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Trade liberalization with other countries In addition to bilateral and plurilateral trade liberalization among the CEE countries these countries also participated in a number of bilateral free trade agreements concluded with other countries located both in the Middle East as well as in South-Eastern Europe (see Table 3). Table 3. Bilateral Free Trade Agreements of the CEE countries with other countries [years in force] Middle East South-Eastern Europe Country Israel Turkey Albania Macedonia Ukraine Estonia FTA FTA [1998-2004] [1996-2004] Latvia FTA [2000-2004] Lithuania FTA [1998-2004] Czech Republic FTA FTA [1997-2004] [1998-2004] Slovakia FTA FTA [1997-2004] [1998-2004] Hungary FTA FTA [1998-2004] [1998-2004] Poland FTA FTA [1998-2004] [2000-2004] Slovenia FTA FTA FTA [1998-2004] [2000-2004] [1996-2004] Romania FTA FTA FTA FTA [2001-2007] [1998-2007] [2004-2007] [2004-2007] Bulgaria FTA FTA FTA FTA [2002-2007] [1999-2007] [2003-2007] [2000-2007] Croatia FTA FTA [2003-present] [2003-present] Most agreements were signed by the CEFTA members with Israel and Turkey in the late 1990s and the early 2000s once these two countries concluded new Association Agreements with the EU. 14 In addition to that the Balkan members of the CEFTA concluded also a number of agreements with neighbouring Balkan countries: Albania and Macedonia. The Baltic states also concluded bilateral free trade agreements with Turkey, and Estonia also a separate agreement with Ukraine. 14 The new EU association agreement with Turkey established a customs union with the EU that entered into force in 1996. 33
The Definitions of the Variables and the Data Sources Our dependent variables used in the estimating equation (1) are bilateral exports and imports of ten CEE countries that joined the EU in the two subsequent waves of enlargement to the East in 2004 and 2007. These include five Central European countries: the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Poland and Slovenia, three North-Eastern European states: Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, and two South-Eastern European countries: Bulgaria and Romania. The trade flows data comes from the single source UN COMTRADE database and is expressed in the constant US dollars in 2000 prices. The sample choice was determined by data availability. The sample covers 195 trading partners of the CEE countries in the period of 1993-2004. 15 This yields a total of approximately 16 thousand observations. Our main explanatory variables include dummy variables indicating the EU Association Agreements as well as dummy variables indicating various intra-CEE bilateral trade and subregional trade agreements discussed in detail in Section 2 that were in force for the time span covered by our sample. In addition to this in our study we control also for potential effects of other preferential trading agreements concluded by the CEE countries. These include bilateral agreements concluded with the EFTA member states, the Mediterranean countries as well as the South Eastern European countries. Moreover, we also control for the potential effects of the EU enlargement in 2004 by including a special dummy variable for the EU-25. Our main control variables derived from the trade theory include two types of variables. The first refers to economic country size measures while the second to the measures of factor proportions. The country size is measured using the data on trading partners’ GDPs expressed in constant 2000 US dollars and evaluated in the PPP terms to assure their cross country comparability. The GDP data comes from the World Development Indicators 2006 (WDI) database compiled and published on a CD-ROM by the World Bank in Washington. 15 The sample choice was determined by data availability. The sample is limited downwards because of the political changes in Central and Eastern Europe related to the collapse of the Soviet Union and the break-up of Yugoslavia in 1992 and the ‘velvet’ divorce between the Czech and Slovak Republics that earlier constituted the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic. 34
Page 1 and 2: In collaboration with: F E M I S E
Page 3 and 4: Table of contents INTRODUCTION AND
Page 5 and 6: Introduction and summary In the pro
Page 7 and 8: that of the NMS, we would observe a
Page 9 and 10: accession to the EU. Instead, a num
Page 11 and 12: trade area (FTA). The Agadir Agreem
Page 13 and 14: liberalization has taken five years
Page 15 and 16: signed Europe Agreements, EFTA and
Page 17 and 18: used as industry organization varia
Page 19 and 20: The main goal of the project was to
Page 21 and 22: Chapter 1: Assessing trade liberali
Page 23 and 24: Agricultural Policy (CAP). Further
Page 25 and 26: Agreements concluded with the MPCs.
Page 27 and 28: n lnTijt = ∑ k= 1 β RTAijt + α1
Page 29 and 30: Preferential trade liberalization i
Page 31 and 32: the EU enlargement, the EFTA lost t
Page 33: The most important of these was the
Page 37 and 38: Estimates for the whole CEE sample
Page 39 and 40: agreements is, however, mixed. Whil
Page 41 and 42: The OLS estimates suggest that both
Page 43 and 44: Czech Republic Estonia Hungary Lith
Page 45 and 46: Czech Slovak Republic Estonia Hunga
Page 47 and 48: products. The provisions of the Eur
Page 49 and 50: foreseen to take effect in 2005. Ho
Page 51 and 52: Similar to the AMU, the ACC was for
Page 53 and 54: Unfortunately, the data on capital
Page 55 and 56: Table 2. The estimates for bilatera
Page 57 and 58: obust, while the dummy variable for
Page 59 and 60: Yi (partner) 0.944 1.009 2.267 1.96
Page 65 and 66: Agreements on the third countries a
Page 67 and 68: Chapter 2: Grossman-Helpman Model I
Page 69 and 70: N function (U ), given by: + ( ) u
Page 71 and 72: ti 1+ ti xi Ii −α i mi = ⋅ ,
Page 73 and 74: Probably the most extensive list of
Page 75 and 76: eginning of 1990. But the tariff st
Page 77 and 78: The non-preferential (MFN, conventi
Page 79 and 80: have important impact on political
Page 81 and 82: xi where ti is the tariff, ei is th
Page 83 and 84: We can recover the structural param
Page 85 and 86:
Appendix Table 2 Estimation results
Page 87 and 88:
Table 4 Estimation results using mo
Page 89 and 90:
Testing Grossman-Helpman model for
Page 91 and 92:
practice most importers do not pay
Page 93 and 94:
countries were traditionally subjec
Page 95 and 96:
point to notify the US government o
Page 97 and 98:
and between 157% and 247% in 2004.
Page 99 and 100:
policy reforms. On the other hand i
Page 101 and 102:
Table 1 Estimation results for Isra
Page 103 and 104:
1995 0.00202 [2.04]** -0.00199 [2.0
Page 105 and 106:
extended to disaggregation of burea
Page 107 and 108:
The Importance of Corruption A subs
Page 109 and 110:
transition countries. Sekkat and Ve
Page 111 and 112:
society. In addition, they show tha
Page 113 and 114:
Johnson, Kaufmann, McMillan, and Wo
Page 115 and 116:
corruption. For example, upon grant
Page 117 and 118:
and criminal prosecution. On the ot
Page 119 and 120:
estimation are likely to be influen
Page 121 and 122:
levels have been used to derive fur
Page 123 and 124:
Union. In fact, the level of regula
Page 125 and 126:
Table 2 List of the Commonly Raised
Page 127 and 128:
Table 6 Predicted improvement (show
Page 129 and 130:
SB_PR all procedures required to re
Page 131 and 132:
AFGHANISTAN, ALBANIA, ALGERIA, ANGO
Page 133 and 134:
Brunetti, Aymo; Kisunko, Gregory an
Page 135 and 136:
Hines, J.R. (1995). Forbidden Payme
Page 137 and 138:
PellegriniI, Lorenzo and Gerlagh, R
Page 139:
World Bank (2005). Doing Business i
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