PDF, GB, 139 p., 796 Ko - Femise
PDF, GB, 139 p., 796 Ko - Femise PDF, GB, 139 p., 796 Ko - Femise
Accession Partnerships is that the political conditions that must be satisfied for countries to enter the EU include fight against corruption. The political conditions that candidate countries must fulfil to be allowed to access were laid down at the Copenhagen European Council in 1993. In each area covered by the document, corruption seems to have major significance. Moreover, the EU-Commission has adopted a requirement of an anti-corruption framework for all candidates. What is more important, the EU was a major force behind de-regulation in the NMS. Therefore, the EU accession process has had a major impact on corruption in candidate states. This can be seen in the Figure 2 where corruption scores of non-EU post communist countries and New Member States are compared. Note that an increase in control of corruption score pertains to an improvement in the level of governance. Figure 2 The “Pull effect” of the EU 0.80 0.60 0.40 0.20 0.00 -0.20 -0.40 -0.60 -0.80 -1.00 1996 1998 2000 2002 2003 2004 2005 non-EU EUaccess 2004 EUaccess 2006 Source: Own calculation based on Control of Corruption Index by Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi (2006). "Governance Matters V: Governance Indicators for 1996-2005". World Bank Policy Research September 2006 In our opinion, the recent accession to the EU required from the NMS to put in place measures that enforce transparency and competition. In MENA countries, there has been a tendency for reforms and economic liberalization programs to lag. This underdevelopment of bureaucratic powers and regulation has created opportunities for rent seeking associated with 113
corruption. For example, upon granting private licenses for providers of mobile phone services, authorities in several countries of the region failed to put in place impartial and effective regulators. One of the consequences, according to Transparency International (2003), were discretionary powers enjoyed by private providers and state officials — an environment conducive to corruption. The MENA countries were not subject to such external influence and pressure as the European Commission had on the NMS. Hence, the position of interest groups within the MPC may allow rent-seeking behaviour through artificial barriers to entry to internal markets and discourage competition, not only among domestic producers but also from foreign exporters. Such constraints impose onerous costs to businesses, which try to make way around them by resorting to corruption. At the same time, corruption itself may reinforce the existence of these barriers and thus perpetuate itself. To the best of our knowledge there does not exist an empirical analysis investigating corruption, focusing either on the MENA countries as a region nor any other study employing the data on business constraints. In fact, even case studies and general studies of the subject of corruption in the MENA region are very rare. Even though, there is an absence of empirical studies, few observers would disagree that the problem of corruption in the region is very heavy. In the historically state socialist countries and present monarchies, despite some level of liberalization and privatization carried out in the past couple of decades, government and bureaucratic officials still have a strong control over the economic environment. They have power over the massive public sector but also have a strong command of the private sector by means of proliferating regulation and delaying bureaucratic decisions (Salem, 2003, UNDP, 2002, and TI 2004). High levels of government control, economic monopolies, and burdensome regulations set the incentives for corruption high. This is coupled with an excessive bureaucratization of public administration and lack of its streamlining and computerization. General inefficiency of the public sector creates incentive for citizens to use corruption as a mean to speed up their transactions with the public sector. Therefore, our goal will be to explain the relationship between corruption and constraints on carrying out business. This will give us the knowledge of root causes of corruption, which is a necessary precondition for successful tackling of the problems associated with it. Our expectation is that corruption is intertwined with regulatory constraints and bureaucratic delays. 114
- Page 63 and 64: Table 5. The estimates for bilatera
- Page 65 and 66: Agreements on the third countries a
- Page 67 and 68: Chapter 2: Grossman-Helpman Model I
- Page 69 and 70: N function (U ), given by: + ( ) u
- Page 71 and 72: ti 1+ ti xi Ii −α i mi = ⋅ ,
- Page 73 and 74: Probably the most extensive list of
- Page 75 and 76: eginning of 1990. But the tariff st
- Page 77 and 78: The non-preferential (MFN, conventi
- Page 79 and 80: have important impact on political
- Page 81 and 82: xi where ti is the tariff, ei is th
- Page 83 and 84: We can recover the structural param
- Page 85 and 86: Appendix Table 2 Estimation results
- Page 87 and 88: Table 4 Estimation results using mo
- Page 89 and 90: Testing Grossman-Helpman model for
- Page 91 and 92: practice most importers do not pay
- Page 93 and 94: countries were traditionally subjec
- Page 95 and 96: point to notify the US government o
- Page 97 and 98: and between 157% and 247% in 2004.
- Page 99 and 100: policy reforms. On the other hand i
- Page 101 and 102: Table 1 Estimation results for Isra
- Page 103 and 104: 1995 0.00202 [2.04]** -0.00199 [2.0
- Page 105 and 106: extended to disaggregation of burea
- Page 107 and 108: The Importance of Corruption A subs
- Page 109 and 110: transition countries. Sekkat and Ve
- Page 111 and 112: society. In addition, they show tha
- Page 113: Johnson, Kaufmann, McMillan, and Wo
- Page 117 and 118: and criminal prosecution. On the ot
- Page 119 and 120: estimation are likely to be influen
- Page 121 and 122: levels have been used to derive fur
- Page 123 and 124: Union. In fact, the level of regula
- Page 125 and 126: Table 2 List of the Commonly Raised
- Page 127 and 128: Table 6 Predicted improvement (show
- Page 129 and 130: SB_PR all procedures required to re
- Page 131 and 132: AFGHANISTAN, ALBANIA, ALGERIA, ANGO
- Page 133 and 134: Brunetti, Aymo; Kisunko, Gregory an
- Page 135 and 136: Hines, J.R. (1995). Forbidden Payme
- Page 137 and 138: PellegriniI, Lorenzo and Gerlagh, R
- Page 139: World Bank (2005). Doing Business i
corruption. For example, upon granting private licenses for providers of mobile phone<br />
services, authorities in several countries of the region failed to put in place impartial and<br />
effective regulators. One of the consequences, according to Transparency International<br />
(2003), were discretionary powers enjoyed by private providers and state officials — an<br />
environment conducive to corruption. The MENA countries were not subject to such external<br />
influence and pressure as the European Commission had on the NMS. Hence, the position of<br />
interest groups within the MPC may allow rent-seeking behaviour through artificial barriers to<br />
entry to internal markets and discourage competition, not only among domestic producers but<br />
also from foreign exporters. Such constraints impose onerous costs to businesses, which try to<br />
make way around them by resorting to corruption. At the same time, corruption itself may<br />
reinforce the existence of these barriers and thus perpetuate itself.<br />
To the best of our knowledge there does not exist an empirical analysis investigating<br />
corruption, focusing either on the MENA countries as a region nor any other study employing<br />
the data on business constraints. In fact, even case studies and general studies of the subject of<br />
corruption in the MENA region are very rare. Even though, there is an absence of empirical<br />
studies, few observers would disagree that the problem of corruption in the region is very<br />
heavy. In the historically state socialist countries and present monarchies, despite some level<br />
of liberalization and privatization carried out in the past couple of decades, government and<br />
bureaucratic officials still have a strong control over the economic environment. They have<br />
power over the massive public sector but also have a strong command of the private sector by<br />
means of proliferating regulation and delaying bureaucratic decisions (Salem, 2003, UNDP,<br />
2002, and TI 2004). High levels of government control, economic monopolies, and<br />
burdensome regulations set the incentives for corruption high. This is coupled with an<br />
excessive bureaucratization of public administration and lack of its streamlining and<br />
computerization. General inefficiency of the public sector creates incentive for citizens to use<br />
corruption as a mean to speed up their transactions with the public sector. Therefore, our goal<br />
will be to explain the relationship between corruption and constraints on carrying out<br />
business. This will give us the knowledge of root causes of corruption, which is a necessary<br />
precondition for successful tackling of the problems associated with it. Our expectation is that<br />
corruption is intertwined with regulatory constraints and bureaucratic delays.<br />
114
Change language