PDF, GB, 139 p., 796 Ko - Femise
PDF, GB, 139 p., 796 Ko - Femise PDF, GB, 139 p., 796 Ko - Femise
Gatti, R. (2004). Explaining Corruption: Are Open Countries Less Corrupt? Journal of International Development 16, 6 851-61. Gerring, J. and S. Thacker (2005). Do Neoliberal Policies Deter Political Corruption?, International Organization, Vol. 59: 233–254. Goczek, Ł. (2006a). Causes of Post-Communist Corruption: an Empirical Study, Paper presented at the WISER 2006 Economic Meeting. Goldberg P. and G. Maggi (1999). Protection for sale: An empirical investigation. American Economic Review 89(5): 1135-1155. Goldberg P. and G. Maggi. (1997). Protection for sale: An empirical investigation. NBER Working paper 5942. Grether J-M, J. De Melo and M. Olarrega (2001). Who Determines Mexican Trade Policy?, Journal of Development Economics, 37, 199-227. Grossman G., and E. Helpman (1994). Protection for sale. American Economic Review 84(4): 833- 50. Guetat, I., (2006). The effects of corruption on growth performance of the MENA countries, Journal of Economics and Finance, Vol. 30, No. 2, pp. 208-21. Gupta, S.; Davoodi, H. and Tiongson, E. (2002). Corruption and the Provision of Health Care and Education Services, in: George T. Abed and Sanjeev Gupta (Ed.): Governance, Corruption, & Economic Performance, International 17 Monetary Fund, Publication Services, Washington, D.C.; pp. 254-279. Gupta, S.; De Mello, L. and Sharan, R. (2001). Corruption and Military Spending, in: European Journal of Political Economy, 17 (4); pp. 749-777. Gupta, Sanjeev; Davoodi, H. and Alonso-Terme, Rosa (2002). Does Corruption Affect Income Inequality and Poverty?, in: George T. Abed and Sanjeev Gupta (Ed.): Governance, Corruption, & Economic Performance, International Monetary Fund, Publication Services, Washington, D.C.; pp. 458-486. Gymiah-Brempong, K. (2002). Corruption, Economic Growth, and Income Inequality in Africa, in: Economics of Governance, 3 (3); pp. 183-209. Habib, Moshin, and Zurawicki.L. (2002). Corruption and Foreign Direct Investment. Journal of International Business Studies 33): 291-307. Hellman, J. S., G. Jones, and D. Kaufmann. (2003). ’Seize the State, Seize the Day’: State Capture, Corruption, and Influence in Transition, Journal of Comparative Economics 31:751-773. Hellman, J. S., G. Jones, D. Kaufmann and M. Schankerman (2000). Measuring governance, corruption and state capture, World Bank Policy Research Working Paper, no. 2312. Herzfeld, T. and Weiss, C. R. (2003). Corruption and Legal (In)effectiveness: an Empirical Investigation, in: European Journal of Political Economy, 19 (3); pp. 621-632. Hillman, A.L. (1982). Declining industries and political-support protectionists motives, American Economic Review, 72, pp 1180-1187. 133
Hines, J.R. (1995). Forbidden Payment: Foreign Bribery and American Business after 1977, National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper, No. 5266, Cambridge MA. HSBC (2004). Israel: Business profile, Second Edition, London, United Kingdom. Hummels, D. and Levinsohn, J. (1995). Monopolistic Competition and International Trade: Reconsidering the Evidence, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 110, 799-836. Islam, A. (2004). Economic Growth and Corruption Evidence from Panel Data, in: Bangladesh Journal of Political Economy, 21 (2); pp. 185-198. Jasiecki K., M. Moleda-Zdziech, and U. Kurczewska. (2000). Lobbing. Sztuka skutecznego wywierania wplywu (Lobbing. The Art of Effective Influence) Dom Wydawniczy ABC, Krakow. Johnson, S, D Kaufman, J. McMillan and C. Woodruff (2000). Why do firms hide? Bribes and unofficial activity after communism, Journal of Public Economics, 76: 495-520. Johnson, S., D. Kaufman, and P. Zoido-Lobaton (1998). Regulatory Discretion and the Unofficial Economy, in: American Economic Review, 88 (2); pp. 387-392. Kaufman D., A. Kraay, and M. Mastruzzi (2006). Governance Matters V: Governance Indicators for 1996-2005. World Bank Policy Research, September. Kaufman, D. (1997). Corruption: The Facts, Foreign Policy, Summer, pp. 114-130. Kierzkowski H., Okolski M., Wellisz S. (eds.). (1993). Stabilization and Structural Adjustment In Poland. Routledge, London. Knack, S. (2006). Measuring Corruption in Eastern Europe and Central Asia: A Critique of the Cross-Country Indicators. World Bank Policy Research Department Working Paper 3968. Knack, S. and Keefer, P. (1995). Institutions and Economic Performance: Cross-Country Test Using Alternative Institutional Measures, in: Economics and Politics, 7 (3); pp. 207-227. Kunicova, J. (2005). Are Presidential Systems More Susceptible to Political Corruption?, Mimeo, Department of Political Science, Yale University, New Haven CT. Kunicova, J. and Rose-Ackerman, S. (2005). Electoral Rules and Constitutional Structures as Constraints on Corruption, British Journal of Political Science, forthcoming. Kurtz, Marcus, and Andrew Shrank (2006). Growth and Governance: Models, Measures, and Mechanism. Journal of Politics 69(2). Kutan, A. and Douglas, T. (2006). Does Corruption Hurt Economic Development? Evidence From Middle Eastern, North African and Latin American Countries, Working Paper. Lambsdorff, J. (1998). An Empirical Investigation of Bribery in International Trade, in: European Journal of Development Research, 10 (1); pp. 40-59. Lambsdorff, Johann Graf (2003). How Corruption Affects Persistent Capital Flows, in: Economics of Governance, 4 (3); pp. 229-243. Lambsdorff, Johann Graf (2005). Consequences and Causes of Corruption –What do We Know from a Cross-Section of Countries? PassauerDiskussionspapiere, Nr. V-34-05 134
- Page 83 and 84: We can recover the structural param
- Page 85 and 86: Appendix Table 2 Estimation results
- Page 87 and 88: Table 4 Estimation results using mo
- Page 89 and 90: Testing Grossman-Helpman model for
- Page 91 and 92: practice most importers do not pay
- Page 93 and 94: countries were traditionally subjec
- Page 95 and 96: point to notify the US government o
- Page 97 and 98: and between 157% and 247% in 2004.
- Page 99 and 100: policy reforms. On the other hand i
- Page 101 and 102: Table 1 Estimation results for Isra
- Page 103 and 104: 1995 0.00202 [2.04]** -0.00199 [2.0
- Page 105 and 106: extended to disaggregation of burea
- Page 107 and 108: The Importance of Corruption A subs
- Page 109 and 110: transition countries. Sekkat and Ve
- Page 111 and 112: society. In addition, they show tha
- Page 113 and 114: Johnson, Kaufmann, McMillan, and Wo
- Page 115 and 116: corruption. For example, upon grant
- Page 117 and 118: and criminal prosecution. On the ot
- Page 119 and 120: estimation are likely to be influen
- Page 121 and 122: levels have been used to derive fur
- Page 123 and 124: Union. In fact, the level of regula
- Page 125 and 126: Table 2 List of the Commonly Raised
- Page 127 and 128: Table 6 Predicted improvement (show
- Page 129 and 130: SB_PR all procedures required to re
- Page 131 and 132: AFGHANISTAN, ALBANIA, ALGERIA, ANGO
- Page 133: Brunetti, Aymo; Kisunko, Gregory an
- Page 137 and 138: PellegriniI, Lorenzo and Gerlagh, R
- Page 139: World Bank (2005). Doing Business i
Hines, J.R. (1995). Forbidden Payment: Foreign Bribery and American Business after 1977, National<br />
Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper, No. 5266, Cambridge MA.<br />
HSBC (2004). Israel: Business profile, Second Edition, London, United Kingdom.<br />
Hummels, D. and Levinsohn, J. (1995). Monopolistic Competition and International Trade:<br />
Reconsidering the Evidence, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 110, 799-836.<br />
Islam, A. (2004). Economic Growth and Corruption Evidence from Panel Data, in: Bangladesh<br />
Journal of Political Economy, 21 (2); pp. 185-198.<br />
Jasiecki K., M. Moleda-Zdziech, and U. Kurczewska. (2000). Lobbing. Sztuka skutecznego<br />
wywierania wplywu (Lobbing. The Art of Effective Influence) Dom Wydawniczy ABC,<br />
Krakow.<br />
Johnson, S, D Kaufman, J. McMillan and C. Woodruff (2000). Why do firms hide? Bribes and<br />
unofficial activity after communism, Journal of Public Economics, 76: 495-520.<br />
Johnson, S., D. Kaufman, and P. Zoido-Lobaton (1998). Regulatory Discretion and the Unofficial<br />
Economy, in: American Economic Review, 88 (2); pp. 387-392.<br />
Kaufman D., A. Kraay, and M. Mastruzzi (2006). Governance Matters V: Governance Indicators for<br />
1996-2005. World Bank Policy Research, September.<br />
Kaufman, D. (1997). Corruption: The Facts, Foreign Policy, Summer, pp. 114-130.<br />
Kierzkowski H., Okolski M., Wellisz S. (eds.). (1993). Stabilization and Structural Adjustment In<br />
Poland. Routledge, London.<br />
Knack, S. (2006). Measuring Corruption in Eastern Europe and Central Asia: A Critique of the<br />
Cross-Country Indicators. World Bank Policy Research Department Working Paper 3968.<br />
Knack, S. and Keefer, P. (1995). Institutions and Economic Performance: Cross-Country Test Using<br />
Alternative Institutional Measures, in: Economics and Politics, 7 (3); pp. 207-227.<br />
Kunicova, J. (2005). Are Presidential Systems More Susceptible to Political Corruption?, Mimeo,<br />
Department of Political Science, Yale University, New Haven CT.<br />
Kunicova, J. and Rose-Ackerman, S. (2005). Electoral Rules and Constitutional Structures as<br />
Constraints on Corruption, British Journal of Political Science, forthcoming.<br />
Kurtz, Marcus, and Andrew Shrank (2006). Growth and Governance: Models, Measures, and<br />
Mechanism. Journal of Politics 69(2).<br />
Kutan, A. and Douglas, T. (2006). Does Corruption Hurt Economic Development? Evidence From<br />
Middle Eastern, North African and Latin American Countries, Working Paper.<br />
Lambsdorff, J. (1998). An Empirical Investigation of Bribery in International Trade, in: European<br />
Journal of Development Research, 10 (1); pp. 40-59.<br />
Lambsdorff, Johann Graf (2003). How Corruption Affects Persistent Capital Flows, in: Economics of<br />
Governance, 4 (3); pp. 229-243.<br />
Lambsdorff, Johann Graf (2005). Consequences and Causes of Corruption –What do We Know from a<br />
Cross-Section of Countries? PassauerDiskussionspapiere, Nr. V-34-05<br />
134
Change language