PDF, GB, 139 p., 796 Ko - Femise
PDF, GB, 139 p., 796 Ko - Femise PDF, GB, 139 p., 796 Ko - Femise
ti xi xi ei = γ + δI + εi 1+ t m m i i i xi where, ti is the tariff, ei is the elasticity of import demand, is the inverse penetration ratio, I m is the industry organization dummy, εi and μ i are error terms. This is the same equation, as the equation (6) in the case of Poland. However, the proxies used for industry organization are different for Israel: (i) the concentration index (proxied by the ratio of sales of the four largest establishments to total sales of the industry), (ii) export intensity, (iii) intra-industry trade index and (iv) investment-labour ratio. We set the I dummy to one whenever the variable in question exceeded the average across industries. We used the Grubel-Lloyd index of intraindustry trade as industries seeking protection, with lower intra-industry trade, will find their task harder if they have to counter not only consumer dissatisfaction, but also producers who purchase their goods as intermediates (Marvel and Ray, 1983). The model was estimated by OLS, for the years 1995, 1999 and 2002-2003. Two types of duties were considered: effectively applied tariffs and MFN tariffs. For any product, effectively applied duty considers the preferential tariff if there is any, otherwise it takes the MFN applied tariff 55 . In case of year 1995, tariffs applied in 1993 were used as a proxy for tariffs applied in 1995. The data on production, investment, labour and concentration come from the Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics. The relevant data was converted to US dollars according to the average annual exchange rate and then deflated by overall PPI using 2000 as a base year. The trade data is taken from COMTRADE. The elasticity of import demand for all sectors is set to -1 56 . The final dataset includes 58 NACE rev. 1.1 3 digit sectors. In Table 1 below we present the results of regression for effectively applied tariffs. The results of the estimation for the MFN tariffs are similar and we present them in Table 2. 55 This definition and the tariffs data come from The World Integrated Trade Solution (WITS) database. 56 The data on import demand elasticities were unavailable for Israel. The study often used in the literature is Shiells, Stern and Deardorff (1986). However, since not only it provides elasticities for a different economy and period but also uses SITC 3-digit classification, we have decided to set the elasticity of import demand for all sectors at -1. 99 i
Table 1 Estimation results for Israeli effectively applied duties Periods X/M I*X/M(concentration) Obs. alpha_l Beta Beta=1 p-val All -0.00117 [1.87]* 0.00088 [1.24] 232 1.33 0.99912 1.53 0.22 1995 -0.00233 [1.73]* 0.00239 [1.78]* 58 0.97 0.99761 3.18 0.08 1999 -0.00194 [1.58] -0.00006 [0.03] 58 -31.37 1.00006 0.00 0.97 2002 -0.00073 [0.57] -0.00159 [0.71] 58 -0.46 1.00159 0.50 0.48 2003 -0.00148 [1.72]* -0.00044 [0.21] 58 -3.35 1.00044 0.04 0.83 Periods X/M I*X/M(exp. intensity) Obs. alpha_l Beta Beta=1 p-val All -0.00036 [1.09] 0.00123 [2.76]*** 232 0.29 0.99877 7.62 0.01 1995 0.00004 [0.84] 0.00117 [3.01]*** 58 -0.04 0.99883 9.08 0.00 1999 -0.00212 [1.10] 0.00230 [1.40] 58 0.92 0.99770 1.95 0.17 2002 -0.00347 [1.23] 0.00350 [1.37] 58 0.99 0.99650 1.87 0.18 2003 -0.00233 [0.94] 0.00268 [1.21] 58 0.87 0.99733 1.46 0.23 Periods X/M I*X/M(intra industry trade) Obs. alpha_l Beta Beta=1 p-val All -0.00139 [3.33]*** 0.00128 [2.88]*** 232 1.08 0.99872 8.28 0.00 1995 0.00190 [1.88]* -0.00188 [1.85]* 58 1.01 1.00188 3.44 0.07 1999 -0.00199 [3.45]*** -0.00057 [0.28] 58 -3.48 1.00057 0.08 0.78 2002 -0.00217 [2.51]** 0.00093 [0.37] 58 2.34 0.99907 0.14 0.71 2003 -0.00361 [3.87]*** 0.00368 [2.97]*** 58 0.98 0.99632 8.88 0.00 Periods X/M I*X/M(invest/L) Obs. alpha_l Beta Beta=1 p-val All 0.00038 [1.15] -0.00073 [1.48] 232 0.51 1.00073 2.18 0.14 1995 0.00011 [0.11] -0.00004 [0.04] 58 2.47 1.00004 0.00 0.97 1999 -0.00024 [0.31] -0.00217 [0.97] 58 -0.11 1.00218 0.94 0.34 2002 -0.00003 [0.05] -0.00401 [1.41] 58 -0.01 1.00402 1.96 0.17 2003 -0.00008 [0.18] -0.00509 [1.78]* 58 -0.02 1.00511 3.14 0.08 Robust t statistics in brackets * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% The Grossman-Helpman model hardly finds support in the data in the cases in which industry organization is proxied by concentration and investment-labour ratio. The estimated parameters usually have incorrect signs and are statistically insignificant. The signs of the parameter estimates are correct only for export intensity and for intra-industry trade in most of the cases. However, the last specification gives unsatisfactory results as far as other tests as concerned. Therefore we focus only on export intensity specification of lobbies organization, where the results are at least in part consistent with the theoretical model. The hypothesis requiring γ + δ > 0 , is supported in all of the cases for the export intensity specification. The estimated parameters are of expected signs, however the parameters are statistically significant only in case of the total panel and in year 1995. Considering the structural parameters ( α L and β ) of the Grossman-Helpman model, they are almost always within the [0,1] for the export intensity variable. In addition, the null hypothesis that β =1 is 100
- Page 49 and 50: foreseen to take effect in 2005. Ho
- Page 51 and 52: Similar to the AMU, the ACC was for
- Page 53 and 54: Unfortunately, the data on capital
- Page 55 and 56: Table 2. The estimates for bilatera
- Page 57 and 58: obust, while the dummy variable for
- Page 59 and 60: Yi (partner) 0.944 1.009 2.267 1.96
- Page 61 and 62: Table 4. The estimates for bilatera
- Page 63 and 64: Table 5. The estimates for bilatera
- Page 65 and 66: Agreements on the third countries a
- Page 67 and 68: Chapter 2: Grossman-Helpman Model I
- Page 69 and 70: N function (U ), given by: + ( ) u
- Page 71 and 72: ti 1+ ti xi Ii −α i mi = ⋅ ,
- Page 73 and 74: Probably the most extensive list of
- Page 75 and 76: eginning of 1990. But the tariff st
- Page 77 and 78: The non-preferential (MFN, conventi
- Page 79 and 80: have important impact on political
- Page 81 and 82: xi where ti is the tariff, ei is th
- Page 83 and 84: We can recover the structural param
- Page 85 and 86: Appendix Table 2 Estimation results
- Page 87 and 88: Table 4 Estimation results using mo
- Page 89 and 90: Testing Grossman-Helpman model for
- Page 91 and 92: practice most importers do not pay
- Page 93 and 94: countries were traditionally subjec
- Page 95 and 96: point to notify the US government o
- Page 97 and 98: and between 157% and 247% in 2004.
- Page 99: policy reforms. On the other hand i
- Page 103 and 104: 1995 0.00202 [2.04]** -0.00199 [2.0
- Page 105 and 106: extended to disaggregation of burea
- Page 107 and 108: The Importance of Corruption A subs
- Page 109 and 110: transition countries. Sekkat and Ve
- Page 111 and 112: society. In addition, they show tha
- Page 113 and 114: Johnson, Kaufmann, McMillan, and Wo
- Page 115 and 116: corruption. For example, upon grant
- Page 117 and 118: and criminal prosecution. On the ot
- Page 119 and 120: estimation are likely to be influen
- Page 121 and 122: levels have been used to derive fur
- Page 123 and 124: Union. In fact, the level of regula
- Page 125 and 126: Table 2 List of the Commonly Raised
- Page 127 and 128: Table 6 Predicted improvement (show
- Page 129 and 130: SB_PR all procedures required to re
- Page 131 and 132: AFGHANISTAN, ALBANIA, ALGERIA, ANGO
- Page 133 and 134: Brunetti, Aymo; Kisunko, Gregory an
- Page 135 and 136: Hines, J.R. (1995). Forbidden Payme
- Page 137 and 138: PellegriniI, Lorenzo and Gerlagh, R
- Page 139: World Bank (2005). Doing Business i
Table 1 Estimation results for Israeli effectively applied duties<br />
Periods X/M I*X/M(concentration) Obs. alpha_l Beta Beta=1 p-val<br />
All -0.00117 [1.87]* 0.00088 [1.24] 232 1.33 0.99912 1.53 0.22<br />
1995 -0.00233 [1.73]* 0.00239 [1.78]* 58 0.97 0.99761 3.18 0.08<br />
1999 -0.00194 [1.58] -0.00006 [0.03] 58 -31.37 1.00006 0.00 0.97<br />
2002 -0.00073 [0.57] -0.00159 [0.71] 58 -0.46 1.00159 0.50 0.48<br />
2003 -0.00148 [1.72]* -0.00044 [0.21] 58 -3.35 1.00044 0.04 0.83<br />
Periods X/M I*X/M(exp. intensity) Obs. alpha_l Beta Beta=1 p-val<br />
All -0.00036 [1.09] 0.00123 [2.76]*** 232 0.29 0.99877 7.62 0.01<br />
1995 0.00004 [0.84] 0.00117 [3.01]*** 58 -0.04 0.99883 9.08 0.00<br />
1999 -0.00212 [1.10] 0.00230 [1.40] 58 0.92 0.99770 1.95 0.17<br />
2002 -0.00347 [1.23] 0.00350 [1.37] 58 0.99 0.99650 1.87 0.18<br />
2003 -0.00233 [0.94] 0.00268 [1.21] 58 0.87 0.99733 1.46 0.23<br />
Periods X/M I*X/M(intra industry trade) Obs. alpha_l Beta Beta=1 p-val<br />
All -0.00<strong>139</strong> [3.33]*** 0.00128 [2.88]*** 232 1.08 0.99872 8.28 0.00<br />
1995 0.00190 [1.88]* -0.00188 [1.85]* 58 1.01 1.00188 3.44 0.07<br />
1999 -0.00199 [3.45]*** -0.00057 [0.28] 58 -3.48 1.00057 0.08 0.78<br />
2002 -0.00217 [2.51]** 0.00093 [0.37] 58 2.34 0.99907 0.14 0.71<br />
2003 -0.00361 [3.87]*** 0.00368 [2.97]*** 58 0.98 0.99632 8.88 0.00<br />
Periods X/M I*X/M(invest/L) Obs. alpha_l Beta Beta=1 p-val<br />
All 0.00038 [1.15] -0.00073 [1.48] 232 0.51 1.00073 2.18 0.14<br />
1995 0.00011 [0.11] -0.00004 [0.04] 58 2.47 1.00004 0.00 0.97<br />
1999 -0.00024 [0.31] -0.00217 [0.97] 58 -0.11 1.00218 0.94 0.34<br />
2002 -0.00003 [0.05] -0.00401 [1.41] 58 -0.01 1.00402 1.96 0.17<br />
2003 -0.00008 [0.18] -0.00509 [1.78]* 58 -0.02 1.00511 3.14 0.08<br />
Robust t statistics in brackets<br />
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%<br />
The Grossman-Helpman model hardly finds support in the data in the cases in which industry<br />
organization is proxied by concentration and investment-labour ratio. The estimated<br />
parameters usually have incorrect signs and are statistically insignificant. The signs of the<br />
parameter estimates are correct only for export intensity and for intra-industry trade in most of<br />
the cases. However, the last specification gives unsatisfactory results as far as other tests as<br />
concerned. Therefore we focus only on export intensity specification of lobbies organization,<br />
where the results are at least in part consistent with the theoretical model.<br />
The hypothesis requiring γ + δ > 0 , is supported in all of the cases for the export intensity<br />
specification. The estimated parameters are of expected signs, however the parameters are<br />
statistically significant only in case of the total panel and in year 1995. Considering the<br />
structural parameters ( α L and β ) of the Grossman-Helpman model, they are almost always<br />
within the [0,1] for the export intensity variable. In addition, the null hypothesis that β =1 is<br />
100
Change language