the sectoral level. This analysis clearly indicates that such cumulation<br />
appears to have had a substantial impact on a number of industries, with the impact<br />
being largest on industries such as clothing, leather, machinery, and electrical<br />
machinery. We also show, that there is little evidence of external trade diversion<br />
arising from this process.<br />
In the second part of the paper we turn to considering what might be some of the<br />
determinants of the degree of restrictiveness of rules of origin, as proxied by our<br />
diagonal cumulation variables. What this analysis appears to suggest is that there is<br />
weak evidence that EU tariffs are important in determining the restrictiveness of rules<br />
of origin. This is perhaps surprising given that the tariff represents the penalty where<br />
rules of origin have not been satisfied. A possible explanation for this is that EU<br />
tariffs are generally very low, and with a low dispersion. Secondly, the analysis<br />
indicates that rules of origin do tend to be more restrictive the higher the share of<br />
exports in that industry being directed to the EU. This provides secondary evidence<br />
that the setting of rules of origin may be strongly determined by political economy<br />
considerations, where the ROOs are most restrictive in those areas were partner<br />
countries may be most competitive. This is also supported by the results with regard<br />
to the share of intermediate imports of each industry. Thirdly, the evidence suggests<br />
that greater use of the VA criterion tends to be associated with rules of origin being<br />
less restrictive, and that the value added criterion becomes more restrictive only<br />
where the intermediate share of output is quite high (approximately between 70%-<br />
80%). This is an interesting result which needs further research, as it has important<br />
policy implications.