- Page 1 and 2: In collaboration with: F E M I S E
- Page 3 and 4: Table of contents INTRODUCTION AND
- Page 5 and 6: Introduction and summary In the pro
- Page 7 and 8: that of the NMS, we would observe a
- Page 9 and 10: accession to the EU. Instead, a num
- Page 11 and 12: trade area (FTA). The Agadir Agreem
- Page 13 and 14: liberalization has taken five years
- Page 15 and 16: signed Europe Agreements, EFTA and
- Page 17 and 18: used as industry organization varia
- Page 19 and 20: The main goal of the project was to
- Page 21 and 22: Chapter 1: Assessing trade liberali
- Page 23 and 24: Agricultural Policy (CAP). Further
- Page 25 and 26: Agreements concluded with the MPCs.
- Page 27: n lnTijt = ∑ k= 1 β RTAijt + α1
- Page 31 and 32: the EU enlargement, the EFTA lost t
- Page 33 and 34: The most important of these was the
- Page 35 and 36: The Definitions of the Variables an
- Page 37 and 38: Estimates for the whole CEE sample
- Page 39 and 40: agreements is, however, mixed. Whil
- Page 41 and 42: The OLS estimates suggest that both
- Page 43 and 44: Czech Republic Estonia Hungary Lith
- Page 45 and 46: Czech Slovak Republic Estonia Hunga
- Page 47 and 48: products. The provisions of the Eur
- Page 49 and 50: foreseen to take effect in 2005. Ho
- Page 51 and 52: Similar to the AMU, the ACC was for
- Page 53 and 54: Unfortunately, the data on capital
- Page 55 and 56: Table 2. The estimates for bilatera
- Page 57 and 58: obust, while the dummy variable for
- Page 59 and 60: Yi (partner) 0.944 1.009 2.267 1.96
- Page 61 and 62: Table 4. The estimates for bilatera
- Page 63 and 64: Table 5. The estimates for bilatera
- Page 65 and 66: Agreements on the third countries a
- Page 67 and 68: Chapter 2: Grossman-Helpman Model I
- Page 69 and 70: N function (U ), given by: + ( ) u
- Page 71 and 72: ti 1+ ti xi Ii −α i mi = ⋅ ,
- Page 73 and 74: Probably the most extensive list of
- Page 75 and 76: eginning of 1990. But the tariff st
- Page 77 and 78: The non-preferential (MFN, conventi
- Page 79 and 80:
have important impact on political
- Page 81 and 82:
xi where ti is the tariff, ei is th
- Page 83 and 84:
We can recover the structural param
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Appendix Table 2 Estimation results
- Page 87 and 88:
Table 4 Estimation results using mo
- Page 89 and 90:
Testing Grossman-Helpman model for
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practice most importers do not pay
- Page 93 and 94:
countries were traditionally subjec
- Page 95 and 96:
point to notify the US government o
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and between 157% and 247% in 2004.
- Page 99 and 100:
policy reforms. On the other hand i
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Table 1 Estimation results for Isra
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1995 0.00202 [2.04]** -0.00199 [2.0
- Page 105 and 106:
extended to disaggregation of burea
- Page 107 and 108:
The Importance of Corruption A subs
- Page 109 and 110:
transition countries. Sekkat and Ve
- Page 111 and 112:
society. In addition, they show tha
- Page 113 and 114:
Johnson, Kaufmann, McMillan, and Wo
- Page 115 and 116:
corruption. For example, upon grant
- Page 117 and 118:
and criminal prosecution. On the ot
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estimation are likely to be influen
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levels have been used to derive fur
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Union. In fact, the level of regula
- Page 125 and 126:
Table 2 List of the Commonly Raised
- Page 127 and 128:
Table 6 Predicted improvement (show
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SB_PR all procedures required to re
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AFGHANISTAN, ALBANIA, ALGERIA, ANGO
- Page 133 and 134:
Brunetti, Aymo; Kisunko, Gregory an
- Page 135 and 136:
Hines, J.R. (1995). Forbidden Payme
- Page 137 and 138:
PellegriniI, Lorenzo and Gerlagh, R
- Page 139:
World Bank (2005). Doing Business i