PDF, GB, 139 p., 796 Ko - Femise

More documents

Recommendations

Info

ejected in most of the cases for export intensity. We may think that good, at least to some extent, results for export intensity specification suggest that the export-oriented sectors may be specifically promoted by government policy in Israel. On the other hand, we may not draw any credible conclusions about the other specifications of industry organization. On the whole, we may find only weak support for the Grossman-Helpman model as for the Israeli trade policy. In addition, the model performs significantly worse for Israel than for Poland. We also made the same regressions for MFN duties, for which results are shown in Table 2. They do not provide support for Grossman-Helpman model either. The best results are obtained for export intensity proxy of industry organization. The parameters have correct signs and are statistically significant for the panel and for year 1995. However, the values of the structural parameters ( α L and β ) are not consistent with the findings of the theoretical model. Table 2 Estimation results for Israeli MFN-duties Periods X/M I*X/M(concentration) Obs. alpha_l Beta Beta=1 p-val All -0.00137 [2.09]** 0.00107 [1.45] 232 1.28 0.99893 2.09 0.15 1995 -0.00236 [1.78]* 0.00244 [1.85]* 58 0.97 0.99756 3.42 0.07 1999 -0.00248 [2.50]** 0.00037 [0.21] 58 6.70 0.99963 0.04 0.84 2002 -0.00073 [0.57] -0.00159 [0.71] 58 -0.46 1.00160 0.50 0.48 2003 -0.00148 [1.72]* -0.00044 [0.21] 58 -3.35 1.00044 0.04 0.83 Periods X/M I*X/M(exp. Intensity) Obs. alpha_l Beta Beta=1 p-val All -0.00038 [1.09] 0.00148 [3.25]*** 232 0.25 0.99852 10.59 0.00 1995 0.00006 [1.11] 0.00134 [3.55]*** 58 -0.04 0.99866 12.61 0.00 1999 -0.00230 [1.22] 0.00323 [1.85]* 58 0.71 0.99678 3.43 0.07 2002 -0.00347 [1.23] 0.00350 [1.37] 58 0.99 0.99650 1.87 0.18 2003 -0.00233 [0.94] 0.00268 [1.21] 58 0.87 0.99732 1.46 0.23 Periods X/M I*X/M(intra industry trade) Obs. alpha_l Beta Beta=1 p-val All -0.00147 [3.47]*** 0.00137 [3.03]*** 232 1.07 0.99863 9.15 0.00 101
1995 0.00202 [2.04]** -0.00199 [2.00]* 58 1.02 1.00199 4.02 0.05 1999 -0.00210 [3.19]*** -0.00100 [0.42] 58 -2.10 1.00101 0.18 0.67 2002 -0.00217 [2.51]** 0.00093 [0.37] 58 2.34 0.99907 0.14 0.71 2003 -0.00361 [3.87]*** 0.00368 [2.97]*** 58 0.98 0.99632 8.87 0.00 Periods X/M I*X/M(invest/L) Obs. alpha_l Beta Beta=1 p-val All 0.00049 [1.46] -0.00086 [1.69]* 232 0.57 1.00086 2.84 0.09 1995 0.00004 [0.04] 0.00004 [0.04] 58 -1.15 0.99996 0.00 0.97 1999 0.00036 [0.49] -0.00307 [1.40] 58 0.12 1.00307 1.95 0.17 2002 -0.00003 [0.05] -0.00401 [1.41] 58 -0.01 1.00403 1.96 0.17 2003 -0.00008 [0.18] -0.00509 [1.78]* 58 -0.02 1.00511 3.14 0.08 Robust t statistics in brackets * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% One possible reason for these disappointing results may be the limited data availability on capital and subsidies 57 . Another may come from the specific profile of Israeli trade policy. The estimations are performed on tariff data, while the protection may exist in many forms of non-tariff measures (licences, kosher laws, as mentioned in the trade policy review). This type of trade restrictions were not included in our database. Therefore we may not find plausible interpretation of the results for the influence of the lobbies on Israeli trade policy schedules. The last possible and the most optimistic explanation is that the Israeli industries were not well organized or sufficiently efficient in lobbing for their sectoral interests. As a result, the government was able to follow fairly liberal trade policy increasing welfare of the whole society. 57 The most recent data on capital stock could be obtained only for 1.1.1992. The 90’s, however, were marked by a rapid economic growth, significant industrial changes (both in organization and technology), therefore this data could not be used as an estimator. 102
Page 1 and 2:
In collaboration with: F E M I S E
Page 3 and 4:
Table of contents INTRODUCTION AND
Page 5 and 6:
Introduction and summary In the pro
Page 7 and 8:
that of the NMS, we would observe a
Page 9 and 10:
accession to the EU. Instead, a num
Page 11 and 12:
trade area (FTA). The Agadir Agreem
Page 13 and 14:
liberalization has taken five years
Page 15 and 16:
signed Europe Agreements, EFTA and
Page 17 and 18:
used as industry organization varia
Page 19 and 20:
The main goal of the project was to
Page 21 and 22:
Chapter 1: Assessing trade liberali
Page 23 and 24:
Agricultural Policy (CAP). Further
Page 25 and 26:
Agreements concluded with the MPCs.
Page 27 and 28:
n lnTijt = ∑ k= 1 β RTAijt + α1
Page 29 and 30:
Preferential trade liberalization i
Page 31 and 32:
the EU enlargement, the EFTA lost t
Page 33 and 34:
The most important of these was the
Page 35 and 36:
The Definitions of the Variables an
Page 37 and 38:
Estimates for the whole CEE sample
Page 39 and 40:
agreements is, however, mixed. Whil
Page 41 and 42:
The OLS estimates suggest that both
Page 43 and 44:
Czech Republic Estonia Hungary Lith
Page 45 and 46:
Czech Slovak Republic Estonia Hunga
Page 47 and 48:
products. The provisions of the Eur
Page 49 and 50:
foreseen to take effect in 2005. Ho
Page 51 and 52: Similar to the AMU, the ACC was for
Page 53 and 54: Unfortunately, the data on capital
Page 55 and 56: Table 2. The estimates for bilatera
Page 57 and 58: obust, while the dummy variable for
Page 59 and 60: Yi (partner) 0.944 1.009 2.267 1.96
Page 65 and 66: Agreements on the third countries a
Page 67 and 68: Chapter 2: Grossman-Helpman Model I
Page 69 and 70: N function (U ), given by: + ( ) u
Page 71 and 72: ti 1+ ti xi Ii −α i mi = ⋅ ,
Page 73 and 74: Probably the most extensive list of
Page 75 and 76: eginning of 1990. But the tariff st
Page 77 and 78: The non-preferential (MFN, conventi
Page 79 and 80: have important impact on political
Page 81 and 82: xi where ti is the tariff, ei is th
Page 83 and 84: We can recover the structural param
Page 85 and 86: Appendix Table 2 Estimation results
Page 87 and 88: Table 4 Estimation results using mo
Page 89 and 90: Testing Grossman-Helpman model for
Page 91 and 92: practice most importers do not pay
Page 93 and 94: countries were traditionally subjec
Page 95 and 96: point to notify the US government o
Page 97 and 98: and between 157% and 247% in 2004.
Page 99 and 100: policy reforms. On the other hand i
Page 101: Table 1 Estimation results for Isra
Page 105 and 106: extended to disaggregation of burea
Page 107 and 108: The Importance of Corruption A subs
Page 109 and 110: transition countries. Sekkat and Ve
Page 111 and 112: society. In addition, they show tha
Page 113 and 114: Johnson, Kaufmann, McMillan, and Wo
Page 115 and 116: corruption. For example, upon grant
Page 117 and 118: and criminal prosecution. On the ot
Page 119 and 120: estimation are likely to be influen
Page 121 and 122: levels have been used to derive fur
Page 123 and 124: Union. In fact, the level of regula
Page 125 and 126: Table 2 List of the Commonly Raised
Page 127 and 128: Table 6 Predicted improvement (show
Page 129 and 130: SB_PR all procedures required to re
Page 131 and 132: AFGHANISTAN, ALBANIA, ALGERIA, ANGO
Page 133 and 134: Brunetti, Aymo; Kisunko, Gregory an
Page 135 and 136: Hines, J.R. (1995). Forbidden Payme
Page 137 and 138: PellegriniI, Lorenzo and Gerlagh, R
Page 139: World Bank (2005). Doing Business i
show all

PDF, GB, 139 p., 796 Ko - Femise

Create successful ePaper yourself

Delete template?

Save as template?