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In collaboration with: F E M I S E
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Table of contents INTRODUCTION AND
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Introduction and summary In the pro
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that of the NMS, we would observe a
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accession to the EU. Instead, a num
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trade area (FTA). The Agadir Agreem
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liberalization has taken five years
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signed Europe Agreements, EFTA and
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used as industry organization varia
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The main goal of the project was to
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Chapter 1: Assessing trade liberali
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Agricultural Policy (CAP). Further
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Agreements concluded with the MPCs.
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n lnTijt = ∑ k= 1 β RTAijt + α1
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Preferential trade liberalization i
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the EU enlargement, the EFTA lost t
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The most important of these was the
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The Definitions of the Variables an
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Estimates for the whole CEE sample
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agreements is, however, mixed. Whil
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The OLS estimates suggest that both
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Czech Republic Estonia Hungary Lith
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Czech Slovak Republic Estonia Hunga
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products. The provisions of the Eur
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foreseen to take effect in 2005. Ho
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Similar to the AMU, the ACC was for
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Unfortunately, the data on capital
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Table 2. The estimates for bilatera
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obust, while the dummy variable for
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Yi (partner) 0.944 1.009 2.267 1.96
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Table 4. The estimates for bilatera
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Table 5. The estimates for bilatera
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Agreements on the third countries a
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Chapter 2: Grossman-Helpman Model I
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N function (U ), given by: + ( ) u
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ti 1+ ti xi Ii −α i mi = ⋅ ,
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Probably the most extensive list of
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eginning of 1990. But the tariff st
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The non-preferential (MFN, conventi
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have important impact on political
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xi where ti is the tariff, ei is th
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We can recover the structural param
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Appendix Table 2 Estimation results
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- Page 91 and 92: practice most importers do not pay
- Page 93 and 94: countries were traditionally subjec
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- Page 99 and 100: policy reforms. On the other hand i
- Page 101 and 102: Table 1 Estimation results for Isra
- Page 103 and 104: 1995 0.00202 [2.04]** -0.00199 [2.0
- Page 105 and 106: extended to disaggregation of burea
- Page 107 and 108: The Importance of Corruption A subs
- Page 109 and 110: transition countries. Sekkat and Ve
- Page 111 and 112: society. In addition, they show tha
- Page 113 and 114: Johnson, Kaufmann, McMillan, and Wo
- Page 115 and 116: corruption. For example, upon grant
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- Page 119 and 120: estimation are likely to be influen
- Page 121 and 122: levels have been used to derive fur
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- Page 125 and 126: Table 2 List of the Commonly Raised
- Page 127 and 128: Table 6 Predicted improvement (show
- Page 129 and 130: SB_PR all procedures required to re
- Page 131 and 132: AFGHANISTAN, ALBANIA, ALGERIA, ANGO
- Page 133 and 134: Brunetti, Aymo; Kisunko, Gregory an
- Page 135 and 136: Hines, J.R. (1995). Forbidden Payme
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