PDF, GB, 139 p., 796 Ko - Femise
PDF, GB, 139 p., 796 Ko - Femise PDF, GB, 139 p., 796 Ko - Femise
Yi (partner) 1.159 1.212 1.481 1.001 1.224 [129.22]*** [42.88]*** [9.52]*** [4.97]*** [5.89]*** Yj (reporting) 0.64 0.752 0.805 -0.358 -0.526 [38.94]*** [13.61]*** [2.92]*** [1.11] [1.63] K/Li (partner) 0.626 0.412 -0.194 0.217 0.027 [37.50]*** [9.41]*** [1.33] [1.13] [0.14] K/Lj (reporting) -0.056 0.283 1.368 1.983 1.853 [1.95]* [3.75]*** [6.40]*** [8.43]*** [7.73]*** DISTANCEij -0.877 -0.903 -0.806 -0.832 [43.27]*** [12.97]*** [18.56]*** [20.29]*** COLONYij 0.576 0.749 0.301 0.244 [8.99]*** [1.87]* [3.87]*** [3.16]*** COLONIZERij 1.07 0.596 0.675 0.829 [16.59]*** [3.32]*** [9.89]*** [12.38]*** ARABICij 0.342 0.585 0.86 0.702 [7.21]*** [3.91]*** [12.29]*** [10.19]*** TURKISHij -1.373 -1.178 -1.742 -1.376 [4.02]*** [0.69] [4.92]*** [4.18]*** CONTIGUITYij 0.248 -0.264 0.788 0.81 [1.89]* [0.69] [5.44]*** [5.67]*** Constant -33.943 -38.985 -57.958 -19.727 -19.07 [62.78]*** [23.65]*** [9.36]*** [2.68]*** [2.56]** Observations 18577 18577 18577 18577 16390 R-squared 0.64 0.63 0.08 0.74 0.75 F test: time dum. 17.49 254.07 4.49 2.31 2.81 Prob > F 0 0 0 0 0 Notes: - ***, **, * significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels of statistical significance, respectively. In all the cases our estimation results demonstrate that the EU-Association Agreements significantly contributed to the increase in bilateral imports of the MPCs from the EU member states. The evidence obtained for bilateral trade agreements concluded in the late 1990s between the members of the Agadir group is, however, mixed. While the simple OLS estimates suggest that all bilateral agreements concluded between the Agadir group member states significantly increased their bilateral imports, this evidence is not robust when panel data estimation techniques are employed. The estimates obtained for sub-regional plurilateral trade agreements in the MENA region: the AMU and the ACC are not robust with respect to the estimation method and suggest that once panel data estimation techniques are used, these agreements were not effective in stimulating bilateral imports of the MPCs. In contrast to these, the agreements concluded with the EFTA countries seem to have exerted a significant impact on bilateral imports of the MPCs, although the estimated magnitudes of this impact vary across the estimation methods. The estimation results obtained for particular bilateral agreements with Central and Eastern European countries concluded by Israel and Turkey are country specific and not 55
obust, while the dummy variable for the bilateral agreement concluded between Israel and Turkey remains positive and statistically significant across all model specifications. Similarly, estimation results obtained for bilateral agreements concluded by particular MPCswith other Arab countries are country specific and not robust. Finally, the agreements concluded with particular member states of the NAFTA: Canada, Mexico and the US are also not robust. Summing up, the assembled empirical evidence demonstrates that trade liberalization with the West European countries, including both the EU as well as EFTA countries, has been effective in increasing the bilateral imports of the MPCs, while the results obtained for other agreements are country specific and their simple generalization is not possible. The estimation results for bilateral exports of the MPCs obtained using different estimation techniques are reported in Table 3. The particular columns of this table are the direct counterparts of the columns in Table 2. Similar to the case of bilateral imports, the baseline estimates obtained using the traditional OLS method on the pooled dataset with individual time effects are presented in column (1), while their robustness is tested in columns (2)-(5) using panel data estimation techniques. 56
- Page 5 and 6: Introduction and summary In the pro
- Page 7 and 8: that of the NMS, we would observe a
- Page 9 and 10: accession to the EU. Instead, a num
- Page 11 and 12: trade area (FTA). The Agadir Agreem
- Page 13 and 14: liberalization has taken five years
- Page 15 and 16: signed Europe Agreements, EFTA and
- Page 17 and 18: used as industry organization varia
- Page 19 and 20: The main goal of the project was to
- Page 21 and 22: Chapter 1: Assessing trade liberali
- Page 23 and 24: Agricultural Policy (CAP). Further
- Page 25 and 26: Agreements concluded with the MPCs.
- Page 27 and 28: n lnTijt = ∑ k= 1 β RTAijt + α1
- Page 29 and 30: Preferential trade liberalization i
- Page 31 and 32: the EU enlargement, the EFTA lost t
- Page 33 and 34: The most important of these was the
- Page 35 and 36: The Definitions of the Variables an
- Page 37 and 38: Estimates for the whole CEE sample
- Page 39 and 40: agreements is, however, mixed. Whil
- Page 41 and 42: The OLS estimates suggest that both
- Page 43 and 44: Czech Republic Estonia Hungary Lith
- Page 45 and 46: Czech Slovak Republic Estonia Hunga
- Page 47 and 48: products. The provisions of the Eur
- Page 49 and 50: foreseen to take effect in 2005. Ho
- Page 51 and 52: Similar to the AMU, the ACC was for
- Page 53 and 54: Unfortunately, the data on capital
- Page 55: Table 2. The estimates for bilatera
- Page 59 and 60: Yi (partner) 0.944 1.009 2.267 1.96
- Page 61 and 62: Table 4. The estimates for bilatera
- Page 63 and 64: Table 5. The estimates for bilatera
- Page 65 and 66: Agreements on the third countries a
- Page 67 and 68: Chapter 2: Grossman-Helpman Model I
- Page 69 and 70: N function (U ), given by: + ( ) u
- Page 71 and 72: ti 1+ ti xi Ii −α i mi = ⋅ ,
- Page 73 and 74: Probably the most extensive list of
- Page 75 and 76: eginning of 1990. But the tariff st
- Page 77 and 78: The non-preferential (MFN, conventi
- Page 79 and 80: have important impact on political
- Page 81 and 82: xi where ti is the tariff, ei is th
- Page 83 and 84: We can recover the structural param
- Page 85 and 86: Appendix Table 2 Estimation results
- Page 87 and 88: Table 4 Estimation results using mo
- Page 89 and 90: Testing Grossman-Helpman model for
- Page 91 and 92: practice most importers do not pay
- Page 93 and 94: countries were traditionally subjec
- Page 95 and 96: point to notify the US government o
- Page 97 and 98: and between 157% and 247% in 2004.
- Page 99 and 100: policy reforms. On the other hand i
- Page 101 and 102: Table 1 Estimation results for Isra
- Page 103 and 104: 1995 0.00202 [2.04]** -0.00199 [2.0
- Page 105 and 106: extended to disaggregation of burea
obust, while the dummy variable for the bilateral agreement concluded between Israel and<br />
Turkey remains positive and statistically significant across all model specifications. Similarly,<br />
estimation results obtained for bilateral agreements concluded by particular MPCswith other<br />
Arab countries are country specific and not robust.<br />
Finally, the agreements concluded with particular member states of the NAFTA:<br />
Canada, Mexico and the US are also not robust. Summing up, the assembled empirical<br />
evidence demonstrates that trade liberalization with the West European countries, including<br />
both the EU as well as EFTA countries, has been effective in increasing the bilateral imports<br />
of the MPCs, while the results obtained for other agreements are country specific and their<br />
simple generalization is not possible.<br />
The estimation results for bilateral exports of the MPCs obtained using different<br />
estimation techniques are reported in Table 3. The particular columns of this table are the<br />
direct counterparts of the columns in Table 2. Similar to the case of bilateral imports, the<br />
baseline estimates obtained using the traditional OLS method on the pooled dataset with<br />
individual time effects are presented in column (1), while their robustness is tested in columns<br />
(2)-(5) using panel data estimation techniques.<br />
56
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