PDF, GB, 139 p., 796 Ko - Femise
PDF, GB, 139 p., 796 Ko - Femise PDF, GB, 139 p., 796 Ko - Femise
Table 5 Estimation results using model 2 as first stage (EU tariff) Periods X/M I*X/M(concentration) Obs. alpha_l beta Beta=1 p-val All -0.00003 [3.02]*** -0.00002 [0.87] 349 -1.56 1.00002 0.75 0.39 1996 -0.00002 [1.76]* -0.00005 [1.08] 88 -0.47 1.00005 1.16 0.28 1997 -0.00002 [1.17] 0.00000 [0.03] 88 17.00 1.00000 0.00 0.97 1998 -0.00002 [1.51] 0.00000 [0.07] 87 12.59 1.00000 0.00 0.94 1999 -0.00002 [1.09] -0.00001 [0.31] 86 -2.54 1.00001 0.10 0.76 Periods X/M I*X/M(exp. intensity) Obs. alpha_l beta Beta=1 p-val All -0.00001 [1.89]* -0.00004 [2.56]** 349 -0.36 1.00004 6.53 0.01 1996 -0.00001 [0.76] -0.00006 [2.74]*** 88 -0.14 1.00006 7.48 0.01 1997 0.00000 [0.34] -0.00005 [1.57] 88 -0.09 1.00005 2.48 0.12 1998 -0.00001 [1.02] -0.00003 [1.23] 87 -0.34 1.00003 1.51 0.22 1999 -0.00001 [0.78] -0.00002 [1.02] 86 -0.28 1.00002 1.04 0.31 Periods X/M I*X/M(subsidies) Obs. alpha_l beta Beta=1 p-val All -0.00003 [3.77]*** 0.00003 [1.70]* 349 1.18 0.99997 2.89 0.09 1996 -0.00003 [2.25]** 0.00003 [0.98] 88 1.00 0.99997 0.97 0.33 1997 -0.00002 [1.36] 0.00004 [0.65] 88 0.55 0.99996 0.42 0.52 1998 -0.00002 [1.82]* 0.00003 [2.17]** 87 0.76 0.99997 4.70 0.03 1999 -0.00002 [1.73]* 0.00003 [2.07]** 86 0.73 0.99997 4.26 0.04 Periods X/M I*X/M(K/L) Obs. alpha_l beta Beta=1 p-val All -0.00001 [1.61] -0.00005 [3.59]*** 349 -0.24 1.00005 12.89 0.00 1996 -0.00002 [1.68]* -0.00002 [0.77] 88 -0.92 1.00002 0.59 0.45 1997 0.00000 [0.11] -0.00006 [2.04]** 88 -0.02 1.00006 4.17 0.04 1998 0.00000 [0.67] -0.00005 [2.52]** 87 -0.09 1.00005 6.34 0.01 1999 0.00000 [0.96] -0.00005 [2.91]*** 86 0.02 1.00005 8.46 0.00 Robust t statistics in brackets * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 87
Testing Grossman-Helpman model for Israel In this part of the chapter we made an attempt to test empirically the Grossman-Helpman model for Israel. We applied almost the same specification as was used for Poland in the previous part, however, the limited availability of the data caused some serious econometric problems, resulting in the poor performance of the model. We start with some stylized facts on Israel’s trade policy. Afterwards we present the results of estimation of Grossman- Helpman model. Some stylized facts on Israel's trade policy Since 1991 Israel has moved slowly but steadily towards a very open trade regime. Endeavours in this direction include, among others, increased transparency of its tariff system. Unilateral tariff liberalization to be operated since then through 1998 was meant to bring maximum MFN tariff rates for most products to a range of 8-12 percent over a period of six years. All major political parties accepted a gradual liberalization of trade policy in order to increase the efficiency of the regulated economy in which the level of public expenditure was unusually high for a developed country. The plan required thus a gradual reduction of tariffs, when as a first step tariffs replaced NTBs (Non-Tariff Barriers) like licenses and quotas. The reduction process was postponed to 2000 for the textile industry, but market forces proved to be very strong, so that beginning in 2000 most of Israel’s textile plants closed down and moved their production to neighbouring countries such as Jordan and Egypt. Since 1998-2000, Israel has continued to implement trade liberalization reforms, albeit at a somewhat slower pace than in the previous six-year period. The average applied MFN tariff has fallen from 10.8% in 2000 to 8.9% in 2005, with a maximum rate of 560% on fresh or dried dates (!), and high tariff dispersion as the coefficient of variation reaches 2.8. About 48.5% of all tariff lines now carry the zero rate, up from 45.1% in 2000 (WTO 2006). Other frequent tariff rates are 12% (2,094 lines), 10% (614 lines), and 8% (603 lines). Some 46.4% of the tariff lines carry duties between zero (excluded) and 15% (included). 88
- Page 37 and 38: Estimates for the whole CEE sample
- Page 39 and 40: agreements is, however, mixed. Whil
- Page 41 and 42: The OLS estimates suggest that both
- Page 43 and 44: Czech Republic Estonia Hungary Lith
- Page 45 and 46: Czech Slovak Republic Estonia Hunga
- Page 47 and 48: products. The provisions of the Eur
- Page 49 and 50: foreseen to take effect in 2005. Ho
- Page 51 and 52: Similar to the AMU, the ACC was for
- Page 53 and 54: Unfortunately, the data on capital
- Page 55 and 56: Table 2. The estimates for bilatera
- Page 57 and 58: obust, while the dummy variable for
- Page 59 and 60: Yi (partner) 0.944 1.009 2.267 1.96
- Page 61 and 62: Table 4. The estimates for bilatera
- Page 63 and 64: Table 5. The estimates for bilatera
- Page 65 and 66: Agreements on the third countries a
- Page 67 and 68: Chapter 2: Grossman-Helpman Model I
- Page 69 and 70: N function (U ), given by: + ( ) u
- Page 71 and 72: ti 1+ ti xi Ii −α i mi = ⋅ ,
- Page 73 and 74: Probably the most extensive list of
- Page 75 and 76: eginning of 1990. But the tariff st
- Page 77 and 78: The non-preferential (MFN, conventi
- Page 79 and 80: have important impact on political
- Page 81 and 82: xi where ti is the tariff, ei is th
- Page 83 and 84: We can recover the structural param
- Page 85 and 86: Appendix Table 2 Estimation results
- Page 87: Table 4 Estimation results using mo
- Page 91 and 92: practice most importers do not pay
- Page 93 and 94: countries were traditionally subjec
- Page 95 and 96: point to notify the US government o
- Page 97 and 98: and between 157% and 247% in 2004.
- Page 99 and 100: policy reforms. On the other hand i
- Page 101 and 102: Table 1 Estimation results for Isra
- Page 103 and 104: 1995 0.00202 [2.04]** -0.00199 [2.0
- Page 105 and 106: extended to disaggregation of burea
- Page 107 and 108: The Importance of Corruption A subs
- Page 109 and 110: transition countries. Sekkat and Ve
- Page 111 and 112: society. In addition, they show tha
- Page 113 and 114: Johnson, Kaufmann, McMillan, and Wo
- Page 115 and 116: corruption. For example, upon grant
- Page 117 and 118: and criminal prosecution. On the ot
- Page 119 and 120: estimation are likely to be influen
- Page 121 and 122: levels have been used to derive fur
- Page 123 and 124: Union. In fact, the level of regula
- Page 125 and 126: Table 2 List of the Commonly Raised
- Page 127 and 128: Table 6 Predicted improvement (show
- Page 129 and 130: SB_PR all procedures required to re
- Page 131 and 132: AFGHANISTAN, ALBANIA, ALGERIA, ANGO
- Page 133 and 134: Brunetti, Aymo; Kisunko, Gregory an
- Page 135 and 136: Hines, J.R. (1995). Forbidden Payme
- Page 137 and 138: PellegriniI, Lorenzo and Gerlagh, R
Table 5 Estimation results using model 2 as first stage (EU tariff)<br />
Periods X/M I*X/M(concentration) Obs. alpha_l beta Beta=1 p-val<br />
All -0.00003 [3.02]*** -0.00002 [0.87] 349 -1.56 1.00002 0.75 0.39<br />
1996 -0.00002 [1.76]* -0.00005 [1.08] 88 -0.47 1.00005 1.16 0.28<br />
1997 -0.00002 [1.17] 0.00000 [0.03] 88 17.00 1.00000 0.00 0.97<br />
1998 -0.00002 [1.51] 0.00000 [0.07] 87 12.59 1.00000 0.00 0.94<br />
1999 -0.00002 [1.09] -0.00001 [0.31] 86 -2.54 1.00001 0.10 0.76<br />
Periods X/M I*X/M(exp. intensity) Obs. alpha_l beta Beta=1 p-val<br />
All -0.00001 [1.89]* -0.00004 [2.56]** 349 -0.36 1.00004 6.53 0.01<br />
1996 -0.00001 [0.76] -0.00006 [2.74]*** 88 -0.14 1.00006 7.48 0.01<br />
1997 0.00000 [0.34] -0.00005 [1.57] 88 -0.09 1.00005 2.48 0.12<br />
1998 -0.00001 [1.02] -0.00003 [1.23] 87 -0.34 1.00003 1.51 0.22<br />
1999 -0.00001 [0.78] -0.00002 [1.02] 86 -0.28 1.00002 1.04 0.31<br />
Periods X/M I*X/M(subsidies) Obs. alpha_l beta Beta=1 p-val<br />
All -0.00003 [3.77]*** 0.00003 [1.70]* 349 1.18 0.99997 2.89 0.09<br />
1996 -0.00003 [2.25]** 0.00003 [0.98] 88 1.00 0.99997 0.97 0.33<br />
1997 -0.00002 [1.36] 0.00004 [0.65] 88 0.55 0.99996 0.42 0.52<br />
1998 -0.00002 [1.82]* 0.00003 [2.17]** 87 0.76 0.99997 4.70 0.03<br />
1999 -0.00002 [1.73]* 0.00003 [2.07]** 86 0.73 0.99997 4.26 0.04<br />
Periods X/M I*X/M(K/L) Obs. alpha_l beta Beta=1 p-val<br />
All -0.00001 [1.61] -0.00005 [3.59]*** 349 -0.24 1.00005 12.89 0.00<br />
1996 -0.00002 [1.68]* -0.00002 [0.77] 88 -0.92 1.00002 0.59 0.45<br />
1997 0.00000 [0.11] -0.00006 [2.04]** 88 -0.02 1.00006 4.17 0.04<br />
1998 0.00000 [0.67] -0.00005 [2.52]** 87 -0.09 1.00005 6.34 0.01<br />
1999 0.00000 [0.96] -0.00005 [2.91]*** 86 0.02 1.00005 8.46 0.00<br />
Robust t statistics in brackets<br />
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%<br />
87
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