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governments may be more sensitive to FDI interests than to the interests of nationals. This can also result from the fact that foreign companies may be more credible in the lobbying game than domestic producers. Moreover, some authors claim that declining industries (those with large increases in import penetration) tend to obtain more protection, to reduce adjustment costs (Grether, De Melo, Olarreaga, 2001, Hillman, 1982, or Brainard and Verdier, 1994). In a dynamic context, the compensation effect predicts that slow-growing industries will lobby more as the opportunity cost of lobbying will be lower. To avoid the endogeneity of the inverse import penetration ratio, most authors have used instrumental variables. These include factor intensity characteristics, such as labour intensity (Grether, De Melo, Olarreaga, 2001), wage per worker (Trefler, 1993 and McCalman, 2004), capital-labour ratio (Grether, De Melo, Olarreaga, 2001 and McCalman, 2004) or human capital-labour ratio (McCalman, 2004). The large number of variables used reflects difficulties in finding suitable measures and limited availability of some statistical data in analyzed countries. In our empirical part we will concentrate only on some of those variables, which are available for Poland. Testing Grossman-Helpman Model for Poland Some stylized facts on Polish trade policy The opening up of the Polish economy was an important element in the process of economic transformation. Trade liberalization started in January 1990 when the zloty became convertible and almost all-domestic prices were released from administrative control. Majority of non-tariff measures were eliminated at that time. The new customs code, introduced in January of 1990, was compatible with international norms. The tariff description, the rules of customs' valuation, and the anti-dumping procedures were in line with the GATT articles. The average level of tariffs was 8.9 per cent ad valorem in the 73
eginning of 1990. But the tariff structure was not fully adapted to requirements of the market economy, and was somewhat arbitrary. At that time Poland’s tariffs were not subject to the discipline of the GATT and the government enjoyed a great deal of freedom when shaping the tariff structure. Poland had no legal constraint in the form of “bound” tariff schedule, although it was a GATT member since 1967. As a former communist country, it had a unique reciprocity formula in the Protocol of accession to GATT. In exchange for the MFN status among GATT members, Poland committed itself to increase the value of its imports from the members of GATT by at least seven percent annually. This commitment became impossible to fulfil by the mid 1970's. But formally nothing has been changed until the creation of the WTO in 1994. Therefore tariff changes were feasible in the beginning of 1990s. 36 On August 1, 1991, the new tariff schedule came into force. The new schedule adopted the commodity nomenclature applied by the European Community (EC). Average nominal (unweighted) customs rates calculated on the basis of MFN were raised from 11.65 to 17.02. 37 Such changes were feasible since Polish tariffs were unbound in the GATT. "The increase was motivated by the need to increase fiscal revenues, and by the desire to afford a degree of protection to Polish producers competing with imports.”Sensitive" agricultural goods, such as butter and meat, automobiles and electronics." were among products that had been granted particularly high protection. 38 However, the notion of a sensitive product was not clearly defined at that time. The government administration had limited knowledge of what the reasonable tariff pattern should be. 39 On the other hand, the organized interest groups were either weak or nonexistent at that time. Therefore, in the early 1990s, the influence of domestic lobbies should not have been significant. 36 Position of Poland was different from that one of Hungary or Czechoslovakia. These two countries were also GATT members under communist regime, but had standard schedules of concessions. Their tariffs were “bound” at the beginning of economic transition. 37 When duty suspensions were also taken into consideration the average level was raised form 5.82 to 16.83 per cent Poland's Foreign Trade Policy 1993-1994 (1994), p. 63. 38 Kierzkowski, Okolski, Wellisz (1993), p. 56. 39 The opinion expressed by professor Stanislaw Wellisz, who acted, in the beginning of 1990’s, as an economic adviser to Polish government. 74
Page 1 and 2:
In collaboration with: F E M I S E
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Table of contents INTRODUCTION AND
Page 5 and 6:
Introduction and summary In the pro
Page 7 and 8:
that of the NMS, we would observe a
Page 9 and 10:
accession to the EU. Instead, a num
Page 11 and 12:
trade area (FTA). The Agadir Agreem
Page 13 and 14:
liberalization has taken five years
Page 15 and 16:
signed Europe Agreements, EFTA and
Page 17 and 18:
used as industry organization varia
Page 19 and 20:
The main goal of the project was to
Page 21 and 22:
Chapter 1: Assessing trade liberali
Page 23 and 24: Agricultural Policy (CAP). Further
Page 25 and 26: Agreements concluded with the MPCs.
Page 27 and 28: n lnTijt = ∑ k= 1 β RTAijt + α1
Page 29 and 30: Preferential trade liberalization i
Page 31 and 32: the EU enlargement, the EFTA lost t
Page 33 and 34: The most important of these was the
Page 35 and 36: The Definitions of the Variables an
Page 37 and 38: Estimates for the whole CEE sample
Page 39 and 40: agreements is, however, mixed. Whil
Page 41 and 42: The OLS estimates suggest that both
Page 43 and 44: Czech Republic Estonia Hungary Lith
Page 45 and 46: Czech Slovak Republic Estonia Hunga
Page 47 and 48: products. The provisions of the Eur
Page 49 and 50: foreseen to take effect in 2005. Ho
Page 51 and 52: Similar to the AMU, the ACC was for
Page 53 and 54: Unfortunately, the data on capital
Page 55 and 56: Table 2. The estimates for bilatera
Page 57 and 58: obust, while the dummy variable for
Page 59 and 60: Yi (partner) 0.944 1.009 2.267 1.96
Page 65 and 66: Agreements on the third countries a
Page 67 and 68: Chapter 2: Grossman-Helpman Model I
Page 69 and 70: N function (U ), given by: + ( ) u
Page 71 and 72: ti 1+ ti xi Ii −α i mi = ⋅ ,
Page 73: Probably the most extensive list of
Page 77 and 78: The non-preferential (MFN, conventi
Page 79 and 80: have important impact on political
Page 81 and 82: xi where ti is the tariff, ei is th
Page 83 and 84: We can recover the structural param
Page 85 and 86: Appendix Table 2 Estimation results
Page 87 and 88: Table 4 Estimation results using mo
Page 89 and 90: Testing Grossman-Helpman model for
Page 91 and 92: practice most importers do not pay
Page 93 and 94: countries were traditionally subjec
Page 95 and 96: point to notify the US government o
Page 97 and 98: and between 157% and 247% in 2004.
Page 99 and 100: policy reforms. On the other hand i
Page 101 and 102: Table 1 Estimation results for Isra
Page 103 and 104: 1995 0.00202 [2.04]** -0.00199 [2.0
Page 105 and 106: extended to disaggregation of burea
Page 107 and 108: The Importance of Corruption A subs
Page 109 and 110: transition countries. Sekkat and Ve
Page 111 and 112: society. In addition, they show tha
Page 113 and 114: Johnson, Kaufmann, McMillan, and Wo
Page 115 and 116: corruption. For example, upon grant
Page 117 and 118: and criminal prosecution. On the ot
Page 119 and 120: estimation are likely to be influen
Page 121 and 122: levels have been used to derive fur
Page 123 and 124: Union. In fact, the level of regula
Page 125 and 126:
Table 2 List of the Commonly Raised
Page 127 and 128:
Table 6 Predicted improvement (show
Page 129 and 130:
SB_PR all procedures required to re
Page 131 and 132:
AFGHANISTAN, ALBANIA, ALGERIA, ANGO
Page 133 and 134:
Brunetti, Aymo; Kisunko, Gregory an
Page 135 and 136:
Hines, J.R. (1995). Forbidden Payme
Page 137 and 138:
PellegriniI, Lorenzo and Gerlagh, R
Page 139:
World Bank (2005). Doing Business i
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