PDF, GB, 139 p., 796 Ko - Femise

PDF, GB, 139 p., 796 Ko - Femise PDF, GB, 139 p., 796 Ko - Femise

12.10.2013 Views

unpredictable informal ones and are willing to pay more of the latter. In reality, there is a substitution between this two; this reflects the trade-off between costly incorrupt bureaucracy and cheaper incorrupt one. Hence, tested variables may take either negative or positive signs in the estimation, depending on which effect will come out as the stronger one. Methodology and Discussion of the Empirical Results The corruption indexes come not only with a point estimate of corruption in a given country, but also with a standard error precision of the estimate. This additional data was used to produce Weighted Least Squares estimation, where weights are the inverse of the standard error of precision. This approach, proposed first by Treisman (2000) now became a standard in the literature on corruption (Treisman, 2003, Gering and Thacker, 2005, among others). This enables to give more weight to corruption scores that are more reliable in the regression. A novelty in this paper is that Jackknife robust standard errors were used in the estimation. The reason for this is a possibility of heterogeneity and correlated errors in the regression. This is important since corruption indices may be systematically biased. Both the experts and people surveyed on corruption may have consistently biased perceptions. What is not covered in the paper is that there exists a probability of causality bias. In order to tackle this, IV regression could be used, however, there are no examples of good instruments in the literature on corruption as argued by Treisman (2000). It was tested with a trimmed regression whether the results are affected by outliers and the results were consistent with those obtained without trimming. When reading the empirical testing section, it is nevertheless important to bear in mind that empirical research on corruption is still a relatively new field of inquiry. As a result, the econometric methods used in the estimations may seem to be less advanced then the techniques used in applications more original to the core of economic thought. Definitely, more discussion is needed on the subject of proper approach to the estimation of economic linkages of corruption. Initially, the observations are pooled over the three years in the dataset and the model is estimated with Weighted Least Squares (WLS). However, it has been shown that WLS may sometimes suffer from heterogeneity bias in cross-country framework: the results of 117

estimation are likely to be influenced by certain unobserved individual effects. If these effects are correlated with the explanatory variables, which an examination of the WLS residuals supports, this will lead to pooled WLS estimates being biased. To counter this two most commonly employed panel models are employed: the fixed effects model (FEM) and the random effects model (REM). In the FEM, the intercept terms are allowed to vary over the countries, but are held constant over time. REM assumes that the intercepts of individual units are randomly distributed and independent of the explanatory variables. At the outset, the FEM would be expected to fit better to the corruption model context as the panel tracks countries over time and it is not realistic to consider them to be randomly drawn. If this is the case and the unobserved effects are correlated with regressors, the REM estimates will be biased. A shortcoming of the FEM is that some of the variables do not vary much over time (the number of required procedures licenses for example) and their coefficients cannot be estimated as they are dropped in the fixed effects transformation. All of the tested methodologies provided very similar results. Both FEM and REM were estimated and their efficiency compared. The possibility of REM estimates being biased was confirmed by the Hausmann test at 1 percent level, since the null hypothesis that the REM is consistent is rejected. With this result, the REM is shown to suffer from correlation and generate biased estimates. Later, the Breusch-Pagan test was applied to the REM/FEM and compared to the pooled WLS estimator and there were no grounds to reject null hypothesis at 5 % level. This indicates that REM/FEM are less efficient estimators than the pooled WLS. As noted above, even it was likely that WLS and REM would suffer from heterogeneity bias and endogenous explanatory variables respectively; only the latter effect was confirmed to be significant. Therefore, this method was used in the empirical analysis. Table 1 presents results of the pooled WLS regression for 117 countries over three years (2003-2005). The testing started with the two variables set exogenously: the logarithm of GDP per capita and the level of democracy proxied by the political rights variable. This pair of control variables proved to be significant both statistically and in terms of magnitude of influence on the level of corruption, as well as of the correct sign in all of the specifications. Then, dealing with licenses variables were added to the estimation. This topic tracks the procedures, time, and costs to build a warehouse, including obtaining necessary licenses and permits, completing required notifications and inspections, and obtaining utility connections. As 118

estimation are likely to be influenced by certain unobserved individual effects. If these effects<br />

are correlated with the explanatory variables, which an examination of the WLS residuals<br />

supports, this will lead to pooled WLS estimates being biased. To counter this two most<br />

commonly employed panel models are employed: the fixed effects model (FEM) and the<br />

random effects model (REM). In the FEM, the intercept terms are allowed to vary over the<br />

countries, but are held constant over time. REM assumes that the intercepts of individual units<br />

are randomly distributed and independent of the explanatory variables. At the outset, the FEM<br />

would be expected to fit better to the corruption model context as the panel tracks countries<br />

over time and it is not realistic to consider them to be randomly drawn. If this is the case and<br />

the unobserved effects are correlated with regressors, the REM estimates will be biased. A<br />

shortcoming of the FEM is that some of the variables do not vary much over time (the number<br />

of required procedures licenses for example) and their coefficients cannot be estimated as they<br />

are dropped in the fixed effects transformation.<br />

All of the tested methodologies provided very similar results. Both FEM and REM were<br />

estimated and their efficiency compared. The possibility of REM estimates being biased was<br />

confirmed by the Hausmann test at 1 percent level, since the null hypothesis that the REM is<br />

consistent is rejected. With this result, the REM is shown to suffer from correlation and<br />

generate biased estimates. Later, the Breusch-Pagan test was applied to the REM/FEM and<br />

compared to the pooled WLS estimator and there were no grounds to reject null hypothesis at<br />

5 % level. This indicates that REM/FEM are less efficient estimators than the pooled WLS.<br />

As noted above, even it was likely that WLS and REM would suffer from heterogeneity bias<br />

and endogenous explanatory variables respectively; only the latter effect was confirmed to be<br />

significant. Therefore, this method was used in the empirical analysis. Table 1 presents results<br />

of the pooled WLS regression for 117 countries over three years (2003-2005).<br />

The testing started with the two variables set exogenously: the logarithm of GDP per capita<br />

and the level of democracy proxied by the political rights variable. This pair of control<br />

variables proved to be significant both statistically and in terms of magnitude of influence on<br />

the level of corruption, as well as of the correct sign in all of the specifications. Then, dealing<br />

with licenses variables were added to the estimation. This topic tracks the procedures, time,<br />

and costs to build a warehouse, including obtaining necessary licenses and permits,<br />

completing required notifications and inspections, and obtaining utility connections. As<br />

118

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