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Table 3 First stage estimation results of inverse of import penetration ratio Variable Model 1 Model 2 Capital share -98.26 -304.00 [1.09] [2.62]*** Investment share -2499.03 -2378.88 [3.25]*** [3.08]*** Labour share -2891.07 -3433.08 [1.92]* [2.00]** Employment 0.01 0.01 [1.84]* [1.79]* Investment 0.00 0.00 [3.28]*** [3.35]*** Concentration -217.58 [1.43] Subsidies 3533.68 [2.66]*** Obs. 352 352 R-squared 0.19 0.19 Robust t statistics in brackets * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 85
Table 4 Estimation results using model 1 as first stage (EU tariff) Periods X/M I*X/M(concentration) Obs. alpha_l beta Beta=1 p-val All -0.00002 [2.78]*** -0.00001 [0.40] 349 -3.05 1.00001 0.16 0.69 1996 -0.00002 [1.67]* -0.00004 [0.77] 88 -0.62 1.00004 0.60 0.44 1997 -0.00002 [1.11] 0.00002 [0.51] 88 1.04 0.99998 0.26 0.61 1998 -0.00002 [1.38] 0.00000 [0.06] 87 -14.00 1.00000 0.00 0.95 1999 -0.00002 [1.09] 0.00000 [0.24] 86 -3.45 1.00000 0.06 0.81 Periods X/M I*X/M(exp. intensity) Obs. alpha_l beta Beta=1 p-val All -0.00001 [1.23] -0.00004 [2.70]*** 349 -0.22 1.00004 7.29 0.01 1996 0.00000 [0.24] -0.00007 [3.07]*** 88 -0.05 1.00007 9.45 0.00 1997 0.00000 [0.07] -0.00005 [1.67]* 88 0.02 1.00005 2.79 0.10 1998 -0.00001 [0.78] -0.00003 [1.27] 87 -0.26 1.00003 1.61 0.21 1999 -0.00001 [0.82] -0.00002 [0.96] 86 -0.31 1.00002 0.93 0.34 Periods X/M I*X/M(subsidies) Obs. alpha_l beta Beta=1 p-val All -0.00003 [3.64]*** 0.00004 [2.87]*** 349 0.69 0.99996 8.25 0.00 1996 -0.00003 [2.32]** 0.00007 [1.84]* 88 0.44 0.99993 3.37 0.07 1997 -0.00002 [1.39] 0.00011 [2.26]** 88 0.23 0.99989 5.11 0.03 1998 -0.00002 [1.76]* 0.00004 [2.25]** 87 0.64 0.99996 5.04 0.03 1999 -0.00003 [1.73]* 0.00003 [2.03]** 86 0.78 0.99997 4.13 0.05 Periods X/M I*X/M(K/L) Obs. alpha_l beta Beta=1 p-val All -0.00001 [1.37] -0.00004 [2.98]*** 349 -0.25 1.00004 8.85 0.00 1996 -0.00002 [1.65] -0.00002 [0.48] 88 -1.47 1.00002 0.23 0.64 1997 0.00000 [0.04] -0.00005 [1.52] 88 -0.01 1.00005 2.31 0.13 1998 0.00000 [0.65] -0.00005 [2.12]** 87 -0.10 1.00005 4.50 0.04 1999 0.00000 [1.19] -0.00005 [2.80]*** 86 0.03 1.00005 7.85 0.01 Robust t statistics in brackets * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 86
Page 1 and 2:
In collaboration with: F E M I S E
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Table of contents INTRODUCTION AND
Page 5 and 6:
Introduction and summary In the pro
Page 7 and 8:
that of the NMS, we would observe a
Page 9 and 10:
accession to the EU. Instead, a num
Page 11 and 12:
trade area (FTA). The Agadir Agreem
Page 13 and 14:
liberalization has taken five years
Page 15 and 16:
signed Europe Agreements, EFTA and
Page 17 and 18:
used as industry organization varia
Page 19 and 20:
The main goal of the project was to
Page 21 and 22:
Chapter 1: Assessing trade liberali
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Agricultural Policy (CAP). Further
Page 25 and 26:
Agreements concluded with the MPCs.
Page 27 and 28:
n lnTijt = ∑ k= 1 β RTAijt + α1
Page 29 and 30:
Preferential trade liberalization i
Page 31 and 32:
the EU enlargement, the EFTA lost t
Page 33 and 34:
The most important of these was the
Page 35 and 36: The Definitions of the Variables an
Page 37 and 38: Estimates for the whole CEE sample
Page 39 and 40: agreements is, however, mixed. Whil
Page 41 and 42: The OLS estimates suggest that both
Page 43 and 44: Czech Republic Estonia Hungary Lith
Page 45 and 46: Czech Slovak Republic Estonia Hunga
Page 47 and 48: products. The provisions of the Eur
Page 49 and 50: foreseen to take effect in 2005. Ho
Page 51 and 52: Similar to the AMU, the ACC was for
Page 53 and 54: Unfortunately, the data on capital
Page 55 and 56: Table 2. The estimates for bilatera
Page 57 and 58: obust, while the dummy variable for
Page 59 and 60: Yi (partner) 0.944 1.009 2.267 1.96
Page 65 and 66: Agreements on the third countries a
Page 67 and 68: Chapter 2: Grossman-Helpman Model I
Page 69 and 70: N function (U ), given by: + ( ) u
Page 71 and 72: ti 1+ ti xi Ii −α i mi = ⋅ ,
Page 73 and 74: Probably the most extensive list of
Page 75 and 76: eginning of 1990. But the tariff st
Page 77 and 78: The non-preferential (MFN, conventi
Page 79 and 80: have important impact on political
Page 81 and 82: xi where ti is the tariff, ei is th
Page 83 and 84: We can recover the structural param
Page 85: Appendix Table 2 Estimation results
Page 89 and 90: Testing Grossman-Helpman model for
Page 91 and 92: practice most importers do not pay
Page 93 and 94: countries were traditionally subjec
Page 95 and 96: point to notify the US government o
Page 97 and 98: and between 157% and 247% in 2004.
Page 99 and 100: policy reforms. On the other hand i
Page 101 and 102: Table 1 Estimation results for Isra
Page 103 and 104: 1995 0.00202 [2.04]** -0.00199 [2.0
Page 105 and 106: extended to disaggregation of burea
Page 107 and 108: The Importance of Corruption A subs
Page 109 and 110: transition countries. Sekkat and Ve
Page 111 and 112: society. In addition, they show tha
Page 113 and 114: Johnson, Kaufmann, McMillan, and Wo
Page 115 and 116: corruption. For example, upon grant
Page 117 and 118: and criminal prosecution. On the ot
Page 119 and 120: estimation are likely to be influen
Page 121 and 122: levels have been used to derive fur
Page 123 and 124: Union. In fact, the level of regula
Page 125 and 126: Table 2 List of the Commonly Raised
Page 127 and 128: Table 6 Predicted improvement (show
Page 129 and 130: SB_PR all procedures required to re
Page 131 and 132: AFGHANISTAN, ALBANIA, ALGERIA, ANGO
Page 133 and 134: Brunetti, Aymo; Kisunko, Gregory an
Page 135 and 136: Hines, J.R. (1995). Forbidden Payme
Page 137 and 138:
PellegriniI, Lorenzo and Gerlagh, R
Page 139:
World Bank (2005). Doing Business i
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