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CHAPTER 2: GROSSMAN-HELPMAN MODEL .................................................. 66 Introduction........................................................................................................... 66 The “Protection for Sale” model ......................................................................... 67 Review of empirical studies.................................................................................. 70 Testing Grossman-Helpman Model for Poland ................................................. 73 SOME STYLIZED FACTS ON POLISH TRADE POLICY...............................................................73 ESTIMATION TECHNIQUE AND DATA.........................................................................................78 ESTIMATION RESULTS....................................................................................................................80 CONCLUSIONS ..................................................................................................................................83 APPENDIX ..........................................................................................................................................84 Testing Grossman-Helpman model for Israel.................................................... 88 SOME STYLIZED FACTS ON ISRAEL'S TRADE POLICY............................................................88 EMPIRICAL VERIFICATION OF GROSSMAN-HELPMAN MODEL FOR ISRAELI TRADE POLICY................................................................................................................................................98 CHAPTER 3: .............................................................................................................. 103 CAUSES OF CORRUPTION IN MENA COUNTRIES AND THE NEW MEMBER STATES ................................................................................................... 103 INTRODUCTION ..............................................................................................................................103 DEFINING AND MEASURING CORRUPTION.............................................................................104 THE IMPORTANCE OF CORRUPTION .........................................................................................106 CAUSES OF CORRUPTION AND THE “PULL EFFECT” OF THE EU .......................................111 WORKING HYPOTHESES...............................................................................................................115 METHODOLOGY AND DISCUSSION OF THE EMPIRICAL RESULTS....................................117 CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY GUIDANCE..................................................................................120 APPENDIX A: TABLES....................................................................................................................123 APPENDIX B: DEFINITIONS AND SOURCES OF THE VARIABLES........................................127 APPENDIX C: LIST OF COUNTRIES IN THE SAMPLE...............................................................129 BIBLIOGRAPHY....................................................................................................... 131 3
Introduction and summary In the project we compared the depth of trade liberalization and integration with the EU between the MPCs (Mediterranean Partner Countries) 1 and NMS (New Member States) 2 . We analyzed trade implications of preferential arrangements between MPCs and EU in the framework of EUROMED and between Central and East European countries in the frameworks of BAFTA (Baltic Free Trade Area) and CEFTA (Central European Free Trade Area) and so called Europe Agreements. This analysis demonstrated that Europe Agreements and two sub-regional agreements BAFTA and CEFTA have been efficient in promoting bilateral trade among European states. We find that the Europe Agreements as well as BAFTA and CEFTA significantly contributed to increase in both bilateral exports and imports of the CEE countries. In contrast to the NMS the impact of New Association Agreements concluded with the MPCs had been much more limited. We find that while the new Agreements increased significantly imports of the MPCs countries from the EU, they had no impact on their exports to the EU which can be attributed to the asymmetry in trade liberalization between the EU and the MPCs. In particular, liberalization of the EU imports from the MPCs was a gradual process that extended over the last thirty years and there was not much to liberalize in the 1990s while liberalization of the MPCs imports from the EU took place much faster and its scope was much bigger. Differences in growth rates may stem from differences in trading arrangements of these two regions with the EU-15 and institutional factors within these regions. Despite the similar openness ratio, MPCs maintained (with the exception of Israel) considerably higher levels of trade protection in comparison to NMS. Higher levels of protection, causing production and consumption distortions, can slow down the rate of growth of economies. 1 The group MPCs consists of: Algeria, Cyprus, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Malta, Morocco, the Palestinian Authority, Syria, Tunisia and Turkey 2 The group of NMS consists of: Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia and Cyprus and Malta. In our project we analyze only first eight countries. 4
Page 1 and 2: In collaboration with: F E M I S E
Page 3: Table of contents INTRODUCTION AND
Page 7 and 8: that of the NMS, we would observe a
Page 9 and 10: accession to the EU. Instead, a num
Page 11 and 12: trade area (FTA). The Agadir Agreem
Page 13 and 14: liberalization has taken five years
Page 15 and 16: signed Europe Agreements, EFTA and
Page 17 and 18: used as industry organization varia
Page 19 and 20: The main goal of the project was to
Page 21 and 22: Chapter 1: Assessing trade liberali
Page 23 and 24: Agricultural Policy (CAP). Further
Page 25 and 26: Agreements concluded with the MPCs.
Page 27 and 28: n lnTijt = ∑ k= 1 β RTAijt + α1
Page 29 and 30: Preferential trade liberalization i
Page 31 and 32: the EU enlargement, the EFTA lost t
Page 33 and 34: The most important of these was the
Page 35 and 36: The Definitions of the Variables an
Page 37 and 38: Estimates for the whole CEE sample
Page 39 and 40: agreements is, however, mixed. Whil
Page 41 and 42: The OLS estimates suggest that both
Page 43 and 44: Czech Republic Estonia Hungary Lith
Page 45 and 46: Czech Slovak Republic Estonia Hunga
Page 47 and 48: products. The provisions of the Eur
Page 49 and 50: foreseen to take effect in 2005. Ho
Page 51 and 52: Similar to the AMU, the ACC was for
Page 53 and 54: Unfortunately, the data on capital
Page 55 and 56:
Table 2. The estimates for bilatera
Page 57 and 58:
obust, while the dummy variable for
Page 59 and 60:
Yi (partner) 0.944 1.009 2.267 1.96
Page 61 and 62:
Page 63 and 64:
Page 65 and 66:
Agreements on the third countries a
Page 67 and 68:
Chapter 2: Grossman-Helpman Model I
Page 69 and 70:
N function (U ), given by: + ( ) u
Page 71 and 72:
ti 1+ ti xi Ii −α i mi = ⋅ ,
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Probably the most extensive list of
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eginning of 1990. But the tariff st
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The non-preferential (MFN, conventi
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have important impact on political
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xi where ti is the tariff, ei is th
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We can recover the structural param
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Appendix Table 2 Estimation results
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Table 4 Estimation results using mo
Page 89 and 90:
Testing Grossman-Helpman model for
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practice most importers do not pay
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countries were traditionally subjec
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point to notify the US government o
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and between 157% and 247% in 2004.
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policy reforms. On the other hand i
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Table 1 Estimation results for Isra
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1995 0.00202 [2.04]** -0.00199 [2.0
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extended to disaggregation of burea
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The Importance of Corruption A subs
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transition countries. Sekkat and Ve
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society. In addition, they show tha
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Johnson, Kaufmann, McMillan, and Wo
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corruption. For example, upon grant
Page 117 and 118:
and criminal prosecution. On the ot
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estimation are likely to be influen
Page 121 and 122:
levels have been used to derive fur
Page 123 and 124:
Union. In fact, the level of regula
Page 125 and 126:
Table 2 List of the Commonly Raised
Page 127 and 128:
Table 6 Predicted improvement (show
Page 129 and 130:
SB_PR all procedures required to re
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AFGHANISTAN, ALBANIA, ALGERIA, ANGO
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Brunetti, Aymo; Kisunko, Gregory an
Page 135 and 136:
Hines, J.R. (1995). Forbidden Payme
Page 137 and 138:
PellegriniI, Lorenzo and Gerlagh, R
Page 139:
World Bank (2005). Doing Business i
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